Indonesian Religious Communities in Europe: The Nahdlatul Ulama and Other Muslim Groups in Search of Influence

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Leiden, 23 September 2019

Contents

Chapter 1
Introduction

Background

The Nahdlatul Ulama (the NU) is a traditionalist Sunni Islam organization in Indonesia. It is by far the largest Islamic organization in the country, with approximately forty to fifty million followers (Nakamura 1983; Feillard 1999; Mujani and Liddle 2004, p. 111). It is in fact often said that the NU is probably the world's largest Islamic organization (Feillard 2013, p. 558; Van Bruinessen 2013, p. 21). The organization was founded on 31 January 1926 in Surabaya by a number of renowned *kiai* (religious leaders/teachers). The NU sees its function as being the guardian of sacred tradition by maintaining the four *madhhab* (schools of Islamic law) teachings, although it is the Shafi'i that has been predominantly embraced by Indonesian Muslims (Boland 1982, p. 11; Feillard 1999, p. 13).

Between 1950s and 1970s, the NU faced fierce religious-ideological competitions with the reformist/modernist Muhammadiyah. In post-New Order, the organization has competed with Islamist and other Middle Eastern-influenced Muslim associations, such as the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the Indonesian chapter of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HTI), the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), the Indonesian Council of Jihad Warriors (MMI), and the Indonesian Council of Islamic Propagation (DDII) in terms of Islamic movement, ideologies, *dakwah* (religious dissemination) activities, and other socio-political facets. The NU commonly represents the traditionalist cohort, while the other groups are associated with trans-national networks of Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi movement. The latter has made significant manoeuvres to broaden their scope and spread their influence

among the constituency of the NU and other organizations, such as Muhammadiyah, and has challenged these larger organizations over their control of mosques, schools, and other institutions. While in post-authoritarian Indonesia the NU has openly expressed their support for the unity of the Indonesian state, the HTI and the Salafi movement have rejected the very idea of the nation as a legitimate entity or have attempted to transform Indonesia to an Islamic state.

Meanwhile, Islam in the West, particularly in Europe, has been seen as a spectre haunting the continent. With rapid widespread and invigorating fear, suspicion, and hostility toward Islam, it is not surprising that these feelings have been turned upon Muslim populations across Europe (Goody 2004, pp. 1-2; Vertovec and Peach 1997, p. 4).

Today, one of the most widespread issues that has given rise to a heated debate in Europe relates to the continent's complex relationship with its large Muslim minorities largely comprising migrants from North Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Turkey and beyond (Sofos and Tsagarousianou 2013, p. 2). Now Islam poses the challenge of how to manage the European public sphere and life at the local, national, and regional levels while accommodating the political, social, cultural, and economic needs of all Europeans (Aykaç 2012, p. 2). Islam in Europe is in a state of flux, but so is religion in general in Europe, and it is useful to recognize how these two dimensions affect one another: understanding, in other words, how European policies impact upon Muslim communities, but also how activities and thoughts of Muslim individuals and groups influence changing conceptions and policy considerations on the place of religion in the European public sphere (Fokas 2007, p. 3).

Germany and the Netherlands are among the countries in Europe which have been facing complex encounters with Islam. In Germany, it was mainly Muslim immigrants who arrived during the 1960s under the so-called "guest worker" agreements who founded Islamic associations and practiced their religion in public. Their focus of activities ranges from the religious to the political sphere (Rosenow-Williams 2012, p. 1). In the Netherlands, the process of institutionalization of Islam reached a bold stage when mosques were established in about hundreds of Dutch towns in 1980s. On the national level, there were two processes progressing simultaneously: the

concerted efforts to create a common platform for all Muslim organizations, and the establishment of rival federations of mosques and organizations, based on discrete ethnic communities (Landman 1997, p. 226).

Despite their negative labelling, these substantial minorities have important social and political implications for the respective societies, particularly as the communities are made up of recent immigrants who differ not only in their religion but in other cultural aspects (Goody 2004, p. 11). However, various forms of socio-economic, political, and physical exclusion and failure also abound. Such forms of exclusion have largely been responsible for producing conditions of serious expropriation rampant throughout the Muslim populations across Europe (Vertovec and Peach 1997, p. 5).

As many Muslim groups have increasingly organized themselves effectively to engage with local administrations, local populations, and other areas of the public domain, they have voiced their concerns by broadening their agendas to address an ever wider set of socio-political spheres. These include the freedom to exercise religious observances, the establishment of various Islamic organizations, and the gaining of political representation. These spheres are themselves conditioned by evolving contextual considerations including national political discourses (for instance 'pillarization' in the Netherlands and federalism in Germany) (Vertovec and Peach 1997, pp. 22-23).

Indonesian Muslims in Europe have also experienced such circumstances. As Indonesia's largest Islamic organization, the NU has expanded their scope and networks by establishing its special branches (Pengurus Cabang Istimewa NU – PCI NU) across the globe. In Germany, the special branch was established in 2011, while in the Netherlands it was established in 2013. Both special branches have been founded, organized, managed, led, and dominated by Indonesian students pursuing their M.A. and Ph.D. degrees, although recently many Indonesian migrants who have long resided in both countries also joined and influenced the organization. Meanwhile, the Indonesian Islamist associations, such as the PKS, the DDII, and the HTI also spread their influence in Europe through, mostly, students pursuing post-graduate degrees as well as other diaspora. Although in Europe they are less organized than the NU, through committed individuals, their activities

and influence have continuously challenged the NU in terms of religious and political ideologies, Islamic observances, and other socio-political facets similar to the situation in the home country. Therefore, it is argued here that the NU through its special branches and the Islamist associations through individuals, officially or non-officially represent the PKS, the HTI, the DDII, and other Islamist groups, have expanded their rivalries, tensions, as well as compromises overseas. It is the objective of this research project that seeks to investigate how Indonesian religious communities in Europe, particularly in Germany and the Netherlands, are extending their networks and seeking influence and at the same time competing and also compromising with each other. In doing so, we will be working with Prof. Henk Schulte Nordholt, Professor of Indonesian History at Leiden University and Head of Research KITLV the Netherlands, as our research collaborator/associate. Prof. Schulte Nordholt has officially invited us to become affiliated fellows at KITLV, and has offered us office facilities at the institution and access to the Leiden University remarkable collections on Indonesian and Islamic studies. In Germany, Prof. Birgitt Röttger-Rössler, Professor of Social and Cultural Anthropology at Freie University Berlin, has also officially invited us to conduct research at Freie University Berlin and to explore the university's rich collections on Islamic studies. It thus means that we have two reputable institutions and two prominent professors supporting our research project in Europe. Furthermore, we have also identified key informants who represent the NU and other groups from our own previous visit to both countires in 2017 and 2018.

Research Questions

In response to the objective, this research project seeks to answer four main questions:

1. What kinds of rivalries, tensions, as well as compromises do the NU and Islamist associations engage in Europe?
2. How have expressions of traditional Islam and Islamism been used in everyday life abroad?
3. How do these groups extend their networks and seek influence overseas?

4. To what extent have the rivalries, tensions, as well as compromises affected the developments and dynamics of Muslim politics in Indonesia and vice versa?

By answering the questions, this project may further our interest in the trans-national linkages of Indonesian religious communities overseas and is also expected to become a preliminary research of broader unexplored topics: to what extent has the life of Indonesian Muslims overseas affected the developments and dynamics of Islam in their country of residence and vice versa? How have they contributed to wider issues in their country of residence, such as radicalism, terrorism, secularism, and liberalism? What can this tell us about the role of Indonesian Muslims in shaping the face of Islam in their country of residence in coming years?

Statement of Aims

This project aims to explore the complex and multi-layered landscape of the entanglement between the NU's special branches in Germany and the Netherlands and Indonesia's Islamist groups in an effort to outline the emerging interdisciplinary collaboration between religious studies, anthropology, and political science, and provides an informed understanding of the socio-political dimension of Indonesian Islam's religious networks in Europe. By investigating the interplay between religion, culture, and politics, this project is expected to show a display of various socio-political expressions of Islam from the world's largest Muslim country in shaping and characterizing Islam in Europe. The outcome of this project is expected to be published as a paper in a reputable and Scopus-indexed journal, such as *Islamic Law and Society*, *Contemporary Islam*, *Studia Islamica*, or *Die Welt des Islams*.

The wider aims are:

1. To initiate a new research project which is a continuation of this project that deals with the developments of new waves of the dissemination of Indonesian Islam worldwide, particularly in the United States and Australia.

2. To improve our academic skills in teaching and learning, research, and community service that will be useful for us, our university, and the Ministry of Religious Affairs in general.
3. To create networks with world's major reputable universities and research institutions.

Previous Studies

To the best of our knowledge, there has been neither single book nor article, either in English or in Indonesian, dealing with Indonesian religious communities in the West, particularly Europe. Therefore, the outcome of this project could be an important and main source to consult on subjects of Indonesian Islam overseas. There are, however, recent important articles and books on Islam in Europe:

1. Aykaç, Çagla E. and Hakan Yilmaz (eds.). 2012. *Perceptions of Islam in Europe: Culture, Identity and the Muslim 'Other'*. London: I.B. Tauris.
2. Al-Azmeh, Aziz and Effie Fokas (eds.), 2007. *Islam in Europe: Diversity, Identity and Influence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3. Goody, Jack. 2004. *Islam in Europe*. Cambridge: Polity.
4. Vertovec, Steven and Ceri Peach (eds.). 1997. *Islam in Europe: The Politics of Religion and Community*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
5. Rosenow-Williams, Kerstin. 2012. *Organizing Muslims and Integrating Islam in Germany: New Developments in the 21st Century*. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
6. Sofos, Spyros A. and Roza Tsagarousianou. 2013. *Islam in Europe: Public Spaces and Civil Networks*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

The NU:

1. Feillard, Andrée. 1999. *NU vis-à-vis Negara: Pencarian Isi, Bentuk dan Makna*. Yogyakarta: LKiS.
2. Feillard, Andrée. 2013. 'Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia', in John L. Esposito and Emad el-Din Shahin (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics*, pp. 558-573. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

3. Bruinessen, Martin van. 1994. *NU, Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa, Pencarian Wacana Baru*. Yogyakarta: LKiS.
4. Anam, Choirul. 1985. *Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan Nahdlatul Ulama*. Sala: Jatayu.
5. Barton, Greg and Greg Fealy (eds.). 1996. *Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia*. Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, Monash University.
6. Bush, Robin. 2009. *Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power within Islam and Politics in Indonesia*. Singapore: ISEAS.

Indonesians abroad:

1. Hewett, Rosalind Hewett. 2015. "Children of Decolonisation". *Indonesia and the Malay World* 43, no. 126: 191-206.
2. Ryad, Umar. 2012. "Among the Believers in the Land of the Colonizer: Mohammed Ali van Beetem's Role Among the Indonesian Community in the Netherlands in the Interwar Period". *Journal of Religion in Europe* 5: 273–310.
3. Kitamura, Yumi. 2017. "Long Way Home: The Life History of Chinese-Indonesian Migrants in the Netherlands. *Wacana* 18, no. 1: 24-37.
4. Tjiook-Liem, Patricia. 2017. "The Chinese from Indonesia in the Netherlands and Their Heritage: Chinese Indonesian Heritage Center (CIHC)". *Wacana* 18, no. 1: 1-23.
5. Stutje, Klaas. 2015. "The Complex World of the Chung Hwa Hui: International Engagements of Chinese Indonesian Peranakan Students in the Netherlands, 1918–1931". *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 171: 516–542.

Islamism and Islamist organizations in Indonesia:

1. Platzdasch, Bernhard. 2009. *Islamism in Indonesia: Politics in the Emerging Democracy*. Singapore: ISEAS.
2. Hamayotsu, Kikue. 2011. "The Political Rise of the Prosperous Justice Party in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: Examining the Political Economy of Islamist Mobilization in a Muslim Democracy". *Asian Survey* 51, no. 5: 971-992.

3. Ward, Ken. 2009. "Non-Violent Extremists? Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia". *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 63, issue 2: 149-164.
4. Hilmy, Masdar. 2010. *Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia: Piety and Pragmatism*. Singapore: ISEAS.
5. Osman, Mohamed Nawab Mohamed. 2010. "Reviving the Caliphate in the Nusantara: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia's Mobilization Strategy and Its Impact in Indonesia". *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22, issue 4: 601-622.
6. Tomsa, Dirk. 2012. "Moderating Islamism in Indonesia: Tracing Patterns of Party Change in the Prosperous Justice Party". Political Research Quarterly 65, issue 3: 486-498.

In short, this research project is different with the existing studies and makes an original contribution in the following ways:

1. To the study of Indonesian religious communities, our project fills a very big gap in the lack of literature dealing with the NU and Indonesia's Islamist groups abroad.
2. To the study of Indonesian Islam, our project provides comparative analysis of socio-cultural-political configurations that have shaped and characterized the concept of Islam Nusantara and Islamism.
3. To the study of Indonesian politics, our project provides comparative analysis of political competitions between Indonesian Muslim associations abroad.
4. To the study of Islam in Europe, our project emphasizes comparative analysis of socio-cultural arrangements that have formed and categorized the developments of foreign culture and Islam in Europe.

Theoretical Frameworks

The foundation of the NU was a reaction against the growth of reformist groups, such as the Muhammadiyah and Sarekat Islam that were seen as a threat to traditionalist religious beliefs of Islamic jurisprudence, which depended strongly on strict devotion (*taqlid*) to the

madhhab rather than *ijtihad* (the making of a decision in Islamic law by personal effort as opposed to *taqlid*) of the Quran and *Sunnah* (the practice of the Prophet). More importantly, however, it was founded in response to the changing global developments in the Islamic world in the 1920s that include the eradication of the caliphate, the invasion of Wahhabi into Mecca, and the search for a new Islamic internationalism (Van Bruinessen 1994, pp. 18, 28; Samson 1978, pp. 196-226). From its inception, the NU's main base of support has been rural East and Central Java where traditional Javanese practices and ways of life absorbed elements of Islam. This social base of support for the NU has expanded over time, attracting some urban and more educated followers (Samson 1978, pp. 196-226).

Today, the NU also focuses on, among other things, charitable activities to help alleviate poverty, economic and agricultural works, education, and arts and cultures. The organization is known as the most avid supporters of Islam Nusantara, a relatively new distinctive brand of

Islam based on the global viewpoint of Sunni Islam that has undergone interaction, contextualization, and indigenization of Indonesia's local belief system and that promotes moderation, inclusiveness, and tolerance. From a broader perspective, the NU promotes the Sunni Islamic theological position of *wasatiyyah* (the middle way) implemented in everyday balanced way of life (moderation).

Besides the traditionalist NU, there are also other variants of Indonesian Islam that form a complex relationship between Islam and politics that involves, among other things, on-going processes of democratization, identity politics, the creation of civil society, and Islamism. The relationship demonstrates that Islam and politics coexist, flourish, interlace, and strive in complex, pragmatic, and mutually beneficial relationships.

One of the most conspicuous Muslim groups that continuously challenges the NU is Islamist associations, such as the PKS, the HTI, the DDII, the FPI, the MMI and others. Political Islam or Islamism is a relatively recent vibrant phenomenon in Indonesia. Mohammed Ayoob suggests that political Islam or Islamism is Islam as political ideology rather than religion or theology (Ayoob 2007, p. 2). Olivier Roy defines Islamism as the brand of modern political Islamic fundamentalism that claims to re-create a true Islamic society, not simply by imposing *sharia*, but by establishing first an Islamic state through political action. The supporters of Islamism, Islamists, see Islam not as a mere religion, but as a political ideology that should reshape all aspects of society, such as politics, law, economy, social justice, foreign policy, and others (Roy 2004, p. 58).

Furthermore, Guilain Denoeux argues that politics lies at the heart of Islamism, which ultimately has far more to do with power than with religion. To Islamists, Islam is more a political blueprint than a faith, and the Islamist discourse is to a large extent a political discourse in religious garb. Accordingly, while fundamentalists are usually concerned first and foremost with ideas and religious exegesis, Islamists are action-oriented; they are preoccupied primarily with changing their world (Denoeux 2002, p. 61, 63). Meanwhile, Bassam Tibi maintains that one should focus, not on the religion of Islam and its beliefs, but rather on the political concepts developed on the grounds of the politicization of Islam in order to understand political Islam. He puts it

that it is not the substance of religion that is of interest for the exponents of political Islam; not spirituality, but religious symbolism employed in the pursuit of political ends (Tibi 2000, p. 847). Nonetheless, the 'political' character of political Islam cannot simply be attributed to a strategy by various Islamist movements to capture state power. It must also be seen as a re-interpretation of various social activities that were previously not considered to be political by state authorities and by those analysing social life from a statist perspective (Volpi 2010, p. 12).

As we can see, there has been, especially since the fall of the Suharto administration, organizational fragmentation that permeates virtually every sphere of Indonesian political life. Edward Aspinall (Aspinall 2013, p. 28) argues that from political parties to the world of organized Islam, the dominant pattern and trend in post-authoritarian Indonesia is toward dispersion of political and economic power and competition between rival bodies that are ideologically similar. In this research project, the NU and other Muslim groups are both similar, in the sense that they are Muslim associations. Furthermore, Aspinall contends that this socio-political formation has its deepest roots in two sources. *Firstly,* the continuing importance of patronage distribution for organizing political life and mediating class relations in Indonesia. Patronage is, here, defined as a material resource disbursed for particularistic purposes and for political benefit, typically distributed via clientelist networks, where clientelism is defined as a personalistic relationship of power. Clientelistic networks devoted to the distribution of patronage have long been central features of Indonesian politics. As Aspinall has put it, the weakening of alternate modes of organizing and imagining political identity, growing commodification of social life and related cultural changes have helped to heighten this feature of the political economy and made patronage the most important glue of political relations in Indonesia. Even the NU and other Muslim groups in Europe also share the similar circumstance. *Secondly,* the neoliberal framework within which those arrangements are increasingly embedded and according to whose principles state and non-governmental resources are increasingly allocated. Neo-liberalism here is thus understood not only, or even mostly, as a doctrine, but more as a set of practices. In its original form, neoliberalism is most fundamentally "a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be

advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.” Moreover, as understood here, neo-liberalism is more than a set of ideas about how to allocate economic resources, it is also “a relatively mundane but increasingly ubiquitous practice of making economic calculation a universal standard for the organization, management, and government of human life and conduct.” In this perspective, neo-liberalism is as much a cultural phenomenon as it is a political or economic one.

Today, as both the NU and Indonesia’s Islamist associations have expanded their scope and networks overseas, they also bring the rivalries, tensions, and compromises there, and unsurprisingly, this circumstance—certainly in another topic—is accurately portrayed by Aspinall’s theory on organizational fragmentation. By using Aspinall's theory on organizational fragmentation in explaining the rivalries, tensions, and compromises among Indonesian religious communities in Europe, this unexplored state of affairs certainly deserves a serious attention by Indonesian academics. This research project is definitely an attempt to contribute to the unexplored topic.

Methods and Sources

Based on case studies through fieldworks and multiple methods, including observations, interviews, and archiving with the NU’s leaders of the special branches and followers and Indonesian Islamist-inspired individuals and groups and other communities in Germany and the Netherlands using anthropological and political science approaches, this project examines the organizational strategies and behaviours of the NU people in Europe, and Islamist-inspired individuals and groups. Observed cases are for example traditionalist religious practices, such as *slametan* (religious meal feasts), *tahlilan* (a prayer performed to facilitate a deceased person entering paradise), and *pengajian* (Islamic congregation); Salafism and other Middle Eastern-influenced religious expressions among the Islamist-inspired individuals and groups; rivalries, tensions, as well as compromises between these groups in Indonesia’s socio-political affairs; the encounters with Western values, such as religious freedom and secularism; and the implementation of

moderate-traditional Islamic thought and Salafism and other Middle Eastern-influenced understandings in everyday life.

This research project is neither anthropology nor political science in the classical sense. Instead, it is a multi-disciplinary approach of social history and political anthropology of the development and relationship between the NU and Islamist-inspired individuals and groups that looks at NU's special branches in Germany and the Netherlands and Indonesian diaspora who support Islamism, in the context of the development and dynamics of Indonesian Islam, European socio-cultural-political life, and Indonesia's fledgling democracy.

Historical, anthropological, and political science approaches are jointly employed. In order to explore written sources, library research will be conducted in a number of libraries in Leiden and Berlin. Present events, interviews, and observations will be captured from a set of fieldwork for the period of three months from mid September to mid December 2019 in towns in Germany and the Netherlands where there are active NU followers and Islamist-inspired individuals and groups and their activities. These periods of fieldwork also include library research.

Structure of the Study

The paper will be divided into seven sections:

1. Introduction
2. The history of the NU and other Indonesia's Muslim groups in Europe
3. Rivalries, tensions, and compromises
4. Indonesian Muslims' expressions overseas
5. Extending networks and seeking influence
6. The effects of the rivalries, tensions, and compromises for Muslim politics in Indonesia and vice versa
7. Conclusion

Timeline:

The intended duration of the research in Germany and the Netherlands is three months starting from 15 September 2019 until 15 December 2019. The general work plans will be:

1. First month:

A. Discussion with experts on Indonesian Islam at KITLV and Leiden University, such as Prof. Henk Schulte Nordholt, Prof. Gerry van Klinken, Dr. David Kloos, and Dr. Nico Kaptein
B. Library research at Leiden University
C. Conducting fieldworks in the main NU's bases in the Netherlands, such as Leiden, Amsterdam, The Hague, Wageningen, and Rotterdam
D. Writing the first draft of working paper
2. Second month:
A. Discussion with experts on Indonesian Islam at KITLV and Leiden University, such as Prof. Henk Schulte Nordholt, Prof. Gerry van Klinken, Dr. David Kloos, and Dr. Nico Kaptein
B. Library research at Leiden University
C. Conducting fieldworks in the main NU's bases in the Netherlands, such as Leiden, Amsterdam, The Hague, Wageningen, and Rotterdam
D. Discussion with experts on Indonesian Islam at Freie University, Berlin and Humboldt University, Berlin, such as Prof. Birgitt Röttger-Rössler, Prof. Urte Undine Frömming, Prof. Thomas Stodulka, and Prof. Vincent Houben
E. Library research at Freie and Humboldt University, Berlin
F. Conducting fieldworks in the main NU's bases in Germany, such as Berlin, Frankfurt, Aachen, Muenchen, and Hamburg
G. Writing the second draft of working paper
3. Third month:
A. Discussion with experts on Indonesian Islam at Freie University, Berlin and Humboldt University, Berlin, such as Prof. Birgitt Röttger-Rössler, Prof. Urte Undine Frömming, Prof. Thomas Stodulka, and Prof. Vincent Houben
B. Library research at Freie and Humboldt University, Berlin
C. Conducting fieldworks in the main NU's bases in Germany, such as Berlin, Frankfurt, Aachen, Muenchen, and Hamburg
D. Finalizing the final draft of working paper in Leiden

Chapter 2
Muslims in Europe

Indonesians Abroad

In contemporary Dutch society, the return of religion to the public arena, and particularly the presence of Muslim immigrants, are sensitive issues. The discourse about these issues is related to what is known as the heritage of the Enlightment and the values of modernity. In harmony with secularization theories, Dutch citizens generally assume that modernity and religiosity—Islam in particular—are incompatible. Many people are familiar with just one form of modernity—namely, European or secular modernity (Frans Wijsen. 2016. "Indonesian Muslim or World Citizen? Religious Identity in the Dutch Integration Discourse". In *Making Religion: Theory and Practice in the Discursive Study of Religion*, edited by Frans Wijsen and Kocku von Stuckrad. Leiden and Boston: Brill. Pp. 225-238, p. 225).

Yet the notion that modernization means the eradication of religion is increasingly contested. Various scholars recognize the existence of multiple modernities (Eisenstadt 2003; Schmidt 2006; Bhambra 2007; Lee 2008; Fourie 2012),[1] including religious

[1] Bhambra, G. 2007. *Rethinking Modernity: Postcolonialism and the Sociological Imagination*. Basingstoke: Macmillan; Eisenstadt, S. 2003. *Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities*. Vols. 1 and 2. Leiden: Brill; Fourie, E. 2012. "A Future for the Theory of Multiple Modernities: Insights from the New Modernization Theory." *Social Science Information* 51: 52-69; Lee. R. 2008. "In Search of Second Modernity: Reinterpreting Reflexive Modernization in the Context of Multiple Modernities." *Social Science Information* 47: 55-69; Schmidt, V. 2006. "Multiple Modernities or Varieties of Modernity." *Current Sociology* 54 (1): 77-99.

modernities. This debate is not new. During their colonial rule, Dutch administrators in the Dutch East Indies tried to integrate the Muslim majority there into what they perceived as an enlightened colony by constructing a modern Islam and by separating religion (Islam) and politics (Wijsen 2016, 225).

Wijsen explores two themes in his work: what is the relation between the religious (read Muslim) identity discourses of non-Western immigrants and the integration discourses of Dutch citizens? And what is the relation between these contemporary discourses and colonial discourses? He argues that these relations can be understood in terms of interdiscursivity (Fairclough 1992: 43) or 'orders of discourse' (Fairclough 1992: 68, 85).[2] The colonial past offers 'mental maps'(Fairclough 1992: 82-83) (225) that are stored in the long-term memories of Dutch citizens and are drawn upon when they have to cope with Muslim immigrants in the present (Wijsen 2016, 225-226).

In the Netherlands, religiosity and modernity are generally deemed incompatible. Many people recognize just one form of modernity, namely European modernity. From this perspective, one cannot be Muslim and Dutch at the same time (Wijsen 2016, 226). Muslims who strive for modernization based on Islamic principles do not perceive Islam and modernity as incompatible; there is a clash of voices. The modernization process in Indonesia, for example, shows that radical Islamic voices have had little impact on Indonesian political discourse, despite widespread perceptions in the media that Indonesia has been taken over by political Islam. Religious revivalism does not translate into political choices. The story of Indonesia reflects trends in much of the Islamic world. Most governments in the Islamic world want to safeguard their Islamic traditions, but also want to modernize their societies (Wijsen 2016, 227).

Policy documents tend to perceive Islam as a backward and ignorant religion, as inferior to Dutch culture and civilization, and as a threat to its 'modern values' and 'heritage of enlightment'. For example, the Islam Memorandum on Integrity and Respect of the Protestant Church in the Netherlands notes that Islam "did not go through the Enlightment" and brings along another worldview and another approach

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[2] Fairclough, N. 1992. *Discourse and Social Change*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

to reality”. Drawing upon the opinions of “various congregation members”, “along with part of Dutch society”, it asks whether “Islam is not a threat to our democratic society and the position of Christians” (Reitsma 2010: 13) (Wijsen 2016, 227).

In the same vein, the Memorandum on Integration, Bonding, and Citizenship of the Ministry of Social Affairs states that 61 % of the Dutch population is of the opinion that there are contradictions between indigenous and foreign citizens, and that 41 % is of the opinion that “a Western lifestyle and an Islamic lifestyle are incompatible” (Donner 2011: 3). For this reason, it advocates the full (227) participation of foreigners in the Netherlands, rather than integration while retaining their identity. Both the policy documents (explicitly or implicitly) draw upon public opinion polls to reproduce the image of Islam as a completely different and potentially dangerous religion (Wijsen 2016, 227-228).

The encounter with Islam in the Netherlands is not a new phenomenon. Church-state relations were at the centre of colonial history in the Dutch East Indies; that until 1949, the Netherlands had the largest Muslim population in the world; and that even the Dutch government had to cope with modernist Islamic revival movements (Kennedy and Valenta 2006: 342-344). When we ask how Dutch missionaries and colonial administrators dealt with religion in the Dutch East Indies, we first note that in none of the indigenous languages spoken in Indonesia is there an equivalent word for ‘religion’. The notion of ‘religion’ as a separate entity did not exist. When missionaries and colonial administrators translated the word religion into Bahasa Indonesia, they used the word *agama*, which is the Sanskrit word for “tradition”, “teaching”, or “post-Vedic text” (Smith 1963: 58-59). In the process of Christianization, when indigenous peoples wanted to preserve their ancestral traditions, Dutch missionaries used the word *agama* for parts of the indigenous culture that could be accmmodated for Christianity (228), and they separated them from other (‘primitive’, ‘heathen’, or ‘pagan’) parts of the indigenous culture that were incompatible with Christianity, which they called *adat* (Kruithof 2014: 110-111), from the Arab word *adah*, which means “custom” or “customary law”. Dutch colonial administrators used the word *adat* for the pre-Islamic, indigenous customs and beliefs, in contrast to Islam, or

agama. This distinction was informed by colonial scholars of Islam, such as Christian Snouck Hurgronje (Wijsen 2016, 228-229).

The words *adat* and *agama* seem to have the opposite usage in colonial versus missionary discourse. Whereas *agama* in colonial discourse refers to dangerous Islam, that which is incompatible with colonial policies, *agama* in missionary discourse refers to those parts of the indigenous religion that are compatible with Christianity. Whereas *adat* in colonial discourse is not harmful to colonial policies, being 'customary' or 'indigenous' law instead of Islamic law, *adat* in Christianity discourse is the tradition that is incompatible with Christianity (Wijsen 2016, 229).

According to young Indonesian Muslims, their Islamic voice (self) and their modern voice (self) are not incompatible. On the contrary, integration into modern Dutch society does not require less Islam, but rather more Islam—pure Islam. Islam offers them a platform to be "citizens of the world". Moreover, they seem to suggest that the discourse about the incompatibility of religion and modernity is a typical Dutch, parochial, and narrow-minded discourse (Wijsen 2016, 234).

The present study shows that young Indonesian Muslims do not want to be either Dutch or Indonesian, but rather global or world citizens; for them, Islam (234) as a universal religion provides a platform for this (Wijsen 2016, 235).

This chapter focuses on the personal ads placed by three main groups: those who identified as ethnic minorities or immigrants from non-European countries living in Europe; men and women who posted from outside the "West"; and "native" Dutch and Danes who specifically sought contact with people of color and/or immigrants. Though there are only a few hundred of these ads, they are of scholarly significance: one finds them neither in the histories of the Dutch/Danish gay/lesbian movements of the 1960s and 1970s, nor in the histories of immigration into the Netherlands and Denmark during this period. Linking these two ostensibly distinct histories—of gay/lesbian liberation and immigration in the late 1960s and 1970s—complicates current-day political discussions about a supposed clash between immigrant and "native" European cultures with regard to sexual tolerance. In historical research as in contemporary poitics, the categories "homosexual" and "immigrant" must not be constructed as

mutualy exclusive (Andrew D.J. Shield. 2017. *Immigrants in the Sexual Revolution*. Cham: Springer, p. 178).[3]

Gay/lesbian contact advertisements are a useful primary source for researching not only the history of sexuality, but also the history of ethnicity and immigration. Although readers of gay and lesbian periodicals in the 1960-70s could not interact with physical journals as dynamically as users of online "social media", these readers did indeed make new social connections via the media (Shield 2017, 179).

Despite labour migration booms, there were very few (if any) posts from Moroccans, Turks, or Pakistanis in the 1960s. However, there were a small handful of ethnic minorities and non-"Western" immigrants posting in both the Netherlands and Denmark, even in the 1960s. Indonesian/Indo-Dutch were the most prominent ethnic minority groups in Dutch (and even some Danish) homophile periodicals. While most of them probably had origins in Indonesia or the Netherlands, they showed mobility—or the desire to move—throughout Western Europe. Although many "repatriates" from Indonesia were "white", most had some mixed background; the fact that the men in the following ads identified as "indische" (roughly "Indonesian" or "Indo-Dutch") and Indonesian (in English) likely meant that they were "visible minorities" in European settings (Shield 2017, 187).

From the Hague to (perhaps) Limburg to Berlin, these three posts show that Indonesian men acquired various homophile periodicals across continent. Post colonial migrants in the Netherlands often had vibrant communities in big cities: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht. Yet the 1967 post came from the Southeast Netherlands, an area more often associated with Catholic traditions than with multiethnic communities. The man, born in 1935 or 1936, was either among the 300,000 who immigrated to the Netherlands after the Indonesin National Revolution, or who was born into a family that immigrated prior to World War II, and thus he was raised entirely in the Netherlands (Shield 207, 187).

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[3] Eithne Luibhéid and Lionel Cantú, Queer Migrations: Sexuality, U.S. Citizenship, and Border Crossings (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2005); Keja Valens, Bill Johnson González, and Bradley S. Epps, Passing Lines: Sexuality and Immigrants (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2005).

In the 1960s, some “ethnic” Dutch and Danes sought to identify themselves as open-minded regarding the race or ethnicity of their (187) partner. Some of these influence may have come from reading ads by those who lived in more multicultural areas or outside of the “West”, such as the Englishman in Thailand who wrote, “Any country, any race welcome”. Other readers might have noticed the scattered posts from Indonesians and other ethnic minorities in Western Europe, and wanted to show their openness, such as the Dutchman in the small eatern town of Borculo in 1967 who emphasized that “religion or race [was] unimportant” or the Dane who wrote in 1964 that “race/skin colour not important, prefer handicapped” (Shield 2017, 187-188).

But it is unwise to lump together those who portrayed themselves as unbiased with regard to race and desire, and those who specifically eroticized a member of another racial/national group. For the former, people of colour served as fellow activists; but for the latter, they may have srved as “exotic” figures of fantasy. For some, it was both: the Dutchman who, in 1967, sought a Moroccan, Spanish, Turkish, or black partner might have felt a solidarity with immigrant struggles, in

addition to an erotic attraction founded in the fantasy of an exotic other. His reference to Moroccan and Turkish men showed his awareness of guest worker communities in the Netherlands; yet the post as a whole illustrates his general fantasy for sex with a foreign-born, brown-skinned lover, regardless of their particular struggles in the Netherlands. Scholars who seek to elaborate on Orientalist fantasy using theories of Edward Said or Joseph Massad would conclude that racial fetishization does little to hinder structural inequality (Shield 2017, 189).[4]

In the 1970s, Indonesian men continued to be prominent contributors to various gay periodicals in and outside of the Netherlands. some posts came from those still living in the former Dutch colony; thus their posts must be contextualized within not only the history of homo-emancipation, but also the history of post-colonial migration. In 1971, a young man living in Indonesia posted in Dutch for correspondence friends in the Netherlands. It might first seem unusual that this Indonesian would still have close connections to the Netherlands in 1971, as indonesians eligible to migrate to the Netherlands did so mostly in the late 1940s. But this man's potential migration shuld be contextualized with the regime changes of the late 1960s, including the mass murders of Indonesian communists, and the rise to power of Suharto. In this period, Indonesians who had extended social networks in the Netherlands may have looked there as a place to seek protection (Shield 2017, 193).

A potential immigrant's ability to enter another country and integrate into its society cannot be untied from economic opportunities and available housing in the host country, and often a local social network. The 1970s contact advertisements continued to illustrate that gay and lesbian social networks could be used to secure jobs and housing (Shield 2017, 199).

With regard to ethnic diversity, the 1980s contact ads showed not only an increase in the volume of posts by ethnic minorities in the Netherlands, but also a greater variety of immigrant backgrounds. Indonesian/Indo-Dutch men continued to be the most prominent ethnic

[4] Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1979), 186-190. Joseph A. Massad, Desiring Arabs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

minority to post, and they identified with a variety of terms (Shiled 2017, 203).

Persatuan Pemuda Muslim Se-Eropa (PPME): The Main Indonesian Muslims' Association in the Netherlands

The number of Muslims in the Netherlands numbered 907,000 by 1 January 2010. This amounts to six per cent of the total Dutch population. Among this number are Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, Afghan, Iraqi, Somali, Pakistan, and Iranian, as well as a group of 62,000 'others' that includes Indonesian Muslims.[5] There are no exact figures for the number of Indonesian Muslims in the Netherlands. Until 2011, the Indonesian Embassy for the Netherlands did not provide such a statistic. Supriyono, an official of immigration affairs of the Indonesian Embassy in the Netherlands mentioned that the number of Indonesian people in the Netherlands was approximately 12,000 (Sujadi. 2017. *Persatuan Pemuda Muslim Se-Eropa: Identity, Encouragement for Giving, and Network, 1971-2009*. PhD thesis, Leiden University, p. 1).

Information about the number of members of Persatuan Pemuda Muslim se-Eropa (PPME, Young Muslim Association in Europe), which is an Islamic organization run mostly by Indonesian people in the country, is available. In total, in 2008 the number of families registered as PPME members in the Netherlands was approximately 678 (Sujadi 2017, 2). The existence of PPME reflects the prevailing condition in the Netherlands which demands the existence of well-organized Islamic organizations for Muslim comunities in the country (Sujadi 2017, 2). If Muslim communities have representative organizations, these can provide a more formal framework for engaging in discussions relating to Islam in Europe (Sujadi 2017, 4).

The fact suggests that the need for well-organized Islamic associations is pressing. Historically, Indonesian Muslims in the Netherlands have established a number of organizations in the country. Perkoempoelan Oemat Islam (POI, Islamic Community Association),

[5] Instituut voor Multiculturele Vraagstukken, De Positie van Moslims in Nederland: Feiten en cijfers 2010 (Utrecht: Forum, March 2010), 6.

founded in 1932, was the first Muslim organization to see Indonesian Muslims work together with Dutch Muslims in order to deal with socio-religious problems in the country. The main focus of POI was to establish an Islamic burial ground and to provide a structure for performing Friday prayers. However, there were no other significant programmes carried out by this organization. Indeed, this organization did not attempt to attract Indonesian Muslims and in particular, young Indonesian Muslims. This contributed to the establishment of the above-mentioned PPME. Founded in 1971, the PPME soon became the main organization for Indonesian Muslims in the Netherlands. its estabishment was a response to the absence of any organization for Moluccan Muslims who arrived in the country in the 1950s prior to the founders of PPME who generally came to the Netherlands in the period between the end 1960s and the early 1970s (Sujadi 2017, 4).

The successful establishment of this new new Muslim organization, PPME can be attributed to the progressiveness of its founders. In a series of meetings between early January and mid-April 1971, Indonesian Muslims living in Europe, including the Netherlands and Germany, were able to strengthen their idealism and their efforts to establish a European Muslim organization. On 11 April 1971 a gathering attended by 21 participants agreed on the name PPME for (4) their new organization. This name was favoured over two others, Gerakan Pemuda Islam Eropa and Organisasi Pemuda Islam Eropa. It was claimed that this was due to the word *persatuan*, which was deemed relevant to the needs at that moment, i.e. strengthening unity among Indonesian Muslims in Europe. In addition, the choice of the word *Eropa* accommodated the presence of the Dutch founder, Rachmat Zitter whose house was frequently used for the gatherings of Indonesian Muslim youths in the Netherlands, and another founder, Amir al-Hajri, who at that time possessed South Yemen nationality. In other words, the choice of name could not be dissociated from their existence in Europe rather than Indonesia. Kadungga, a former private secretary to Moh. Natsir (a reformist Muslim), and a son-in-law of Kahar Muzakar, a former key figure of the Darul Islam movement in South Sulawesi, was elected as the organization’s first chairperson. He was one of its founders. Another founder of the new organization was Abdurrahman

Wahid who would eventually become the president of the Republic of Indonesia (Sujadi 2017, 4-5).

Since its inception in 1971, the PPME in the Netherlands has grown steadily enabling its members and sympathizers, who are mostly Indonesian, to perform their socio-religious activities, both in the Netherlands and in Indonesia. Examples of this include: the provision of religious education for children and PPME's new converts; providing assistance to those who want to convert to Islam; *daurah* (intensive Islamic studies; *istighotsah* (appeal for God's protection and assistance); the publication of periodicals; organizing a programme for the pilgrimage to Mecca; the purchase of locations that function as places of worship and centres of activity; increasing attempts to encourage members to give financially or non-financially; inviting (5) *ulama* from Indonesia for Ramadan programmes; the commemoration of the Prophet's birth; sport days; and *halal bi halal* (a gathering for forgiving one another). Today, PPME branches are found not only in large cities such as Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague, but also in smaller cities such as Breda, Tilburg, and Heemskerk. It is worth noting that each PPME branch routinely carries out its activities in such a way that the number of its members and sympathizers continues to grow. Another key characteristic of the organization and one that has proved very attractive to Indonesian Muslims in the Netherlands is that it is politically neutral (Sujadi 2017, 5-6).

In addition to POI and PPME, a number of other organizations and a *da'wa* political party have played significant roles for Indonesian Muslims in the Netherlands. Firstly, Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI, Association for Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) in the Netherlands, founded in the early 1990s, initially drew the attention of many Indonesian Muslims in the country. Leading Muslim figures, officials, and students involved themselves in running this new intellectual association. Due to scholarships provided by Badan Pengkajian dan Penerapan Teknologi (BPPT, Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology), between 1994 and 1996 (6) many Indonesian students studying in graduate programmes in the fields of science at Delft University of Technology joined Keluarga Islam Delft (KID, Delft Muslim Family) founded in the mid-1980s. KID

organized a number of activities, such as organizing Friday prayers, the organizing of almsgiving, weekly general Islamic preaching, establishing a library, dawn preachings, short Islamic studies, and establishing a *baitul maal* [*bayt al-māl*] (division of financial affairs). However, this Muslim organization experienced a degree of instability because many of its members returned to Indonesia on completion of their studies. This instability became worse as the scholarships came to an end in the mid-1990s. Consequently, KID was forced to join the ICMI which was already providing its own scholarships to Indonesian students in the Netherlands30 and playing an active role in improving (7) the quality of faith and piety of Indonesian Muslims. For example, ICMI already had a programme of expanding businesses in order to improve their economic prosperity. In addition, it had plans to build a dormitory for Indonesian students in the Netherlands (Sujadi 2017, 6-8).

Another organization has the characteristics of a political party, but identifies itself as a *da'wa* party, thus its activities are similar to other Indonesian Muslim organizations. The organization is Pusat Informasi dan Pelayanan Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PIP PKS, Centre of Service and Information of Prosperous Justice Party) whose contributions to the party led it to achieve fifth place in the Indonesian general election of 1999 held in the Netherlands and was the winning party in the same election in 2004. However, this section does not concentrate on its political, but rather its socio-religious activities, in particular its *da'wa* (Islamic propagation) which parallels the main activities of PPME. Founded in Jakarta in 1998, Partai Keadilan (PK, Justice Party) established representation in the Netherlands in 2001. The result of the Indonesian general elections in 1999 showed that the party was unable to achieve the minimum number of electoral votes, i.e. two per cent of the 500 seats of House of People's Representatives, which was necessary to participate in the next general election. The rules for the Indonesian general election of 2004 demanded a threshold of three per cent of the votes. Consequently, the PK renamed itself Partai Keadilan-Sejahtera (PKS, Prosperous Justice Party), founded on 20 April 2002, (8) in order to participate in the 2004 election. Representatives of the new PKS party abroad employed the name Pusat Informasi dan Pelayanan Partai Keadilan dan Sejahtera, thus confirming it as an

extension of the PKS, albeit without recognition under Dutch law (Sujadi 2017, 8-9).

Unlike representatives of other Indonesian parties overseas which concentrated solely on political activities, the PIP PKS in the Netherlands has apparently been more concerned with *dakwah* [*da'wa*] (Islamic propagation) and *tarbiyah* [*tarbiyya*] (education). This is in accord with the vision of its party which strongly emphasizes its role as "the *dakwah* party; intensification of justice and prosperity in the framework of the unity of *umma* [Indonesian Muslim community] and the nation [of Indonesia]" thus leading to form a *madani* society (civil society). This centre prepares itself as a vehicle for *da'wa* activities and a training centre for its cadres and as an agent of change using the *manhaj tarbiyyah* (*tarbiyya* method), a system of improving their faith and forming cadres for the party (Sujadi 2017, 9).

Referring to the *tarbiyyah* method, principally there are two (9) kinds of programmes designed by the PIP: internal and external. The internal programme is provided for the cadres and members of the centre, whereas the external programme is aimed towards PIP sympathizers and the public. The internal programme involves the centre facilitating weekly Islamic preaching and the monthly *malam bina insan takwa* (*mabit*, night for making a person pious). This *mabit* consists of a series of activities, beginning with *tawṣiyya* (delivering Islamic messages). Subsequently, various subjects are studied, a number of Quranic verses are recited and memorized, and *qiyām allayl* (night-time devotion) and *muhāsaba* (reflection) are performed consecutively. This *mabit* programme ends with participants having breakfast together. Another internal programme is carried out during *Ramaḍān*, focusing on training to improve their faith and resulting in morally and intellectually qualified cadres. To achieve these objectives, the PIP has introduced eight programmes: 1) online and offline *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) studies through discussion groups; 2) dialogues with leading local figures with heterogeneous expertise in order to strengthen the quality of thinking and competence; 3) reciting, listening to, and studying the Quran; and 4) *mabit*. Unlike the monthly *mabit*, the *Ramaḍān mabit* is opened with Islamic preaching, discussions on Islamic, political and social affairs, and it closes with reflection on the self and the reasons why humans were created; 5) *i'tikāf* (retreat in the mosque) during the

last ten days of *Ramaḍān* with a view to increasing personal and social piety; 6) breaking the *Ramaḍān* fasting together with leading figures of society, its cadres, and [Muslim] neighbours; 7) watching films, such as *Sang Murabbi* (The educator) and *Ustadz* [*Ustadh*] (Islamic teacher) about Rahmat Abdullah. These films (10) about leading Muslim figures are aimed at providing good role models and lessons in order to foster a strong spirit and strengthen values of justice, prosperity, and professionalism; and 8) collecting alms and providing financial aid. These programmes show that the *da'wa* party undertakes constant and intensive improvement of its cadres and members – like PPME, it is much concerned with *da'wa* activities. This representation of the political party has resulted in approximately core cadres in the Netherlands. These cadres are involved in various segments of Indonesian communities in the Netherlands such as the Persatuan Pelajar Indonesia (PPI, Indonesian Student Association), PPME, and Pimpinan Cabang Istimewa Muhammadiyah (PCIM, Board of Special Branch of the Muhammadiyah) (Sujadi 2017, 9-11).

Meanwhile, this PIP has also created programmes for sympathizers and the public. Initially, it sent paper or electronic *surat cinta* (literally meaning 'love letter'); messages aimed at providing support to Indonesian people living in the Netherlands. So, for example, congratulatory notes and parcels were delivered to the community on occasions such as welcoming the fasting month of *Ramaḍān*, *'īd al-fiṭr* (feast after the *Ramaḍān* fasting), and *'īd al-aḍḥā* (sacrifice feast). This programme costs thousands of Euros. The financial donations of the cadres enable the implementation of this programme.47 In addition to *surat cinta*, there is *de zomerkamp* (camping for a few days in Summer), which is a relaxed activity aimed at refreshing the mind and restoring the physical vitality of participants. Participants and their families are encouraged to build familial relations while learning about the natural environment through diverse activities.48 Most of the activities of this (11) programme are games and sports, as well as hiking. This summer camp programme attracted more than 200 participants. Moreover, *halal bihalal* is an annual programme organized by PIP PKS. The participants are cadres and members, as well as outsiders. Members of PPME, PCIM, PPI, Forum Komunikasi Alumni (Alumni Communication Forum) of ESQ (Emotional Spiritual Quotient)51 and its sympathizers

are also invited to attend. In fact, the centre organized *halal bihalal* of 2005 in cooperation with PPME. Finally, the centre provides regular Islamic lectures for its members, sympathizers, and other interested parties. These lectures are particularly aimed at men; women can participate in Pengajian Umum Bulanan Kota (PUBK, City-Based Monthly Islamic Lecture). Still in the context of Islamic lectures, the PIP held trainings for Manajemen Sholat menuju Khusu' dan Nikmat (MSKN, Management for Earnest and Contented Prayer) in cooperation with PPME on 30-31 August 2008. One result of these programmes is that the PIP activists can be found in various student and socio-religious organizations (Sujadi 2017, 11-12).

On 12 August 2006, following Friday prayers in a mosque belonging to PPME Amsterdam, PCIM in the Netherlands was founded by Din Syamsuddin, the chairman of the central Muhammadiyah board. This event was witnessed by more than a hundred members and sympathizers. The elected chairman of this new socio-religious organization was Surya Alinegara and his secretary was Arifin Hudaya. Five months later, on Sunday, 28 January 2007, Din Syamsuddin officially inaugurated the board of PCIM in the Netherlands in a hall at the Indonesian Embassy in The Hague (Sujadi 2017, 13).

PCIM is a new structure of the Muhammadiyah and is positioned directly under the organization's central board. This differs from the structure of Muhammadiyah branches in Indonesia which come under the regional boards. The aim is to unite members and sympathizers living abroad in order to be able to build a network and foster cooperation. To this end, they have also provided a web-based forum. Regarding the aims, in his inaugural address Syamsuddin told his audience that, in order to develop *da'wa* and unite the congregation of Muhammadiyah abroad, the central board would form PCIMs, including in the Netherlands, following their establishment in Cairo, Jeddah, Damascus, Sudan, Teheran and Kuala Lumpur. Furthermore, he emphasized: "Muhammadiyah has currently gone international through PCIMs…overseas."64 He delivered a strong message: "Bear the message of Islam as a peaceful and tolerant religion, and present the image of Indonesian modern and moderate Islam." He went on to say that PCIM in the Netherlands should participate in carrying out Islamic *da'wa* in the Netherlands both for Indonesian and European Muslims. This runs parallel to his assertions, during a seminar jointly held by Uni-Europe and Indonesia in Brussels, that Islam was *raḥma* (benevolence) for the universe. Therefore, the *umma* had to show its advancement and

excellence in civilization, which would serve as an (14) example and enlighten world civilization. Finally, this PCIM should be able to connect the Muhammadiyah with others, both Muslim and non-Muslim, and to extract various beneficial resources from them, such as scholarships and economic cooperation, in order to advance the Muhammadiyah in Indonesia. Having listened to Syamsuddin's speech, the members of PCIM's board welcomed proposals and articulated their desire to offer various programmes to meet the challenges and demands of *da'wa* in Europe (Sujadi 2017, 14-15).

The persons who established PPME were mostly Indonesian youths. They were M. Suyuthi Suhaib, Abdul Wahid Kadungga, Imam, Ozir M. Isa, Rusli Bena, A. H. Maksum, Ujang H. S., Azmihardi, T. Razali, Husni Basuni, Ali Khalik, S. Abidin, I. Idram, M. Rais Mustafa, A. Muiz, Suwardi, Abdurrahman Wahid, Moh. Syukur, Y. Machfud Muchtar, M. Amir al-Hajri, Ade Baharuddin, Moch. Chaeron and Rahmat Zitter. Only two of them were not Indonesian. One was Dutch and the other came from Yemen. Nevertheless, they both had historical ties to Indonesia. Rahmat Zitter was born Robert Geoffrey Zitter in Kudus, Central Java, Indonesia. His father, a Dutchman, worked in Kudus as an official of the Dutch government in the Dutch East Indies. During this time he converted to Islam. Afterwards, he married an Indonesian woman from West Java, Ratu Titing Aeni. Meanwhile, the man from Yemen was a son of Mubarak 'Abdullah Nahdi ibn Thabit al-Hajri from Ḥaḍramawt, who had joined Hizbullah (God's party) and, then, troops of Pembela Tanah Air (Peta, Indonesia's Defenders) in the struggle for defending (24) Indonesia's independence since 1948. His mother, 'Aliyah al-Hajri, came from Temanggung, Central Java, Indonesia. The founders were also young. Indeed, some of them were high school graduates, while others had studied at university. These young men wanted to preserve and strengthen Islamic brotherhood among Indonesian Muslims living in the Netherlands by means of *da'wa* (Islamic propagation), networks, joint activities, and social endeavours (Sujadi 2017, 24-25).

The first one who deserves to be mentioned is Abdul Wahid Kadungga, who was born on 20 May 1940 in Indonesia and was later elected as the first leader of the new organization. He travelled to Germany at the end of the 1960s to pursue higher education at Cologne

University. He had previously graduated from the Sekolah Menengah Ekonomi Atas (SMEA, Senior High School for Economics) of Makassar, South Sulawesi,81 and had also studied at the law faculty of the Indonesian University (UI) in Jakarta between 1962 and 1964. He (25) was a former activist of Pelajar Islam Indonesia (PII, Indonesian Muslim Students). His involvement in the PII started during his studies at SMEA and he participated in the organization's national congress held in Medan in 1962 as the leader of PII's Makassar branch. It was here that he met Adam Malik, a future Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia. It is worth mentioning that the PII was one of the Muslim organizations involved in a demonstration on 13 September 1965 in solidarity with Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI, Muslim Students Association), which had been discredited as being anti-Sukarno by the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Indonesian Communist Party). After a few years in Europe – in both Germany and the Netherlands, Kadungga returned to Indonesia and devoted himself to Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (DDII, Council of Indonesian Islamic Propagation). (26) In 1974, he was arrested and imprisoned, together with some other Islamic activists, on the instructions of the New Order government. This arrest was made because the government blamed the former followers of Masyumi and of Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI, Indonesian Socialist Party) as those who were responsible for the riot in Jakarta on 15 January 1974, known as Malapetaka Limabelas January (Malari, 15 January Disaster). The Intelligence Group of Ali Murtopo, a Special Presidential Assistant of President Suharto, arrested the main student leaders regarded as those who were involved in the Malari. Kadungga himself had connections with the ex-Masyumi people at DDII, and was the former leader of PII. Therefore, it seems that he was arrested because of these links. On his release, he became the private secretary of M. Natsir, the former chairman of DDII and Masyumi, and studied Islam from Ahmad Hassan (the main figure of Persatuan Islam [Persis, Islamic Unity] between 1975 and 1980. He then decided to return to the Netherlands as an asylum seeker due to the treatment he received from the Indonesian government. Consequently, the regime no longer recognized him as an Indonesian. Kadungga himself responded: "Actually, I do not wish to be a black Dutchman [like those Moluccans

in the colonial time in the Dutch East Indies who entered into service with the Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger (KNIL, Royal Dutch East Indies Army)].” I do not rebel against the state and I am not an enemy (27) of the [Indonesian] nation.” Kadungga was a son-in-law of Kahar Muzakkar, the leader of the Darul Islam (DI, Darul Islam) for the region of Sulawesi. He had been accused of being a leader of Jama‘a Islāmiyya (JI, Islamic Community) together with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, the leader of Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI, Council of Indonesian Muslim Warriors). Kadungga was to remain a stateless person until 24 April 2008 when he gained a Dutch passport. Kadungga, who had treated the DDII as his second family, passed away on 12 December 2009 and was unable to fulfill his intention to see Abdurrahman Wahid who had had different political ideas, one of those who founded PPME, when he held the office of President of the Republic of Indonesia (Sujadi 2017, 25-28).

The second central figure to PPME, A. H. Maksum, was born on 13 June 1938 in Indonesia. He was to become the first secretary of the PPME board. After completing his primary school education, he studied Islam in *pesantren*s (Islamic boarding schools) such as the traditionalist Pesantren Tebuireng, East Java, and the modern Pesantren Gontor, Ponorogo, East Java. In 1957, he continued his Islamic education in the Pesantren Jamsaren, Surakarta, Central Java. (28) Subsequently, he travelled to Mecca in order to further his study at a senior high school called Dār al-‘Ulūm (the House of Knowledge). It was here that he studied Islamic jurisprudence relating to various *madhāhib* (differing schools of law). His eagerness to become involved in organizational activities can be seen from his involvement in an Indonesian Student Association in Mecca called Persatuan Pelajar Indonesia (PPI, Indonesian Student Association). Furthermore, he enrolled himself in an undergraduate programme, al-Jāmi‘a Baghdad (Baghdad University). During his stay in Baghdad he joined a Muslim organization known as Keluarga Pemuda Nahdlatul Ulama (KPNU, Awakening of Ulama’s Youth Association). He eventually graduated from Baghdad University in 1969. Having completed his study, he chose to live in the Netherlands where he found employment as a teacher at the Sekolah Indonesia Nederland (SIN, Netherlands Indonesian School). He taught part-time at SIN from 1971. In addition, he also worked for a

Dutch insurance company. In 1974, he moved to Cologne, Germany, where he lived for a year and half, to study philosophy and German at Cologne University. Then, following the regulation of the company obliging its officials to work full-time, he made the decision to leave his job as a teacher at SIN in 1975. After focusing on solving PPME's internal problems in the 1980s, he joined ICMI in the Netherlands in the mid-1990s. From (29) the outset of his stay in the Netherlands, he had no intention of ever living permanently in this country. However, Maksum has been living in the Netherlands since the early 1970s and today is enjoying his life as a pensioner, Islamic preacher, and *imam* for the Indonesian community in the Netherlands (Sujadi 2017, 28-30).

The third person to be mentioned is Mochammad Chaeron who was born on 13 January 1943 in Indonesia. During his studies at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, he had joined Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah (IMM, Muhammadiyah Student Association). He graduated from Gajah Mada University in August 1967 with a major in publicity (communication science). He became a journalist for *Abadi* (Eternal), the newspaper of Masyumi, which gave him the opportunity to travel, together with his colleagues, to Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries. He travelled to the Netherlands in early 1970 via Saudi Arabia in order to further his tertiary education and to find employment in Germany for a better future. His intention to study could not be realised because of his job as a teacher at the SIN, which took a lot of time and energy. In fact, he became the headmaster of the school in 1972 after his involvement in the process of founding PPME. In the early 1990s, Chaeron was also a member of ICMI in the Netherlands. In 2003, at the age of 60, he resigned from his position as a teacher at the school. He had hoped to continue teaching students at the school on a part-time basis during his retirement; however this was not in line with the retirement regulations of the Indonesian Embassy. Two years after his resignation, in 2005, he passed away (Sujadi 2017, 30).

The last person to be discussed is Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) who was born on 7 September 1940 in Jombang Indonesia. He was a son of Wahid Hasyim, a former Minister of Religious Affairs before the New Order began in 1966, and a grandson of Hasyim Asy'ari, a founder of the biggest socio-religious Islamic organization in Indonesia,

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, Awakening of Ulama). He was a pivotal figure (30) for PPME because he was regarded as a person capable of leading the PPME. Therefore, he gained significant votes when the election to elect a leader was held (this will be discussed later on). In the mid-1960s, soon after he arrived in Cairo for study at al-Azhar University, he was elected the chairperson of Persatuan Pelajar Indonesia (PPI, Association of Indonesian Students) in Egypt. This enabled him to build social networks of Indonesian students across the Middle East. Another influential experience was his regular work at the Indonesian Embassy in Cairo. His tasks were to follow the developments in Indonesia; to translate reports from Jakarta about socio-political events taking place in Indonesia from Indonesian to Arabic or English; and to inform upon Indonesian students in Cairo who were under the influence of the communist ideology. Wahid did not finish his study at *al-Azhar* because he frequently did not attend his classes and did not pass certain main courses. Instead, he embarked on another undergraduate programme at Baghdad University. Having completed his studies at Baghdad University, he travelled from Iraq to the Netherlands in early 1970 in order to pursue his graduate studies. He was keen to enroll at Leiden University, however, the university could only admit him as an undergraduate student because of his Middle Eastern diploma. This frustrated Wahid's plans to proceed with his tertiary education in Europe. Consequently, he returned to Indonesia in May 1971 a month after the establishment of the PPME,106 where he would lead not only a socio-religious organization and a political party, but would also go on to lead the nation. At the end of December 1984, he was elected executive chief of Nahdlatul Ulama. Then, in the middle of 1998, he was mandated to be the chief of Dewan Syuro (Advisory Board) of Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB, Party of the Awakening of the Nation). Finally, on 20 October 1999 he was elected the President of the Republic of Indonesia. He passed away in December 2009, the same year when Kadungga passed away (Sujadi 2017, 30-31).

The above-mentioned facts show that the central founding figures of PPME had different organizational and religious orientations. They possessed, in principle, relations to traditionalist and reformist Muslim (31) organizations in Indonesia. The traditionalists are associated with the *pesantren* and the NU, whereas the reformists are

associated with the Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam (Persis), al-Irsyad (The Guidance, a Muslim organization of Arabs in Indonesia). Due to his involvement in the DDII and his closeness to Natsir, Kadungga can be classified as a reformist Muslim who was interested in political affairs. Unlike Kadungga, Chaeron, who was involved in a Muhammadiyah-affiliated organization, was not interested in politics. Gus Dur, who seems to have had interests in political affairs, was the leader of NU, the traditionalist organization. Contrary to Gus Dur, Maksum was also involved in an NU-affiliated organization and was not interested in politics (Sujadi 2017, 31-32).

Hines classifies immigrant populations in the Netherlands into three groups. They are, firstly, "guest workers recruited to fill low to unskilled occupations starting after World War II; secondly, migrants from former colonies; and lastly, post-Cold War refugees from newly independent Eastern Europe."109 The PPME key founders cannot be grouped into the second classification of Hines precisely. In spite of the intentions of a number of PPME's founders to look for work in the Netherlands, they cannot be categorized as guest workers as this required the presence of bilateral agreements between the Netherlands and the countries of the guest workers, which were "arranged for less developed nations to supply Europe's [the Netherlands'] labor force," No such agreement existed between the Netherlands and Indonesia. At the same time, the young men could not be classified precisely as part of the second group defined by Hines; namely, migrants that had a "historical, social, cultural, and political relationship with the (32) Netherlands due to its colonial past."111 While they certainly fall into this second group in terms of their Dutch East Indies origins, they were also migrants, looking for employment or with a desire to further their studies without the bilateral agreement. The only relation between the Netherlands and Indonesia was historical, namely, between the colonizer and the colonized prior to Indonesian independence. Dassetto and Nonneman's depiction of Muslim immigrants in Europe as "mostly men, and usually without families, in the early 1960s and the mid-1970s," can also be applied to those who founded PPME, most of whom were unmarried, despite some of them being over 30 years old. Thus, PPME's central figures are mostly unrestricted young migrants seeking

a better life or future in Europe, specifically the Netherlands (Sujadi 2017, 32-33).

Prior to the establishment of PPME, those who established it had little political and legal knowledge of the Netherlands and the dominant Muslim and/or student organizations in the country. They also had no permanent residence permits. These conditions hardly seemed conducive to becoming pioneering youth leaders. In fact, they did not make such endeavours, but were inspired by the following concerns (Sujadi 2017, 33).

Firstly, the founders were committed to performing Islamic teaching, propagating Islam (*da*ʻ*wa*), and protecting the religion of the *umma* (Indonesian Muslims worldwide, in this case, Europe and (33) the Netherlands). This commitment was not hampered by their lack of knowledge of the political and legal situation in the Netherlands. Therefore, they paid attention to their fellow Indonesian Muslims, living in their host country, the Netherlands, who were experiencing difficulties in performing their religious obligations. That is to say, the non-Islamic atmosphere in their new non-Muslim society, coupled with a dearth of Indonesian experts on Islam in the Netherlands, had prevented many of them from performing their Islamic duties and consulting experts about their religious problems. Another focus for them was addressing the concerns of Indonesian Muslims living in the Netherlands, who were unhappy with the fact that they had not concluded their marriages according to Islamic ritual, even though they had concluded their marriages officiated by the Dutch administration. Therefore, they still wanted to renew their wedding vows on the basis of Islamic tenets. In addition, the persons establishing PPME were concerned with those who, when they died, wanted to be buried with Islamic rites (Sujadi 2017, 33-34).

The socio-religious conditions encountered by those who founded PPME and their peers differed greatly from those encountered by the Muslims of the Moluccas, a group of Indonesian islands, who had previously been affiliated with the KNIL. These Moluccan Muslims lived in Friesland, and subsequently in Waalwijk and Ridderkerk. This group of Muslims appeared to be socio-religiously well-organized in the Netherlands. For example, their religious problems were being taken care of by their Moluccan Muslim leader, Akhmad Tan. Furthermore,

they already had their own mosque and their funerals were conducted in an Islamic way (Sujadi 2017, 34).

It is worth mentioning that the difficulties experienced by the fellow Indonesian Muslims who turned to the founders for assistance (34) and advice apparently were not shared by other Indonesian students in Europe. Unlike other Muslims who may be permanent residents of the Netherlands, these students, almost by definition, return home a few years after finishing their study. In general, in addition to having no relatives there, the students mostly thought that they had no opportunity to directly involved in developments taking place in Indonesia. They were of the opinion that they encountered the unfamiliar cultural, political and social structures in their European host countries. This situation might not matter for them because it would take place temporarily and their concerns suggest that religious affairs were not a priority for this group who devoted their energies to social and political activities. Currently, such subjects still become the concern of Indonesian students in the Netherlands (Sujadi 2017, 34-35).

Secondly, the founders of PPME who believed their spirit and faith would assist them in achieving their goal124 wanted to establish a vehicle for their Islamic *da'wa* activities in Europe, and specifically the Netherlands, rather than create an organization comprising "a large number of people banding together in order to alter, supplement, or preserve some portion of the existing order." It appears that the political situation in Indonesia and the Netherlands had encouraged their belief in their dream. During the early years of the New Order regime, *da'wa* activities had been strictly controlled and required official permission. Take, for example, the establishment of Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) in 1967. The name Yayasan Dakwah (Da'wa Foundation) was chosen, rather than one indicating a political party or a mass organization, because the activities of some of DDII's founders had been censored by the government. They had been accused of being (35) involved in a revolt organized by the Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI, the Republic of Indonesia's Revolutionary Government) in Sumatra since February 1958. Establishing a new organization required obtaining permission from the regime. By contrast, establishing a foundation only required approval from a notary as, technically, it had no membership, but rather founders, supporters

and sympathizers – in this case they were called Keluarga Dewan Dakwah (Family of Islamic Propagation Council). These political circumstances had contributed to an uncomfortable political atmosphere for some Islamic preachers in Indonesia. By contrast, in the Netherlands there were no external obstacles to achieving their aims. Moreover, the existence of non-Muslim Indonesian organizations such as Persekutuan Kristen Indonesia (Perki, Indonesian Christian Association) encouraged those who established PPME in their goals. Another factor that should be considered is that between the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, Muslims in the Netherlands had been attempting to unite under a single Islamic organization. Such an effort was in line with the objective of the Dutch government that people should "take their own initiatives and do not depend on the government incentives" (Sujadi 2017, 35-36).

In respect of the founders' shared intentions, we can conclude that they were aware of their fellow Indonesian Muslims in Europe who were in need of religious guidance. This awareness was central to the founders being part of a minority group, which had no significant political capital or access132 that could be employed to change the prevailing socio-political situation. This awareness could be the starting (36) point for the founders to perform their *da'wa* activities among their fellow Indonesian Muslims encountering socio-religious difficulties in the new non-Muslim environment (Sujadi 2017, 36-37).

The establishment of the new Muslim organization known as PPME took place as a result of a series of monthly gatherings held from early January to mid-April 1971. At each gathering, the ideas underpinning the founding of a Muslim organization progressed and their desire to establish such an organization in Europe was discussed intensively by the participants of the gatherings (Sujadi 2017, 37).

The first meeting was held in early January of 1971 at Barenstraat, The Hague, a house belonging to Zitter. In fact, Indonesian young men gathered frequently in Zitter's home and it had become a sort of 'headquarters' for their activities. Thirteen people participated in this inaugural meeting, which commenced just before midnight. A number of those attending lived in Rotterdam and The Hague, while others, such as Kadungga, Ali Baba and A. Doni had travelled from Germany. They discussed a series of ideas that required consideration before establishing a new Muslim organization. For instance, issues such as the

Dutch rules of association in relation to socio-religious organizations, the possibilities of founding a new Muslim organization, the existing Muslim organizations, and the connections between the planned organization and PPI in the Netherlands. They eventually reached an agreement that their plans to found an organization in Holland for Indonesia-affiliated Muslim young men should continue and the meeting came to an end at 3 am (Sujadi 2017, 37).

A second gathering was held at the beginning of February 1971. The number of participants was less than at the first meeting and Kadungga was the only participant from Germany to attend this gathering (37). This meeting resulted in an agreement to form a commission to draft the statute and by-laws of the new organization. This commission consisted of four people: Suhaib, Chaeron and Zitter (who would later be included in the first PPME board) and Kadungga (Sujadi 2017, 37-38).

After further discussions in February and March of 1971, the commission, assisted by Maksum, finally accomplished their task and presented the statute and by-laws of the new Muslim organization. The last meeting was held on 11 April 1971 at 12 pm. This gathering was

attended by 21 participants and culminated in an agreement to use the name the Persatuan Pemuda Muslim se-Eropa (PPME, Young Muslim Association in Europe). Besides the name PPME, there had been other suggestions put forward, including Gerakan Pemuda Islam Eropa (Islamic Youth Movement in Europe) and Organisasi Pemuda Islam Eropa (Islamic Youth Organization in Europe). Two arguments were presented opting for PPME. Firstly, the first word 'Persatuan' (Unity) was relevant to their situation at that moment; and secondly, the word 'Eropa' (Europe) accommodated not only the Dutchman, Zitter, but also another person, al-Hajri, a citizen of the Republic of South Yemen. There was a clear need to acknowledge the various nationalities of the people who founded PPME. This historical gathering ended with a declaration of the establishment of the new organization whose headquarters were at Volmarijnstraat 54 A, Rotterdam (Sujadi 2017, 38).

While there were 21 people who took part in this meeting, two important figures were unable to attend. One of them was Chaeron. He had been an active and creative figure in the new organization and he was actively involved in the founding of the PPME. He was both a founder and a member of the commission for the statute and by-laws and had designed a logo for the organization. Unfortunately, he was unable to attend the meeting due to his job, which had led him to move to Groningen. The other one was Zitter, a member of the board who was in charge of welfare affairs for the new organization. Zitter was unable to attend as he was in Brussels (Sujadi 2017, 39).

Kadungga became the chairman of the PPME. He was elected by the PPME founders following *musyawarah* (a mutual discussion on an equal footing). Each person at the meeting could put forward the name of the person they wanted to chair the PPME. After each participant cast his vote, by writing the name of their choice on a piece of paper, the outcome of the vote was that 14 votes went to Kadungga, 10 to Wahid, 8 to Suhaib, 7 to Muchtar, and 3 to Maksum. The board members of PPME were as follows: Abdul Wahid Kadungga (the chairman), M Suyuthi Suhaib (the deputy chairperson), A. H. Maksum (secretary), Y. Machfud Muchtar (the coordinator of affairs), Rachmat Zitter (the coordinator of logistics affairs), and T. Razali (the coordinator

of art affairs). Gus Dur, who wanted to return to Indonesia, refused to become a member of the PPME (Sujadi 2017, 39).

To identify the characteristics of PPME we must understand not only its statutes and by-laws, but also its members' nationality and socioreligious backgrounds. The PPME's official statutes elucidated that the sole basis of its struggle was Islam, not Indonesian Nationalism. The exclusion of Indonesian Nationalism can be understood in the (39) context of PPME's goals. As mentioned in the statute, the organization was founded with the aim of performing Islamic teaching through Islamic propagation, networks, and (joint) socio-cultural activities. This indicates that PPME did not want to engage in political activities and was autonomous, i.e. that it had no affiliation with the Indonesian government. The exclusion of 'Indonesian Nationalism' from PPME's statute signifies a transcending of ethnic and national boundaries. This is in line with the arguments that without such nationalism it reached a broader audience and would not prevent Muslims of different nationalities from becoming members. With Islam at its foundation, a wide range of values, including even nationalism, could be represented Sujadi 2017, 39-40).

Given the PPME's objectives, non-political orientation, and independence, it made it difficult to classify the organization according to the four categories posited by Waardenburg:

[firstly,] a spiritual association (the first category), which was concerned with the spiritual well-being of its members and better knowledge of religion, and tended to keep a distance from politics and the state; [secondly, an association aimed at] improving the social, cultural and educational conditions…[which] will be keen on obtaining subsidies…; [thirdly, an association that] expresses dissatisfaction with public affairs and government policies in… [its member's countries]; [or fourthly, as an association that] is concerned with bringing about more than incidental changes in laws existing in the European country….

The PPME is not 'a spiritual association' in the same way as, say, the Jamā'atu'l-Tablīgh (Community for Preaching), a Muslim organization which was founded in Northern India and began running on 2 August 1934.152 This is because the PPME also aims at improving the social

(40) and cultural conditions of its members. As a consequence, PPME may be located in Waardenburg's second category, but with a caveat, i.e. the absence of its link to the Indonesian or Dutch governments and the fact that it is not keen on seeking subsidies. In addition, to some extent, the PPME has served as the vehicle for the dissatisfaction of its founders with the restrictive policy of the New Order government in connection with the freedom to perform *da'wa* activities. This function is characteristic of Waardenburg's third category of Muslim organizations in Western Europe. In short, PPME does not fit precisely into Waardenburg's first, second or third classification, but rather is a combination of all three. PPME is an association intended to improve its members' religious and socio-cultural conditions without turning to the government for making its decisions (Sujadi 2017, 40-41).

The logo of the PPME is explained in its by-laws.153 The logo was created in 1972 and launched in 1973, during the first General Meeting, held on the 25-26 of August at the Indonesian Embassy in The Hague. It shows a crescent facing the European continent framed by a circle. Chaeron, who designed the logo, linked this crescent, a symbol for Islam,155 with Europe and PPME accordingly to indicate that intellectuals in Europe started to discuss Islam. Then, Chaeron explained that the circle meant the strong commitment of PPME's young men in performing and presenting Islamic teaching in their daily lives, whereas the European continent represents the target of the PPME's *da'wa* activities. Lastly, the logo contains specific colours, each with a different meaning. For instance, the white of the crescent (41) signifies the holy and perfect Islamic tenets; the light blue is for Europe and indicates that few of the inhabitants of the continent have begun to recognize the truth of Islam; and the dark blue symbolizes the high morality of those who spread Islam on the European continent. Thus, the symbols are focused on Europe, rather than Indonesia (Sujadi 2017, 41-42).

Having discussed its statute and by-laws, we will now turn to the nationalities of the PPME members. From the outset, the founders and members of PPME came from diverse backgrounds and differing islands, such as Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Borneo. This diversity was not limited to ethnicity. As was mentioned above, Zitter was Dutch, whereas al-Hajri came from Yemen. Recently, there has been an

increase in Dutch Muslims registering as members, and actively participating in the branches of PPME in The Hague, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Breda-Tilburg and Heemskerk. Another group that must not be neglected are from Suriname. They originated from there and are mostly Surinamese-Javanese. Lastly, there are PPME members of Arab descent, some of whom hold a Dutch passport, but all of whom have historical ties with Indonesia. In this regard, the observation of Shadid and Van Koningsveld that PPME belonged to the Indonesian community was not mistaken for the period prior to the mid-1990s. Indeed, in this period, the majority of PPME members were Indonesian. This observation is, however, no longer valid due to the presence of the PPME's al-Moekminun (the Believers) group in The Hague since 1996. This is a group comprising the Dutch husbands of Indonesian wives and Dutch converts to Islam. Despite the fact that (42) no information is available about the number of PPME's members with a nationality other than Indonesian,164 there are a considerable number of non-Indonesian members in PPME branches in the Netherlands. This diversity is a result of PPME's basis in Islam, i.e. that all Muslims are welcome, regardless of ethnicity or nationality (Sujadi 2017, 42-43).

In addition to PPME's members being ethnically and nationally diverse, their professions are also heterogeneous. In the course of its early development, the main actors of this new association, Kadungga, a graduate of secondary school and Chaeron, Maksum and Wahid, graduates of universities, were those who would like to further their study in Europe. However, this has changed as the membership of the organization has developed. Today, members of PPME include professionals, unskilled labourers, business people, and pensioners. In addition, the organization continues to welcome students. Up to now, the students who have registered are, generally, family of existing PPME members. Thus, the opinion that the majority of those using PPME prayer halls are Indonesian students living temporarily in the Netherlands is not correct. From the outset, PPME was not established specifically for Indonesian students, but had a wider goal of attracting membership from Muslim communities, (43) especially Indonesians, living in the Netherlands (Sujadi 2017, 43-44).

Finally, since its establishment, PPME's membership has never relied on religious affiliations. As previously mentioned, both

traditionalist and reformist Muslims worked together to found PPME as a socio-religious association. Among its members are also Muslims who have no relation with Indonesian Muslim organizations with either a traditionalist or reformist background. They may not be *santri*s, i.e. Muslims who pay great attention to Islamic doctrines and have gained Islamic knowledge in the *pesantren* system or they may be new Muslims (*mu'allaf*s), i.e. those who may just know Islam and have no Islamic religious background. These new Muslims can become members of its board. Therefore, though its members might opt for NU, Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam or any other Islamic organization, this has never been the main focus of PPME. This flexible stance allowed PPME to maintain its unity from 1971 until the end of 2005, when discord among PPME members led to a schism in the PPME branch in Amsterdam in mid-2010 (Sujadi 2017, 44).

In sum, there are three key points to emerge from this discussion. Firstly, PPME has attained members other than Indonesians. Secondly, the backbone of this socio-religious association consisted of graduates of secondary schools and university alumni, professionals, and businessmen living in Europe, especially in the Netherlands, rather than Indonesia. Lastly, PPME has members with diverse religious backgrounds (Sujadi 2017, 44).

Islam was selected as the foundation of PPME. Opting for Islam, along with the differing Islamic, ethnic, and national backgrounds of its members, has influenced the boards that run the organization. Consequently, these factors have also become a compass for PPME's religious identity formation. While Indonesian Islamic achievements and Islamic practices remain influential, there have been adjustments to the local context, as can be seen from its religious practices and articles in its bulletins (Sujadi 2017, 66).

Religious Practices

A. Islam for Children (1974): From *Kaidah Baghdadiyah* to *Qiroati*

PPME has provided Islamic teaching to the children (4-12 years old) of its members and sympathizers since 1974 in the apartments of its members. Basic subjects such as Islamic faith, Islamic pillars, Quranic recitation, Islamic history, Islamic etiquette, Islamic jurisprudence, and short prayers were taught. Sources frequently recommended for similar lessons in Indonesia have also been used to teach the children.

The ability to recite Quranic verses and to understand their meaning is considered very important by most Muslims (66). Furthermore, the children of PPME members are considered crucial to the future of PPME. Therefore, since the end of 1974, PPME saw the Quranic lesson for children as a way of meeting both these needs. The lessons were set up as part of the weekly PPME activities and took place on either Saturday or Sunday afternoon. Little is known about the text books used for the lesson before the mid-1990s, except that used most was the text book *Kaidah Baghdadiyah* [*Qāida Baghdādiyya*] (The Baghdad Method), which was written by Abu Mansur Hifẓu al-Fikri al-Baghdādī and consisting of the thirtieth part (*juz'un*) of the Quran and composed of short chapters, i.e. no more than 46 verses. This method for teaching children to recite the Quran, which was generally used in Indonesia until the end of the 1980s, emphasizes the ability to recognize and pronounce Arabic from single characters to sentences with its diacritical marks. This is a time-consuming method; children can spend up to five years learning the Quran this way. Of course, the duration depends on the pupil's diligence and capacity. A fast learner may only need (67) two or three years (Sujadi 2017, 66-68).

In the mid-1990s, as time consuming as using the Baghdad Method, another book for the Quranic lesson was introduced in the PPME branches in the Netherlands. The children of PPME members in The Hague were taught the *Cara Cepat Belajar Membaca al-Qur'an* (The Fast Method of Learning Recitation of the Quran) called *Iqra*' (Read), produced by an Indonesian writer, As'ad Humam. In Indonesia, *Iqra'* had been used to teach children since 1988 (Sujadi 2017, 68). The *Iqra'* method was also used by the Quranic teachers of PPME Amsterdam. At the end of 1998, it was Siti Atma, a member of PPME Amsterdam who brought a copy of *Iqra'* from Indonesia and presented it to the board of PPME Amsterdam suggesting they give it a try. This trial was deemed a success. According to Siti Fatimah, the chairperson of the education section of the association, the *Iqra*' provided a simpler and easier method to teach Muslim children living in the Netherlands. Budiyanto, a researcher of the *Iqra method* argued that it is an effective and not time-consuming method of reciting the Quran. Using the *Iqra*' method children were able to recite the Quranic verses between 6 and 18 months. Because of this time efficiency, the *Iqra'* (68) programme

was implemented until 2005 for children of PMME Amsterdam (*Euromoslem*) members and until 2011 for the children of PPME al-Ikhlash Amsterdam (Sujadi 2017, 68-69).

Following the conflict in PPME Amsterdamin 2005, yet another method was used. PPME al-Ikhlash decided to use *Iqra'* to teach the Quran to the children of its members, but PPME Amsterdam was of the opinion that using *Iqra'* did not produce correct pronunciation and also did not succeed in having children recite the verses fluently – a prerequisite to achieve a higher level of the recitation study. Consequently, PPME Amsterdam opted for another method, *Metode Praktis Belajar Membaca al-Qur'an* (The Practical Method of Learning to Recite the Quran) from *Qiroati* written by another Indonesian author, Dachlan Salim Zarkasy. At least until November 2011, PPME teachers in The Hague and at PPME al-Ikhlash still used *Iqra'* whereas the *Qiroati* was used by PPME Amsterdam after a visit by an imam of *tarāwiḥ* prayers from Indonesia, Khoirul Muttaqin during *Ramaḍān* in 2005. He told them that the *Qiroati* has been used for teaching Quranic recitation at his family *pesantren* in Jepara, Middle Java, called Roisah, a *pesantren* at which Quranic recitation is one of the main subjects taught and to which PPME Amsterdam gives its donations (discussed in chapter 7). His good Quranic recitation, acquired at the *pesantren,* was evident while leading the *tarāwīḥ* prayers in PPME Amsterdam that were followed not only by its members, but also (69) by other Indonesian, Moroccan, and Egyptian people also seem to have inspired the PPME Amsterdam's decision to use the method. Astin, a co-ordinator of *da'wa* activities for PPME Amsterdam, asserted that the main reason for the change in method used was that the *Qiroati* method emphasized aspects of pronunciation and fluency when teaching children to recite the Quran. Teachers of the Quranic recitation in PPME Amsterdam needed to have a Quranic pronunciation (*makhārij*) test. As a result, the teachers would have a similar viewpoint on how to teach the children Quranic recitation. Up to now, the children of PPME Amsterdam members are given Quranic lessons using the *Qiroati* method, used at the Roisah, every Sunday afternoon (Sujadi 2017, 69-70).

B. *Ikhtilāṭ* in the Indonesian-Speaking Group (Early 1975): From Being an Inevitable, to an Accepted, Practice

The meeting for PPME's Indonesian-speaking group has been held on the last weekend of the month since early 1975. In the 1970s, meetings were held in the members' houses in The Hague and environs. No specific topic was selected in advance for this monthly activity. As a result, a diversity of topics was discussed at a meeting. Following the purchase of a building which was then used as a *muṣalla* (place of worship) called *al-Ittihaad* in October 1982, an agenda was set determining the Islamic subjects to be discussed during the group's monthly meetings. After 1993, guest speakers were invited to the meetings and asked to talk on a specific Islamic topic. From the late 1990s this monthly activity became more organized and a wide range of Islamic subjects was presented by a number of speakers. For example, Islamic jurisprudence was taught by A. H. Maksum, M. Isyak gave a talk on Islamic etiquette, Islamic history was taught by M. Chaeron, and A. Naf'an Sulchan spoke on Islamic faith. Other (70) PPME members, including Asief Ishom and A. F. Mas'udi, were also involved in supporting these events by covering for the teachers who were unable to attend. This improved arrangement can be directly linked to the purchase of the Indonesian *al-Hikmah* (Wisdom) Mosque in 1996. The PPME was given permission to use the mosque for the activities of its members, especially those in The Hague, and thus enabled them to hold such meetings weekly (Sujadi 2017, 70-71).

The meetings, which currently take place every Saturday, are attended by both men and women. They share the same space and are not separated by a *sātir* (a cloth dividing a room in two). They are in the same room, but their seats are separated – women were on the right side and men on the left one. This practice is known as *ikhtilāṭ* and means the mingling of men and non-*maḥārim* (a plural form of *maḥram*, i.e. a relative with whom marriage is prohibited) in one place without a *sātir*. For reformist Muslims, such as Ibn Taymiyyah and A. Hassan (Persis), *ikhtilāṭ* is forbidden. Ibn Taymiyyah stated in his *Majmū' al-Fatāwā* (The Collection of Formal Legal Opinions) that, "the mingling of man and woman will initiate temptation (*fitna*). Men who mingle with women are like fire close to wood," whereas Hassan asserted, "Islamic viewpoints forbid male Muslims from seeing female Muslims and they are required to separate the two different sexes in their social

interaction." These viewpoints suggest that it is unlawful and, therefore, must be avoided (Sujadi 2017, 71).

However, the reformist viewpoints contradict with the gathering of PPME to learn Islam, in this case via *ikhtilāṭ*. The phenomenon of *ikhtilāṭ* is also found in branches other than PPME in The Hague, including at PPME al-Ikhlash in Amsterdam (not PPME Amsterdam) and PPME ar-Rahman [*al-Raḥmān*] (the Merciful) in Breda. Initially, the *ikhtilāṭ* was chosen due to the (71) lack of facilities for PPME gatherings. This seems to be in line with Waardenburg's observation that Muslims in Western Europe, especially in the 1970s, encountered financial problems that influenced the running of their activities and associations, and also their survival. In the case of PPME, prior to the purchase of the *Muṣalla* of *al-Ittihaad* in 1982, meetings to acquire Islamic knowledge from PPME preachers took place in members' homes. This meant that male and female members met under the *ikhtilāṭ* conditions. This practice continued, despite the board of PPME purchasing a *muṣallā* in 1982313 which has a big gathering room that can be divided into two by a *sātir* (Sujadi 2017, 71-72).

PPME The Hague holds the *ikhtilāṭ* gatherings after the Indonesian *al-Hikmah* Mosque was purchased in September 1996 despite the fact that there are, at least, three rooms available for religious gatherings. This means that the reason for the *ikhtilāṭ* was no longer the lack of facility. Maksum asserted that the *Ikhtilāṭ* was sustained in order to avoid separating PPME's female and male members radically and to adjust to the prevailing conditions of Dutch society. He added that these integrated gatherings would not lead people to commit sins (*ma'ṣiyya*) because of the sheer number of people who attend, i.e. around a hundred; the meetings held in the *muṣalla* or mosque were not small, intimate gatherings. Though his analogy is questionable, Maksum also stated that the practice of *ikhtilāṭ* could also be found during the *hajj* (pilgrimage). This adjustment relied upon the common good (*maṣlaḥa hājiyya*) – a term of al-Ghazali which means a common good that is necessary for the raising of goodness and for adjustment to prevailing conditions. It "has, according to Ramadan (the writer (72) of *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*), to do with the prevention of anything that could be a source of difficulty in the life of the community…." Thus, avoiding separating men and women in a gathering (which is not familiar to Dutch

society) seems to be Maksum's focus. Similarly, A. Naf'an Sulchan stated that when propagating Islam, Islamic teachings needed to be delivered in accordance with the PPME members' differing ethnic and religious backgrounds. Radical change should be avoided. Separating men and women would be a radical change. He even went on to argue that if a member, male or female, were to ask him, for instance, to dance with people attending an *ikhtilāṭ* gathering, he would accept the request. This is a strategy of *da'wa* (Sujadi 2017, 72-73).

In sum, the facts suggest that *ikhtilāṭ* was practiced at PPME The Hague, and elsewhere, primarily due to a lack of accommodation and also because of the backgrounds of the members, as well as the prevailing conditions in the Netherlands. These factors will also contribute to the continued existence of this practice (Sujadi 2017, 73).

C. Islamic Marriages (1975): Islamic and Positive Laws

The PPME board has presided over Islamic marriages in the Netherlands since 29 March 1975.319 Indeed, facilitating the marriages of its members has been a key part of PPME's incidental activity. Available data suggest that PPME presided over the marriage of 15 couples between 1976 and 1979, five couples between 1984 and 1986, four couples between 1997 and 1998, 15 couples between 2000 and 2002, 12 couples between 2002 and (73) 2004, and seven couples in 2005. In 2008 a couple was married by the PPME The Hague and in 2009 a couple was married by the PPME Amsterdam. Those married were not just Indonesian couples, but also couples of mixed nationalities such as an Indonesian with a Dutch, Malaysian, or British spouse. All of the abovementioned marriages took place in The Hague, Amsterdam, or Rotterdam, usually in the bride's home, *al-Ittihaad Muṣalla*, *al-Hikmah* Mosque, or the place of worship of PPME Amsterdam (Sujadi 2017, 73-74).

The members of PPME's boards acted as the *waliyy ḥakīm* (the authoritative marriage guardian); the witness or the registrar at these marriages. There were no complicated requirements for Muslim couples who wanted to marry under the board's arrangements. This ease reflected the PPME's stance on marriage, namely, "making the performing of marriage easy and making the performing of divorce difficult" – a principle that supports the goal of the marriage, i.e.

“preventing fornication.” These marriages were primarily based on the principles of Islamic Law such as the attendance of a Muslim (or People of the Book) bride and bridegroom, a *waliyy* (a woman’s closest adult male relative who has authority and responsibility with respect to the marriage of the bride), two Muslim male witnesses, and offer-acceptance (*ījāb*-*qabūl*) declaration. They were also based on the official (74) administrative requirements of the Netherlands such as having a valid birth certificate and proof of citizenship. When these requirements were met, the marriage could be conducted. As a result, the marriages were valid according to Islamic law and the married couple was then given their marriage certificate by the board (Sujadi 2017, 74-75).

With regard to marriages involving Indonesians living in the Netherlands, since 1975 PPME has used Indonesian Law Number 1 of 1974 as a guiding principle for the marriages. Indeed, in the 1980s, many marriages were conducted by PPME in cooperation with authorized staff from the Indonesian Embassy in the Netherlands. In practice, this could be as simple as Embassy staff being informed and invited to attend the marriages. Then, in the late 1990s, a more serious effort to follow Indonesian Law was made when conducting marriages. The officiating

of Islamic marriages became part of PPME activities. Since the early 2000s, in order to avoid breaking the positive law on marriage prevailing in Indonesia, couples would be given legal documents relating to their Islamic marriage not only from the PPME, but also from the authorized officer of the Indonesian Embassy in the Netherlands. This meant that the PPME, in conducting Islamic marriages of Indonesian couples, has to involve officials of the embassy acting as the registrar, the official recorder, and the supervisor of the (75) performance of marriages (Sujadi 2017, 75-76).

Currently, PPME's arrangements are in such a way that a conflict with the marriage laws of the Netherlands is avoided. A Dutch person living in the Netherlands, when he or she intended to get married, has to do so in front of a Dutch marriage registrar whereas the Indonesian government only recognizes the marriage of an Indonesian couple overseas on the condition that it is conducted according to the marriage law of the country in which the ceremony is taking place. Therefore, the marriage certificate that PPME issues to the couple is not a legal document, but rather proof of their Islamic marriage. In addition, when the couple is of mixed nationalities (say, Dutch-Indonesian), the couple is also recommended to marry both under the arrangement of PPME and in front of a Dutch marriage official. Thus, this is in line not only with the regulation on marriage of the Indonesian Embassy, but also with the prevailing procedure of marriage in The Netherlands (Sujadi 2017, 76).

D. Assisting Converts (the Early 1980s)

Since the early 1980s, PPME has provided assistance to non-Muslims wanting to convert to Islam. This incidental assistance takes place at a number of locations where PPME activities are held, including the *Muṣallā* of *al-Ittihaad* and *al-Hikmah* Mosque (The Hague), at PPME Amsterdam (later called *at-Taqwa*), the Mosque of *Baiturrahman* (the House of the Merciful) in Ridderkerk, and at the homes of the converts. The assistance to be given would depend on the converts' needs. In the 1980s, the main reason for conversion under the guidance of PPME was for marriage. For instance, between 1984 and 1986 five out of nine converts became Muslim because they wanted to marry a Muslim. There is no (77) information relating to Islamic marriages overseen by the boards of PPME in the 1990s whereas in the

2000s, the situation reflected that of the 1980s, i.e. the majority of converts became Muslim for marriage. For instance, 12 out of 15 converts at the *al-Hikmah* Mosque between 2000 and 2002 became Muslim for marriage, whereas in 2005 the figure was four out of nine converts (Sujadi 2017, 77-78).

In addition to marriage, there is another reason for people converting to Islam under the guidance of PPME. For instance, Hennie Hammink, chairperson of PPME in The Hague (2011-2012), converted to Islam on 3 September 1995 at *al-Ittihaad Muṣalla* under the guidance of Sa'ad Syamlan, a preacher invited from Indonesia for the commemoration of the Prophet's birth. Hammink converted to Islam as the result of a journey to find his own consciousness and search for a meaningful life. He found the meaning he was looking for by attending the weekly gatherings held in the *muṣalla* and he asserted in his writing entitled "*Ik heb mezelf in Islam gevonden* (I have found myself in Islam)" – that is to say, there was a psychological rationale behind his conversion (Sujadi 2017, 78).

Then, one of the 15 people PPME who converted to Islam in the 2000s did not do so for the reason of marriage or a psychological reason. The convert became a Muslim in order to avoid complications in Indonesia. This included having an Islamic marriage officiated by the PPME. The convert believed that having the PPME's Islamic marriage document would make it easier to respond to questions frequently raised by families in Indonesia about their Islamic marriage. In Java, especially in Yogyakarta, such questions also will be raised by the head of Rukun Tetangga (RT, Neighbourhood), who requires the copy of the couple's marriage status document when they want to spend the night in the same house or room in his village (Sujadi 2017, 78).

E. Pengajian Remaja (the Early 1990s): *Pesantren Kilat, Iqra'* and an-Nasyid Remaja

In the early 1990s, the second generation of PPME members in the Netherlands, i.e. the children of its founders and congregations, founded their own group called Pengajian Remaja (PR, Islamic Teaching for Youths). The group (of children between 15 and 18 years old) was led by Hansyah Iskandar, an Indonesian and Dutch-speaking graduate of Delft University. Iskandar was later the chairperson of PPME Arrahman Breda. The group's Secretary was Aaman Sulchan, an

Indonesian and Dutch-speaking graduate of Leiden University, as well as the chairperson of PPME The Hague between 2005 and 2010. This PR, the majority of its members being Dutch speakers, emerged from dissatisfaction with the weekly Islamic teaching delivered in the PPME's Indonesian-speaking groups where the working language was Indonesian and only a summary of the Islamic teachings was provided in Dutch. In response to this situation, Yani Kurdi and Moch. Chaeron were appointed as advisors to the PR in the 1990s.355 In the 2000s, the PR's coordinators were Réné Hendriks, the coordinator of the Dutch-speaking group called al-Moekminun and Taty Suhartono, the vice-chairperson of PPME The Hague (Sujadi 2017, 79).

There were two main reasons for forming the PR, namely to stimulate PPME youth to be able to do self-study about Islam and to provide a space for them to discuss their religious lives in a non-Muslim society. To achieve these ends, the PR held Islamic teaching and *pesantren kilat* (short Islamic courses). It also issued (79) a bulletin called *Iqra'* and formed a music group called an-Nasyid Remaja (Youth's Islamic Song) (Sujadi 2017, 79-80).

Initially, the PR provided bi-monthly Islamic teaching on the second and fourth Sunday of the month on subjects such as Islamic faith, etiquette, and law. For example, on the subject of faith, they learned about principles such as the existence of Allah, the mission of the Prophet Muhammad for human beings, and human beings according to Islam. With regard to morals (*akhlāq*), pupils were taught about things such as why Islamic morals are important, that the Prophet Muhammad is the best representation of Islamic *akhlāq,* and the relations between Muslims with adherents of other religions and other societies. In respect to *Sharī'a* (Islamic Law), pupils learned, for instance, about obligatory prayers, Islamic marriage, and Islamic attitudes towards sexual intercourse (Sujadi 2017, 80).

Subsequently, PR held *pesantren kilat,* which is unique to PPME and crucial to the development of second-generation PPME members. No other Muslim organizations in the Netherlands offer this kind of non-formal Islamic education; they prefer to regularly provide religious instruction via their Islamic schools or mosques. The organizer of *pesantren kilat* asked for its participants to stay a few days in a certain place – not necessary at mosque – to study Islam and receive information

about PPME both during the day and in the evening. The language used was Dutch. It was first held on 5-6 August 1995 in the building at Van Eversdijckstraat 31, Rotterdam. The second *pesantren kilat* was held at a campsite, (80) Camping Duinhoeve, Rotterdam. It took place from 28 to 30 June 1999 and was attended by 62 participants from all the branches of PPME in the Netherlands. In the 2000s, the *pesantren kilat* was held many times: on 11 September 2002 at the Mosque of *an-Nur* belonging to a Moluccan community in Waalwijk; in 2003 it was held at the Mosque of *Baiturrahman* belonging to the Moluccan community in Ridderkerk; in 2004 it was held on 30 April and 1-2 May at the Mosque of *Baiturrahman*; and in 2005 it was held at the Mosque of *al-Hikmah* during the last week of Ramadan. As a result, participants of these courses gained not only diverse Islamic knowledge, but also organizational knowledge of PPME, both of which will assist them in their roles as future PPME leaders (Sujadi 2017, 80-81).

An example from 1995 highlights the achievements. The *pesantren kilat*, as run by the PR in the Netherlands, tends to have similar content with those held in Indonesia. Thirty-five participants from all of the PPME branches in the Netherlands attended. Participants were taught Islamic jurisprudence, worship practices, Islamic history, Islamic faith, Islamic *akhlāq*, Quranic exegesis, and the Traditions of the Prophet. Lectures on PPME's history, roles, functions, and orientation were also delivered. It is worth noting that in addition to the subjects on Islam and PPME, participants were also given an opportunity to explore and discuss any problems experienced in both their private and public lives in the Netherlands. As a result, the participants (81) were provided not only Islamic and organizational subjects, but also solutions to problems important for the cadres of the PPME (Sujadi 2017, 81-82).

In addition to *pesantren kilat*, in 1996 the PR published a Dutch bulletin called *Iqra'*. This bulletin was published bimonthly, alternating with PR's programme of Islamic teaching. The viewpoint of Eickelman and Anderson that "…means of communication have multiplied the possibilities for…opening new grounds for interaction…" seems to be relevant considering the *Iqra*. It can offer its writers' ideas to its readers, especially to PPME's first generation. *Iqra'* served as a means for PPME youth to express their religious ideas and experiences and most of the contributions to the bulletin were written by young PPME members.

One example is Rachmawati (a daughter of PPME's founder, Moch. Chaeron) who discussed the story of Isrā' Mi'rāj (Midnight Journey to the Seven Heavens) of the Prophet Muhammad and Aaman Sulchan (a son of the leading PPME figure and Islamic expert, A. Naf'an Sulchan) dealt with the significance of the fasting month. No less important was Hansyah Iskandar who interviewed Naf'an Sulchan. The latter argued that PPME's youth had to be able, for instance, to benefit from their existence in the Netherlands to seek for both Islamic and secular knowledge in order to develop the existence of Muslims in the Netherlands. Besides, he hoped that the PR could provide assistance to teach Islam to the Dutch-speaking children of PPME. This suggested that Naf'an Sulchan was optimistic about the future of the children in the Netherlands. The examples show that *Iqra'* was adopted as a vehicle for PPME youth not only to express their own Islamic points of view, but also to discuss their own life experiences in the context of Islamic teaching. Unfortunately, the publication (82) ceased to exist after 2000 (Sujadi 2017, 82-83).

Finally, music, which has been judged by some ulama as lawful

and by others as unlawful, was a feature of the PPME youth. The PR formed the music group an-Nasyid Remaja in 2006. This date shows that the band that sings *nasyid*s [*nashīds*] (songs of praise to God or spiritual songs about the glory of Islam) came into existence much later compared to those in Indonesia that had already become popular at the end of the 1990s. The group have a distinctly Indonesian style, i.e. its male members frequently wear *koko* (a long-sleeved white shirt) and *kopiah* (a black, rimless cap). It played its *nasyid* music using guitars – it is not acapella as many bands in Indonesia and Malaysia are (sung by a group of people without any musical instruments). Sometimes female vocalists are featured. The music was performed beyond PPME's congregations. For instance, an-Nasyid Remaja took part in a commemoration of the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad on 11 April 2009 held in The Hague; they also participated in a night of cultural events called 'Initiatives of Change' held in Caux, Switzerland on 22 September 2009 and at the anniversary of the (83) mosque of *Baiturrahman* on 10 October 2009. The existence of this music group and their performances at diverse events indicate that the board of PPME and its Islamic experts have allowed the music group to progress, and even endorsed the use of instruments to play their music. This suggests that PPME leans towards the view of *ulama* such as the Jurist Ibn Hazm al-Andalusi and the Sufi Imam al-Gazali that singing with musical instruments is 'recommended' (Sujadi 2017, 83-84).

The facts demonstrate PPME's tolerance of the diverse characteristics of its members. This, in turn, has enabled its youth members to develop their own programmes. Both Islamic teaching and the backgrounds of members have been taken into consideration when forming the content of these programmes. The PR has been labelled the junior PPME and the breeding ground for future PPME leaders who are developing their interpretation of Islam according to their own characteristics (Sujadi 2017, 84).

F. Dutch-Speaking Group (1995): From Learning Islam to Lecturing on Islam

Islamic teaching is also provided for PPME's Dutch-speaking groups, which have been established in all its branches in the Netherlands. The focus of this section is the Dutch-speaking group of PPME The Hague, mostly consisting of the Dutch husbands of PPME

female members. The reason for this choice is the changes two of its participants underwent, i.e. from learning Islam to teaching and delivering speeches on Islamic subjects.

Before a Dutch-speaking group were formed by PPME The Hague, the Dutch-speaking men attended a group called Islamic teaching for Indonesian-speakers. Many attended at the request of their wives. However, it was only possible to provide a summary of the Indonesian Islamic teaching sessions in Dutch. Many of (84) the husbands were dissatisfied with this situation and the lack of detailed information. This proved to be a catalyst for the emergence of the Dutch-speaking group on 2 July 1995. Sessions were held at the PPME's *Muṣallā al-Ittihaad.* Given that the working language was Dutch, Tjen A Kwoei, a Dutch-Surinamese member who had been the chairman of PPME Rotterdam at the end of the 1980s and a writer of a number of articles in PPME's bulletins in Dutch, was requested to be the group's teacher. Accordingly, he delivered lectures on basic Islamic knowledge such as Islamic pillars and the pillars of faith (*aqīda*) (Sujadi 2017, 84-85).

Since the middle of August 1996, the Dutch-speaking group moved to *al-Hikmah* Mosque in The Hague, which was under the supervision of the Indonesian Embassy in the Netherlands. By now, the group had expanded to include Islamic converts and PPME's sympathizers speaking Dutch. In the same year, a member of the group, Ludo Jongmans, proposed that the group adopted the name al-Moekminun. Asief Ishom who studied Islam at al-Azhar University, Egypt (a reformist-oriented coordinator of the group and leading PPME figure) suggested that they should invite other teachers on their own initiative in order that they could choose Islamic teachers they needed and would be responsible for their own activities. Sulchan (a traditionalist-oriented leading PPME figure) supported Ishom's suggestion "as far as such a move would not challenge the foundations of the PPME and the diverse backgrounds of its members. This move should not lead to discord among members of the Dutch-speaking group. The disintegration that happened to PPME Amsterdam because of the challenge to the diversity should not occur in (85) other PPME branches."390 The group followed Ishom's suggestion to invite teachers from outside the PPME on the basis of their own arrangements. As a

result, different teachers taught at different occasions (Sujadi 2017, 85-86).

From 1996 to the 2000s, the following were the teachers included in different programmes. For the biweekly programme, in addition to Tjen A Kwoei, other teachers were involved. Two times a month the Moroccan Abdul Azizi gave the group lessons on *tajwīd* (knowledge of reciting the Quran correctly) and Rafiq de Vries taught the group *Ḥadīth* (the Tradition of the Prophet Muhammad). Then, for a monthly programme, in addition to A. Naf'an Sulchan (a traditionalist teacher from the PPME) who taught the group Quranic exegesis, Islamic teachers from outside the PPME such as Abdul Wahid van Bommel and Ibrahim Spalburg were asked to give talks to the group in the last week of every month. In addition to those teachers, Remi Soekirman, a scholar of Islamic theology who graduated from Madina University, Saudi Arabia and who was also from outside the PPME, participated later. In the same period, under the guidance of Ishom and Rafiq de Vries, the group set up a weekly programme. Every Saturday afternoon, for example, lectures were held on the basic teachings of Islam, including better understanding of the pillars of Islam and the pillars of faith, the recitation of short chapters of *Juz 'Ammā* (The thirtieth part of the Quran), the Prophet's Traditions, and Quranic exegesis. These subjects were taught by teachers from both inside and outside the PPME. Sometimes, members of the group were asked to deliver the talks. Consequently, participants of al-Moekminun have been exposed to a range of teachers and gained Islamic knowledge, at least, from both traditionalist and (86) reformist perspectives (Sujadi 2017, 86-87).

The providing of Islamic knowledge from such diverse Islamic teachers, rather than through formal education or by attending intensive Islamic courses offered by Islamic organizations and educational institutions, reflects the characteristics of PPME. Réné Hendriks and Ludo Jongmans (the senior participants of al-Moekminun) have ever been invited to deliver lectures on Islam to both PPME members and others. For instance, Hendriks taught basic Islamic history in Dutch to the second generation at the *pesantren kilat* (short Islamic courses) held in Rotterdam in 1996. This stimulated the board of PR at the end of 1997 to ask the board of PPME to support more teaching by Dutch-speaking teachers from al-Moekminun. Consequently, in 2006 he was asked to

deliver an Islamic lecture in Dutch on the Prophet Muhammad at an event commemorating the Prophet's birth. He has also lectured on Islamic jurisprudence in English in relation to *zakāt al-fiṭr* (almsgiving during Ramadan) and *zakāt al-māl* (annual almsgiving) at a workshop held in The Hague in 2009 organized by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The theme of the workshop was the remittances sent back to Indonesia by Indonesians living abroad. Ludo Jongmans frequently talked on diverse Islamic subjects at al-Moekminun meetings. He was also sometimes invited to give speeches in Dutch in the weekly meeting of PPME al-Ikhlash Amsterdam. Furthermore, he was one of the Islamic preachers in the marriage ceremony of Rachmawati (mentioned above) on 24 October 2008 in *al-Hikmah* Mosque – it was in Dutch. Thus, Hendriks and Jongmans are regarded as "Western (87) intellectuals who truly believe in the Islamic faith, …[and who] made great efforts to preach Islam…," and who are valuable to PPME because of their Islamic knowledge, as well as their Dutch Language (Sujadi 2017, 88).

In sum, the members of the PPME Dutch-speaking group have been given opportunities to deliver speeches on Islamic subjects that are important not only for PPME members, especially PPME's young generation, but also for Muslim audiences outside PPME. These lectures are based on Islamic knowledge acquired from teachers with diverse Islamic backgrounds. This, once again, reflects the basis and characteristics of the association with an emphasis on a diversity of religious backgrounds (Sujadi 2017, 88).

G. *Dauroh* (2008): In Search of One New Religious Orientation

A *dauroh* [*dawra*] (intensive Islamic studies) is held twice a year by PPME Amsterdam and has been occurring since 2008. This activity takes place over two weeks in May-June and in December-January. It is led by a preacher invited from Indonesia. Courses taught every day in each *dauroh* are principally the same, i.e. *aqīda* (faith) and the Traditions of the Prophet using the same Islamic books as long as the discussion on these subjects is not finished yet, whereas courses that are taught weekly follow the needs of its congregation (Sujadi 2017, 88).

The following is an example of *dauroh* held at the end of 2008 led by a Salafi preacher, Abu Haidar, who was invited (88) from

Indonesia by the PPME branch. It took place in the main room of the PPME Amsterdam centre, which in mid-2010 was renamed *at-Taqwa* [*al-Taqwā*] (Piety). Male and female participants sat separately on the floor and listened to the preacher's talks which were arranged according to a specific schedule. The talks were given in the evening (after ‘*ishā*), at dawn (after *ṣubḥ*), and in the afternoon (after *‘aṣr*). A cloth two metres high called the *sātir* separated the men from the women. This is in contrast to the practice of *ikhtilāṭ* implemented at gatherings by other PPME branches. In this case, the preacher sat together with the men. To have the women follow his sermon, it was filmed and projected on a wall. This video link also offered them the opportunity to pose questions orally (Sujadi 2017, 88-89).

The *dauroh* of 2008 lasted for two weeks. It began by mid-December 2008 – the date was chosen considering the possibility of a preacher invited from Indonesia. It aimed at enhancing Islamic knowledge among members and had the title "Towards an Understanding of True Islamic Faith". Subjects ranging from Islamic faith to issues relating to women were discussed every day. A book entitled *Arba‘īn Nawāwī* (The Forty Traditions of the Prophet) by Imam Nawawi was used to facilitate the first session from 15:00 to 16:00 after *‘aṣr*. Then, between 19.00 and 21.00 a talk called "The Comprehension of True Islamic Faith" was given referencing *Sharḥ Thalāthati'l-Uṣūl* (Commentary on (89) Three Principles) written by Muḥammad ibn Ṣaliḥ al-‘Uthaymin. Finally, another book, entitled "*Riyāḍ al-Ṣāliḥīn* (The Gardens of the Righteous)," by Imam Nawawi was discussed from 07:00 to 08:00 after dawn prayers. Other sessions held during this *dauroh* course included sessions every Sunday, between 13:00 and 16:00, to discuss a book entitled *al-Wasāil al-Mufīda Lil-‘Ḥayāt al-Sa‘īda* (Effective Media for Achieving Happiness) by Qasim ‘Abd al-Rahman. In addition, Islamic preaching specifically for women was held on Wednesdays from 13:00 to 16:00. These sessions made use of a book called *Wājibāt al-Mar‘at al-Muslima fī Naẓrat al-Qur'ān wal-‘Sunnah* (Obligations for Muslim Women according to the Quran and the Tradition of the Prophet Muhammad) by Ummu ‘Amr. Thus, within two weeks the *dauroh* participants had received both an intensive and a diverse range of Islamic courses (Sujadi 2017, 89-90).

Seemingly, the *dauroh* had a special aim which has been mentioned before. It was to purify the *aqīda* (faith) of PPME members. Two groups that emerged after the split – PPME Amsterdam and PPME al-Ikhlash – had different stances on interpreting *aqīda* (faith) in relation to performing *istighotsah*. Participants of the *dauroh* study the Traditions of the Prophet using the works Salafi people use such as *Arba'īn Nawāwī* and *Riyāḍ al-Ṣāliḥīn.* Unlike the study of the Traditions which lasted only one hour, the study of the *aqīda,* which was a core part of the *daurah* in 2008, lasted three hours and was offered in the evening. As a result, most of PPME Amsterdam members who had to work during the day could attend the session. The theme – "Towards an Understanding of True Islamic Faith" seemingly reflects the schism that occurred in the Amsterdam branch in mid-2005 (Sujadi 2017, 90).

Istighotsah are intercessory prayers asking for God's protection and assistance. *Istighotsah* involves the recitation of a given (90) package of prayers. These prayers are longer and more varied than those of the *tahlilan* (part of the *istighotsah*). For example, it also includes reciting God's names (*Asmā' al-Ḥusnā*). *Yasinan* and *tahlilan* are frequently performed as an introduction to PPME's *istighotsah* activities. All the intercessory prayers are recited loudly in the same way that the prayers of *Qādiriyya* are recited in the Sufi tradition (Sujadi 2017, 90-91).

Instead of performing the *istighotsah* (including *tahlilan* and *yasinan*) members of the board of PPME Amsterdam preferred to practice *dauroh*, which is used for improving Islamic knowledge of its members. They went so far as to raise objections against accommodating *istighotsah* in the PPME's new building at Ekingenstraat at the end of 2004. These objections were in line with the viewpoint of Yazid ibn Abdul Qadir Jawas, author of *Mulia dengan Manhaj Salaf* (Noble with Salaf Method), and who has studied Islam with Muhammad ibn Ṣalih al-'Uthaymin. He refers to a point made by Abu Abdu'l-Salam Hasan ibn Qasim al-Hasani, the writer of a book entitled *Irshādu'l-Bariya* (The Guidance for Creatures), asserting that "…a Salafi does not gather with those performing *bid'a* (innovation)...." Similarly, PPME Amsterdam's members argue that *istighotsah* leads to *shirk* (polytheism) and is not based upon Islamic teaching and therefore is *bid'a*. This was in contrast to the view of members of PPME al-Ikhlash (Sujadi 2017, 91).

The emotional responses of PPME al-Ikhlash and the apparent urgency to enlighten the PPME Amsterdam's members on *istighotsah* drove PPME Amsterdam's board to use the *dauroh* as the media of introducing Salafi religious orientation. In fact, PPME was established on the basis of the diverse religious backgrounds of its founders – traditionalists and reformists have always been the backbone of PPME.

Such diversity has been evident among the members of PPME in The Hague, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and Breda-Tilburg. However, the PPME Amsterdam board members tend to use the *dauroh* to introduce to its members a new religious orientation that they consider to be the proper way. Amghar, a sociologist of *l'Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales* (EHESS), Paris, calls it a Salafi focusing on "the correction of belief and of religious activities" – the second tendency of Salafism in Europe, with a (92) view to perfecting their belief. This effort has been highlighted by the presence of Abu Haedar, a Salafi preacher, at the *dauroh* in 2008. Then, Salafi texts in the programme were used. For instance, *Sharḥ Thalatsati'l-Uṣūli* (Commentary on Three Principles), written by a well-known figure in the Salafi world, Muḥammad ibn Ṣaliḥ al-'Uthaymin, has been used in the programme to teach Islamic faith. The Indonesian translation of this Arabic book was even available for participants to buy. This book contains information on, among other things, the types of polytheism, i.e. the great polytheism that results in exclusion from Islam, and the small one that does not result in exclusion. It also talks about *Istighotsah* which is classified into four categories. They are an appeal for aid from Allah directly; an appeal for aid from the dead who are incapable of providing assistance; an appeal from the living who are capable of providing assistance; and an appeal for aid from the living incapable of providing assistance. The second and fourth categories are forbidden. Appealing for aid from the dead leads to polytheism (*shirk*) and appealing for aid from those alive who are unable to help is seen as mocking others. PPME Members (with the exception of the congregation of PPME Amsterdam) appealing for Allah's aid by mentioning the names of a particular *ulama* (*wasīla*), for instance 'Abdul Qādir al-Jīlāni (Sufi), are not welcome at activities organized by PPME Amsterdam who have been consolidating their new religious orientation (Sujadi 2017, 92-93).

To conclude, the *dauroh* programme has been a vehicle for the board of PPME Amsterdam to improve and increase levels of comprehension of Islam by its members, in particular their knowledge of Islamic faith. This has served as a means to shape (93) their Salafi religious orientation. This new religious orientation actually may not detract from the characteristics of PPME, which favour a diversity of religious backgrounds among its members. This new religious

orientation may extend the PPME's identity when there is still space for diversity among members. However, the disintegration of PPME in Amsterdam indicates the opposite and signifies that one religious orientation has deliberately been singled out for members of PPME Amsterdam (Sujadi 2017, 93-94).

II. Religious Discourses

Publishing bulletins has been a part of PPME's activities in the Netherlands since early 1972. There were at least six bulletins available to the association's congregations. For instance, *al-Falah* [*al-Falāḥ*] (The Success) was published from 1972 to the end of the 1970s; *al-Ittihaad* [*al-Ittiḥād*] (The Unity) was published from 1985 to the late 1990s; and *Iqra'* was issued from 1996 to the late 1990s. In addition to the bulletins published by the centre PPME, its branches in the Netherlands have also published such bulletins. For instance, since 1993 PPME Amsterdam has issued *Euromoslem*; from 1995 to the late 1990s, PPME The Hague has published Z*ikra* (Remembrance); and from early 1999 to 2000 PPME Rotterdam issued *Afdeling* (Division) Rotterdam. In the following section, the author's Islamic backgrounds, writings, and viewpoints in *al-Ittihaad* and *Euromoslem* will be discussed. These two publications are chosen because they were well-read (Sujadi 2017, 94).

A. *Al-Ittihaad* (1985)

Al-Ittihaad containing the information on activities of PPME has served as a resource for PPME's *da'wa* activities both in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1980s, both traditionalist and reformist authors were given space in the bulletin. For instance, in the foreword of *al-Ittihaad* of July (1985: 2-4), Maksum, a traditionalist, discussed the law of *halal bihalal* [*ḥalāl bī ḥalāl*] (a gathering for forgiving one another) and inauguration of the *al-Ittihaad Muṣallā* – laws on subjects which cannot be found in the life of the Prophet. He was of the opinion that it was lawful to hold them. Furthermore, pertaining to the gathering for forgiving each other, he opined that it served as a vehicle for performing the Islamic teachings of *silaturahim* [*ṣilatur-raḥim*] (human links) This point of view was absolutely contrary, for instance, to that of the Salafis arguing that apologies should be made when necessary and not be limited to an annual event. It is worth noting that as far as socio-cultural activities of PPME are concerned, the *halal bihalal* is the one which draws a lot of attention from its members and invited guests. Another example was the

article by Syafi‘i Ma‘arif, an important leader of Muhammadiyah. In the *al-Ittihaad* of July-August (1989: 15-16), he discussed a question from Yusuf Hasyim of NU: “Can a member of either Muhammadiyah or NU become a member of both socio-religious organizations?” delivered in a seminar held in the Surabaya Muhmmadiyah University (UMS) on 9 July 1989. Ma‘arif’s opinion was that it was significant to establish bridges between Muhammadiyah and NU (95) and encouraged the youths of both organizations to support each other (*kompak lahir batin*). He also supported Amin Rais’ point of view of the significance of cross-organizational marriage between members of the two organizations. Ma‘arif highlighted that these ideas were to accelerate the unity of the Indonesian Muslim community (*umma*). Ma‘arif’s suggestions are crucial for PPME which, since its inception, has been supported by people who have different ethnic backgrounds and religious orientations (Sujadi 2017, 95-96).

Articles presenting authors who had different religious backgrounds still could be found in *al-Ittihaad* of the 1990s. Moch. Caheron, a former journalist at Masyumi’s newspaper, *Abadi,* in *al-Ittihaad* of December (1995: 21) discussed PPME’s Islamic teaching for children. He argued that when Islamic teaching was integrated with the Islamic education of Sekolah Indonesia Nederland (SIN, Indonesian School in the Netherlands), its portion was less than enough as a supplement for their religious need. This was, especially, because of the lack of qualified religious teachers and the absence of a syllabus of Islamic teaching. Therefore, it needed a clear objective, syllabus, and schedule of teachers along with the establishment of a good institution for it. Such an integrated approach and an arrangement in education are applied by the schools affiliated with Muhammadiyah. In these schools, religious teaching is given to their students, alongside non-religious subjects and they are well managed. Another example was *al-Ittihaad* of November (1996: 17-18). In the bulletin, PPME published its interview done in The Hague in mid-1996 with Zainuddin, frequently called a preacher of a thousand audiences and who learned Islam from Idham Khalid, the former chairman of NU. During the interview, he explained much about ways to train the (96) young generation of PPME as cadres of *da‘wa* in Europe. He said that it was important to change the focus of *da‘wa* activity for the young generation of Indonesian

Muslims in the Netherlands. He argued that they needed to keep their Indonesian identity while conducting their daily activities in the Netherlands. He furthermore highlighted that they could become the cadres of *da'wa* in a non-Muslim country in which an Islamic atmosphere is less apparent. Therefore, *da'wa* should no longer focus on the preachers' interest, but on that of the audience. As an example he mentioned the involvement of a male member of PPME*'s nasyid* who wore earrings (which was against Islamic teaching) during the inauguration of the Indonesian mosque in the Netherlands in 1996. He argued that the person in question required an organization for his religious expression. It seemed that the *nasyid* group were his place. The last of his statement clearly shows that music for him was lawful, which is in line with the practices of traditionalist *pesantren*s endorsing *qasidah* music using musical instruments. As a result, he supported the music group being used as a medium of *da'wa* for youths (Sujadi 2017, 96-97).

The facts of the 1980s and 1990s show that the authors who contributed to the bulletin had connections to differing religious organizations in Indonesia, both traditionalist and reformist. In this way, readers who had no formal Islamic education were able to acquire Islamic knowledge from a variety of sources within the different religious orientations. In other words, the bulletin served not only as a new source for studying Islam, but also as the media accommodating the differing religious organizational backgrounds consistent with its name, *al-Ittihaad* (Unity), which was unfortunately no longer issued in the following periods (Sujadi 2017, 97).

B. *Euromoslem* (1992)

Another bulletin is *Euromoslem* published by PPME Amsterdam. This bulletin has been published for more than two decades (from 1992 up to now) and serves as a vehicle for transmitting its *da'wa*. The paper-based version of this bulletin still appeared until 2003 and in order that the *da'wa* of PPME Amsterdam could reach a larger audience, Islamic discourses in *Euromoslem* have seemingly been published in digital form since the early 2000s. From the early 1990s to 2005, Islamic discourses in *Euromoslem* originated from both traditionalist and reformist authors (Sujadi 2017, 98).

For instance, in the *Euromoslem* of January (1995: 5-7), Maksum discussed Islamic Law on women's *aurat* [*'awrāt*] (the parts of the body that must be covered up in public). He mentioned that there have been two main lines of thought on this law. There were firstly those who believe that it is obligatory for women to cover all parts of the body, even when not performing the five-times-a-day prayers. Then, there were those who did not consider it obligatory for women to cover up except when praying. According to him, *ulama* in favour of a woman covering herself are textualists, whereas those who hold the opposing view are contextualists, i.e., those who really consider *asbāb al-nuzūl* (the history of the sending down of the Quranic verses) of Chapter Al-Nūr: 31 and al-Ahzāb: 59. Thus, based upon on the contextualist approach, the aim of covering the *'awrāt* and the dress code of the women in a society should be taken into account during the discussion. His point of view absolutely differs, for instance, with that of the reformist Persis which only underpins the first mainstream approach. It (98) argues that women should cover all parts of their body, except their face and palms, in their daily life. Up to now, female members of PPME, themselves, have dressed in the way of the two different streams. In *Euromoslem* of July-August (1999: 11), the writing of A. M. Fatwa, the deputy of Lembaga Hikmah Pimpinan Pusat (Division of Wisdom of Central Executive) of Muhammadiya*h*, one of the founders of the Reformist Muslim-Based Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN, National Mandate Party) and a former chairman of *Muballighāt* (Preachers) Corp of Muhammadiyah Jakarta, on the obligation of performing *da'wa* was presented. Fatwa argued that in order to defend and sustain the life and the common good (*kemaslahatan*) of society, every Muslim must serve as a primary agent of *da'wa*. Hence, it is essential that individual Muslim should engage in *amar ma'rūf wa nahy munkar* (commanding good and forbidding wrong). Such an idea is *da'wa* of Muhammadiyah orientation, i.e. each member of Muhammadiyah must become an *al-Ṣāliḥ al-Muṣliḥ* (a reforming-pious person), namely, a good individual who is prepared to reform mistakes. According to Moh. Ali Aziz, a traditionalist preacher who has been invited by PPME al-Ikhlash for its *Ramaḍān* programme, such an idea can only be implemented when a Muslim has Islamic knowledge. In contrast, the *da'wa* which PPME is concerned with is performed by its members who feel a need to do so.

Moreover, *Euromoslem* of July-August (2001: 3-11) issued a topic about the domestic life of the Prophet Muhammad written by ʻAbd al-Malik ibn Muhammad (99) ibn Abd al-Rahman al-Qasim. He was, among others, of the opinion that Muslims were prohibited to commemorate the birthday of the Prophet and to visit sites of his legacies like his cemetery and the *Ḥirā* cave where the first revelation was sent to him. They were innovations (*bidʻa*). These viewpoints are reformist-oriented and obviously contrary to those of traditionalist Muslims who tended to not only allow, but also encourage others to do such activities (Sujadi 2017, 98-100).

It is worth mentioning that since the late 1990s, Salafi-oriented works have been the primary contents of *Euromoslem.* The authors of this period used the works of Salafis such as Muhammad ibn Shalih al-ʻUthaymin (a student of ʻAbd al-ʻAziz ʻAbd Allāh ibn Bāz) for their viewpoints and the works of those who inspired the emergence of the Salafi *daʻwa,* i.e. *daʻwa* calling upon Muslims to return to the Quran and the Prophet's Tradition, as well as to follow the Salafi *manhaj*, in Indonesia such as Ibn Taymiyya, al-Albani and Ibn Qayyim al-Jauziyyah. The *Euromoslem* editions of July-Agust (1999: 5-9) and September-October (2000: 2-3) presented writings of Ahamd Faiz Asifuddin, an Indonesian Salafi leader. Both discussed attributes of God. The former dealt with significance and principles of understanding of the attributes. In reference to a book entitled *Al-Qawāʻid al-Mutslā fī Ṣifātillāh wa Asmāihī al-Ḥusnā* (Perfect Principles in God's Attributes and His Good Names) by Ibn Utsaymin, he argued that perfect attributes of God were unlike those of human beings. In addition, the attributes should be understood only according to divine proof (*dalīl naqlī*). In a similar sense, it is more clearly discussed in the latter writing. It discussed the point of view of al-Firqat al-Nājiya (The Rescued Group) about Allah's attributes in reference to a book entitled *Al-Aqīdat al-Wāsiṭiyya* (The Mediating Faith) of Ibn Taymiyya. He stated that the *al-firqa*, which is one of the names Salafi groups (100) like to use, was a Muslim group that would be rescued by Allah from the fire of hell. He added that according to the *al-firqa*, it was important to well know and comprehend the names and attributes of Allah in order to be able to truly perform worship to Him. The *al-firqa* determined all His names and attributes on the basis of the Qur'anic verses and the Prophet's

Traditions because they were beyond rational capability; only God knew their essence. Then, between July and August, *Euromoslem* (2003: 7-12) presented a translated article of Ibn Qayyim al-Jauziyyah on the avoidance of *zinā* (adultery) by Muslims. Beginning with the need to control their speech and maintain a commitment to avoiding *zinā*, the author informed his readers of the consequences of *zinā* on both its actors and their families, as well as to any child born as a result of it. The author based his information upon the Quranic verses and the Prophet's Traditions from sources, usually used by Salafis such as *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī* (al-Bukhārī's Sound Collections of the Prophet's Traditions), *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim* (Muslim's Sound Collections of the Prophet's Traditions) and *Jāmi' al-Tirmidhī* of Ibn Mūsā al-Tirmidhī (al-Tirmidhī's Comprehensive Collections of the Prophet's Traditions). Additionally, the author does not discuss them intellectually – a Salafi way (Sujadi 2017, 100-101).

The internal conflict among the congregation of PPME Amsterdam at the end of 2005 strengthened the emergence of a (101) digital version via its e-mails such as euromoslem@hotmail.com, euromoslem@PPME-amsterdam.org, muslimnl@yahoogroups. com, and media@euromoslim.org. These e-mails only contain the writings of Salafi authors and this means that there was no longer space for authors of not only traditionalist, but also reformist backgrounds. This was in line with the performing of the *dauroh* in which the Salafi orientation had deliberately been arranged (Sujadi 2017, 101-102).

The following are examples of Salafi authors' writings of the period. *Euromoslem* of 31 March 2006 issued the true ethics of a Muslim in his relation to God by Arif Syarifuddin. He was of the opinion that a Muslim should establish God's revelation; conduct His laws; and be patient with and accept the fate He has decided. His viewpoints were based mostly on a *Kitāb al-'Ilm* (The Book of Knowledge) by Ibn 'Uthaymin. E*uromoslem* of 20 November 2009 issued the significance of Islamic knowledge and its experts. This was an article which was written by 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Bāz, a leading figure of Salafi *da'wa* and translated by Abu Mushlih Ari Wahyudi, the chairman of Ma'had al-'Ilm (Boarding of Islamic Knowledge) in Yogyakarta. The author presented the importance, for instance, of the *dawra* [which was regularly held by PPME Amsterdam] as the medium for those who wanted to study Islam. Moreover, he added that the seekers of Islamic knowledge should be patient in their learning and want to spread the knowledge to other Muslims, as al-Salaf al-Ṣāliḥ did. *Euromuslem* of January 2010 presented an article on understanding the position of the *imam* (prayer leader) and *ma'mūm* (the follower), in collective prayer (*jamā'a*). It was written by Abu Asma Kholid Syamhudi, a member of editorial board of the Salafi magazine Assunnah, Solo, Central Java. In

this article, the author discussed, for instance, the validity (102) of becoming the follower of a *fāsiq* (sinner) and *mubtadi'* (heretic) in the collective prayer. This is in reference to the opinions of Ibn 'Uthaymin and Ibn Taymiyya. It is worth mentioning that after the internal conflict in 2005, religious orientation of a leader prayer was a heated topic with which PPME Amsterdam was much concerned. Prayers of its congregation should be led by a person who had a similar religious orientation – by a Salafi. As a result, the PPME branch preferred its younger members knowledable of Islam who were Salafi to Islamic preachers whose religious orientation differed from that of its congregation to become their prayers leader even though the preachers were elder and leading figures of the central PPME. We see, then, that after 2005 there has been no diversity in *Euromoslem* and a tendency to reflect a narrow set of religious sources, i.e. Salafi-oriented authors. This suggests that PPME Amsterdam has set aside its previous principle reflecting diverse religious backgrounds – it is still attempting to make its own religious orientation known (Sujadi 2017, 102-103).

To sum up, the Islamic discourses that have developed in *al-Ittihaad* and *Euromoslem* and that can be used as sources for studying Islam by the members of PPME reflect the diverse religious orientation of the organization. *Al-Ittihaad* has accommodated traditionalist and reformist works. By contrast, the articles presented in *Euromoslem* have undergone a change of religious orientation, i.e. from diversity to a single Salafi religious orientation. The schism in PPME Amsterdam'scongregation in mid-2005 can be seen as a factor in *Euromoslem*'s shift to the Salafi publication (Sujadi 2017, 103).

PPME is not an exclusive Indonesian association. Other Muslims in Europe can participate in its activities. However, because of the Indonesian majority of its members and its leading figures, it is impossible for PPME not to have ties with other Indonesian organizations and institutions in the Netherlands, such as the KBRI (Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia), Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI, the Association for Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals), Pusat Informasi dan Pelayanan Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PIP PKS, Centre of Information and Service of the Prosperous Justice Party), and Pimpinan Cabang Istimewa Muhammadiyah (PCIM, Board of Special Branch of the Muhammadiyah) (Sujadi 2017, 138).

I. KBRI: The Result of Cooperation in Religious and Organizational Activities

Since its inception in 1971, PPME has never structurally been a part of the KBRI in the Netherlands. PPME is independent and a Muslim association without politically oriented principles, but with strong principles where it concerns *da‘wa* activities. This means that PPME, which primarily serves to fulfill the religious and sociocultural requirements of its members and sympathizers living in the Netherlands and other European countries, refuses to be dictated to by other organizations or institutions, including the KBRI. The consequence of this European orientation is that only a few PPME activities are aimed at Indonesian Muslims in Indonesia. These are epitomized by the PPME's sending of *zakāt al-fiṭr* and other financial donations collected from its members as aid for the victims of natural disasters and doing a joint activity caring for orphans and needy people (Sujadi 2017, 138).

Furthermore Islam, rather than *Pancasila*, is the basis of PPME's activities enabling it to accept members regardless of their nationality. Consequently, Arabic and Dutch members and participants, mostly *muallafūn* (new Islamic converts), can be found in each PPME branch. Because of the presence of Dutch and Arabic members in the PPME, its boards took the view that cooperation with the KBRI was encouraged so far as it was not harmful to the unity of the PPME and its members. The cooperation between PPME and the KBRI included various activities such as deciding when the first and the final day of *Ramaḍān* should be; deciding the date of *‘īd al-aḍhā* (sacrificial feast); collecting *zakāt al-fiṭr* and *zakāt al-māl* (yearly obligatory almsgiving of property); supporting the performing of the Friday prayers; providing assistance to run the organization of the *al-Hikmah* Mosque; and taking part in the maintenance of the mosque (Sujadi 2017, 139).

A. Religious Activities (1970s)

1. Supporting the KBRI's Decision on the First and the Final Day of *Ramaḍān* and the Date of *‘Īd al-Aḍḥā* In determining the beginning and the end of the fasting month, *Ramaḍān*, Muslims with a different background might decide on a different date. The process requires conducting *ru'yatul-hilāl* (the sighting of the lunar crescent) and the expertise of *ḥisāb* (the reckoning method used to determine the beginning and the end of Islamic lunar months), in addition to the

knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence relating to these rituals. These procedures also apply to the process of making a decision about the date of *ʻīd al-aḍḥā* (the sacrificial feast), even though the latter, on the face of it, appears to be more straightforward. This is because *ʻīd al-aḍḥā* takes place on the 10th of *Dhul-ḥijja* (the 12th month of the Islamic calendar), rather than on the first date of the month. However, the focus of the present discussion is not about the complexities of (139) making these decisions, but it is rather about the participation of the PPME in the gatherings organized and hosted by the KBRI in the Netherlands which aimed to determine the fixed dates of start of *Ramaḍān*, *ʻīd al-fiṭr*, and *ʻīd al-aḍḥā* (Sujadi 2017, 139-140).

The participation of PPME's people in these gatherings was one effort to build a relationship with the Indonesian embassy in the Netherlands. The presence of the representatives of PPME and other Indonesian Muslim groups at these activities was in response to a formal invitation of the KBRI. PPME sent its delegates to attend these gatherings as it was aware of the importance of the dates for its congregation, in particular, and for Indonesian Muslims in the Netherlands who would follow the decision of KBRI, in general. What had been decided upon should not raise a doubt. They, especially as Indonesian employees, needed a fixed schedule of the dates on which they could propose their days off work to their employers (Sujadi 2017, 140).

Generally speaking, PPME supported the decisions made by the KBRI in the above matters. One exception was in 1974 when, based on its own decision on when the final day of *Ramaḍān* would be, the PPME held its own *ʻīd al-fiṭr* (140) prayers at Daguerrestraat 60. The PPME preferred to use the geographical position of Saudi Arabia and the decision of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia when deciding the date, whereas the KBRI preferred to use the geographical position of the Netherlands when making its calculations. Another point of difference arose between the KBRI and PPME in 2005 when the PPME Amsterdam branch split. Again, the disagreement centered on the differing approaches between the PPME branch and the KBRI in determining the important dates in the above matters. However, these two cases did not harm relations between the PPME and the KBRI. Indeed, for many years members of PPME and KBRI officials

performed the prayers of *tarāwih*, *īd al-fiṭr,* and *'īd al-aḍḥā* together; initially in a leased hall and, after 1996, in the *al-Hikmah* Mosque. With regard to the split in Amsterdam, the PPME Amsterdam branch situated on Ekingenstraat was the only PPME branch to decide the dates of key rituals differently from the KBRI. Other branches in The Hague, Rotterdam, Breda-Tilburg, Heemskerk, and also PPME al-Ikhlash Amsterdam, adopted the embassy's dates. Thus, the support of PPME was certainly an effort by the PPME to maintain this togetherness. Sulchan strongly asserts that "to embrace Islam is easy, why should we make it [Islamic teaching] difficult?" This statement can be an exception to the statement of Van Bommel who hints at the lack of cohesion among the Muslims in The Netherlands due to their differing doctrines (Sujadi 2017, 140-141).

2. *'Āmil* of *Zakāt al-Fiṭr* and *Zakāt al-Māl*

Every year PPME fulfills its role as an *'āmil* (collector) of alms – z*akāt al-fiṭr* and z*akāt al-māl*. As an *'āmil*, this Muslim organization has the right to collect these two types of almsgiving and distribute it to those in need. The *zakāt*s were usually collected from members and sympathizers who wanted to pay their alms to a committee formed by the PPME and also from officials of the KBRI, as well as those who performed the *tarāwīḥ* prayers at the KBRI. It will be all right for a Muslim association if the activity of collecting almsgiving from its own members and sympathizers is carried out at its own location. However, questions can be asked about the collection of alms because it was primarily done by PPME; either in the hall of the KBRI in the 1970s and 1980s or in the *al-Hikmah* Mosque, which was under the authority of the KBRI, in the 1990s and 2000s. A key to understanding why the PPME feels justified in collecting alms in places under the authority of the KBRI is by examining the ways in which the PPME cooperates in this case with the KBRI and in which the alms are distributed (Sujadi 2017, 142).

Since 1972, PPME has cooperated with the KBRI in collecting alms. This cooperation usually occurred during *Ramaḍān* during the weekly *tarāwiḥ* prayers, held every Thursday night in the hall of the KBRI. Before prayers commenced, an announcement about the payment of alms was delivered by an almsgiving committee which was affiliated with the KBRI. The announcement included the information that alms

could be paid to either KBRI or PPME almsgiving committees. This indicates that the KBRI had given the PPME permission to collect payments of both *zakāt al-fiṭr and zakāt al-māl* from (142) the congregation before the *tarāwīḥ* prayers at the KBRI hall in The Hague. This shows that the board of the PPME had a good connection with the officials of KBRI responsible for religious activities and with its Indonesian ambassadors. This relation was illustrated by the facts that in the 1970s, both sides cooperated in collecting alms630 and the difference of opinion in 1974 about the date of *'īd al-fiṭr* did not harm their cooperation in this respect (Sujadi 2017, 142-143).

Permission was also granted due to the fact that the PPME and the KBRI were targeting the same country in terms of distributing the collected alms. That is to say, both institutions agreed that they wanted to deliver the alms to those in need living in Indonesia, rather than in the Netherlands, Suriname, or other European countries. This fact also fostered cooperation between the two in the 1980s. Indeed, despite the fact that since 1982, the PPME had had its own place of worship in The Hague, *al-Ittihaad*, it remained faithful to supporting the joint weekly *tarāwīh* prayers in the hall of the KBRI. This provided the PPME with another opportunity to collect alms from both its own members and KBRI's officials (Sujadi 2017, 143).

3. Support for Performing Friday Prayers: From *Khaṭīb* to *Imām*

Van Koningsveld asserted that *imam*s in the mosques or *muṣallā*s (prayer halls) in the Netherlands can be categorized into three types. They are informal *imam*s who voluntarily work for the mosque community; professional *imam*s who (144) are requested and then hired by the mosque community; and professional *imam*s who are sent and employed by the government of the mosque community's country of origin. Based on these categories, the *imam*s of the PPME can be classified as belonging to the first. Despite carrying out weekly tasks such as leading religious ceremonies for its congregation and being the prayer leader, the PPME's *imam*s were not employed by their *muṣhallā* or mosque communities and had other jobs in their daily life. Generally, they worked for the PPME without a written contract. This was also the case after they were recruited by the KBRI as *khaṭīb*s (preachers) for the

Friday prayers held in its hall. Their position was, therefore, worse than that described by Ghaly, who assumes that the salary of *imam*s in the Netherlands is very low and that they are forced to work for periods without a written agreement from an employer. Nevertheless, they continued to support the performance of weekly Islamic obligations. This reflects the founding ideals of the PPME, i.e. to propagate Islam to their congregations and other Muslim groups, in particular those living in the Netherlands (Sujadi 2017, 144-145).

Since the second half of the 1970s, the *imam*s of the PPME have supported the performing of Friday prayers held in KBRI's hall. The *imam*s who participated mainly lived in The Hague and included, among others, A. H. Maksum, Moh. Chaeron, Muhammad Syukur, M. Surya Ali Negara, and A. Naf'an Sulchan. In addition to them, there were preachers from other Indonesian Muslim groups (Sujadi 2017, 145).

The PPME *imam*s' support for the Friday prayers at the Indonesian embassy became even more apparent in the 1980s. There was the *Muṣallā of al-Ittihaad*, but the Friday prayers were rarely held there and instead, took place in the hall of the KBRI. An exception formed the 1980s when Friday prayers were held in *al-Ittihaad* following a request from Surinamese-Javanese Muslims. The PPME's decision on supporting the KBRI's weekly religious programme was a deliberate decision to strengthen the unity among Indonesian Muslims in The Netherlands. In other words, the PPME prioritized the unity of Indonesian Muslims over other interests, such as promoting activities in the *al-Ittihaad* and performing the Friday prayers for Surinam Muslims in the prayer hall (Sujadi 2017, 146).

The involvement of PPME's people in supporting Friday prayers in the hall of the Indonesian Embassy in the 1970s and 1980s was welcomed by the *imam* of the KBRI, Sufjan Ollong, a Moluccan and former member of the Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger (KNIL, Royal Dutch East Indies Army) officially appointed by the Ambassador in 1964. He led the weekly Friday service, while one of the PPME people would act as the preacher. This situation went on until the early 2000s, when the Friday prayers moved from the KBRI and were held in the *al-Hikmah* Mosque. Following this change in venue, the official *imam* of the KBRI could no longer act as the *imam* at the Friday prayers.

Instead, his position was frequently taken over by voluntary *imam*s, including those affiliated with the PPME (Sujadi 2017, 146).

B. Organizational Activities (1996)

As the PPME continued to build relations with the KBRI, (147) it widened its cooperation with the embassy's organizational activities. As an independent socio-religious organization and a regular user of the rooms at *al-Hikmah* Mosque, the PPME had been actively involved in stimulating the use of the mosque and in maintaining the mosque. This would suggest that the status of the PPME as a lessee, rather than the owner or authoritative board of the mosque, was irrelevant and that its commitment to taking care of the mosque led to various involvements with the mosque board. The following examples illustrate this organizational cooperation (Sujadi 2017, 147-148).

1. Stimulating the Use of *al-Hikmah* Mosque

In Europe, the prayer-hall, *muṣallā,* or the mosque generally functioned as places for religious gatherings, basic religious education for children, multi-religious activities as well as a social-cultural centre, the place for social activities, and as a place for women to participate. Consequently, a *muṣallā* or mosque needs to function effectively. Even though *al-Hikmah* Mosque does not belong to the PPME and is organizationally structured under the authority of the KBRI, this was not an obstacle in terms of the PPME jointly stimulating activities in the mosque in cooperation with the mosque board formed by the KBRI. The following section illustrates this (Sujadi 2017, 148). It can be said that the establishment of the Indonesian mosque was "a dream comes true" for the PPME. It had been planning to have a mosque since the early 1970s. After 25 years of waiting, the PPME had the opportunity to run a (148) mosque in cooperation with KBRI. In fact, PPME's enthusiasm and involvement in the mosque sacrificed its own prayer hall *al-Ittihaad*, which the association had purchased in 1982. The hall was deteriorating and required a large amount of money for renovation. However, the PPME appeared to be more concerned with the mosque than with the maintenance of the prayer hall. On 18 September 1996 the KBRI appointed an official board for *al-Hikmah* Mosque. The presence of A. H. Maksum, one of the founders and *imam*s of the PPME, as a member of the mosque board was key to the involvement of PPME activists such as A. Naf'an Sulchan, Erna Jongsman, and Ludo Jongsman, in addition

to Maksum himself, in the efforts to get the mosque functioning. However, it appears that the chairman of the *al-Hikmah* board, Azhari Kasim, a KBRI official, preferred to include other leading Indonesian Muslims, such as Sofjan S. Siregar and M. Surya Alinegara. This suggests that there was a possible conflict of interest among the mosque board, specifically between Maksum's and Azhari Kasim's interests. Maksum certainly secured places for himself as the coordinator of the socio-religious programme for men, for Sulchan as the coordinator of children activities, for Erna Jongsman as the coordinator for women, and for Ludo Jongsman as coordinator of the Dutch-speaking group (Sujadi 2017, 149).

2. Participation in Maintaining *al-Hikmah* Mosque

As a weekly user of the rooms at *al-Hikmah* Mosque, the PPME assisted the mosque board661 in the maintenance the premises in two ways, i.e. providing financial contributions and assistance in cleaning it. It is worth noting that there was no fixed amount of money that PPME should pay for the maintenance. This is because the assistance relied on the capability of PPME (Sujadi 2017, 150). Firstly, PPME provided monthly financial contributions to the mosque board to fund the annual cleaning of the building. Starting in January 1997,662 the PPME donated approximately € 270 and around € 400 monthly during the 2000s to the board. This contribution, paid via PPME in The Hague, was in response to a request from the board to the users of the mosque, including the PPME, to help resolve the financial problems related to the its maintenance - the mosque (150) board, rather than the KBRI, was in charge of its physical maintenance. The amount of the financial contribution was determined based on the financial capability of PPME in The Hague branch. The cost of leasing rooms at the mosque was very low. PPME al-Ikhlash Amsterdam had to pay a monthly fee for rooms at el-Amien School (Trustworthy School) in Amsterdam-Osdorp of around 1,000 Euros a month for its religious and socio-cultural activities. This low cost must be understood in light of the KBRI's remit to protect and facilitate Indonesian people living in The Netherlands, including those Indonesian members participating in PPME activities. It is reflected in PPME being allowed to use one of the rooms at *al-Hikmah* Mosque as a secretariat and a library since the end of the 1990s (Sujadi 2017, 150-151).

Secondly, as a user of the rooms at the mosque, the PPME was actually entitled to expect the members of the mosque board to provide for the cleaning. However, the PPME's congregation preferred to clean the rooms themselves. This was carried out regularly and collectively at the end of its weekly programme, regardless of the associations' monthly contribution. Erfan, the guardian of the mosque (appointed by its board following a recommendation from the PPME board), frequently joined the people of PPME in the cleaning. He cleaned the mosque's mirrors, ablutions room, and bathroom. His involvement was not only because of his function as the guardian of the mosque, but also because of his debt to PPME for recommending him to be the guardian allowing him to live in a house close to the mosque free of charge. Furthermore, since 1997, the PPME's members have (151) also taken part in the annual cleaning of the mosque before *Ramaḍān.* This commitment by the PPME to keep *al-Hikmah* Mosque clean was a reflection of their consciousness of the importance of togetherness in order to maintain the physical condition of the mosque (Sujadi 2017, 151-152).

II. ICMI in the Netherlands (1995): The Result of Inclusivism

The relation of PPME with ICMI in the Netherlands began in 1995 when the ICMI formed its first board in the Netherlands. The discourse of the establishment of ICMI in the Netherlands, founded in the early 1990s, drew much attention from Indonesian Muslims in the country. Various Muslim leading figures and government officials wanted to head the new association of intellectuals. For instance, in addition to Saiful Hadi, the head of Antara (Indonesian News Agency) for Europe and a son of Idham Chalid (the former leader of NU), there were also Azhari Kasim (a KBRI official) and M. Surya Alinegara (a former activist of PPME), in competition to become the chairman of ICMI in the Netherlands. In the end, Hadi was elected by the majority of around one hundred people who had been invited to attend the meeting to decide on the matter. Present were KBRI staff, Indonesian students, and Indonesian Muslim leading figures. After the election, A. H. Maksum was invited to be one of the board members of ICMI in the Netherlands. Maksum, who was regarded as a leading figure of PPME by ICMI there, accepted the offer, and was included as a member of the expert council of ICMI board for the period of 1995-1997. He stated

(152) that his involvement in ICMI at that moment could not be separated from developments in Indonesia where many leading Muslims joined the association. Among them were such well-known intellectuals in Jakarta as Nurcholish Madjid and Jalaluddin Rakhmat. Membership amounted to around eleven thousand in 1992 and rose sharply to forty thousand in 1993. He also asserted that many Indonesian activists in the Netherlands entered in order to strengthen the unity of Indonesian Muslims in the Netherlands. There, ICMI, under Hadi's leadership indeed, included various elements of Indonesian Muslim communities in the Netherlands. Among those who joined were Sufjan Ollong and Azhari Kasim of the KBRI, prominent Muslims such as A. H. Maksum, M. Surya Alinegara, and Sofjan S. Siregar, as well as students such as Husnan Bey Fannanie (Leiden University) and Dody Darsiyan and Siti Wurian Hutomo (Delft University of Technology) (Sujadi 2017, 152-153).

During the period of 1995-1997, the relationship between PPME and ICMI in the Netherlands was close. The existence of PPME, of which most of its members were common people, was taken into account by ICMI. An indication is the cooperation in the effort to realise the aim of having an Indonesian mosque in the Netherlands. Apart from

including Hadi as an adviser of the PPME committee for a mosque in the Netherlands, the PPME programme of having the mosque was adopted by ICMI as part of its main program. Pertaining to this, Hadi told me that his position was that ICMI and PPME should not compete and PPME was a part of ICMI's concern (Sujadi Sujadi 2017, 153).

Husnan Bey Fannanie, a student of Leiden University acting as a member of ICMI and PPME in the Nehterlands, added: "The idea of PPME to have a mosque in the Netherlands was supported by ICMI, thus resulting in a committee for a mosque, which included not only ICMI's people but also those of the KBRI." As consequence, PPME and ICMI cooperated in finding donors, as they did, for instance, at the end of 1995 during the celebration of the birthday of The Prophet Muhammad as previously mentioned. Hadi agreed: "ICMI was established for the Islamic *umma* [of Indonesia] – not only for Muslim officials of the KBRI and Muslim students, but also for Indonesian Muslim communities living in the Netherlands. Therefore, I included, for instance, Azhari Kasim, Husnan Bey Fannanie, and A. H. Maksum as the members of the board." (Sujadi 2017, 154).

However, since the end of 1990 when Hadi and Fannanie were no longer on the ICMI board – a period when ICMI in Indonesia no longer drew interest of Muslim politicians because of the establishment of Islamic-oriented parties, the cooperation of PPME with ICMI in the Netherlands was discontinued. In Indonesia a variety of Muslim groups favoured the establishment of ICMI: Muslim government bureaucrats, intellectuals, and activists. In the Netherlands the situation was different. There, ICMI seemingly ignored the approach of the central ICMI to include significant elements of the Indonesian community. Kurdi, a board member of ICMI in Europe (1995-2000), argues that ICMI in the Netherlands was an association of intellectuals that had only slight concern for the interests of the wider Indonesian Muslim communities living in the Netherlands and paid much more attention (154) to scholarships for Indonesian students (Sujadi 2017, 154-155).

III. PIP PKS (2005): The Result of Sympathizers' Support

The relation of PPME with PIP PKS in the Netherlands cannot be separated from their *da'wa* concerns. This has resulted in some cooperation. For instance, PPME Amsterdam has supported PIP PKS in holding the *halal bihalal* in 2005. This cooperation, which was initiated

by PIP PKS, aimed to similarize their vision of a future Indonesia, i.e. to realise a just, prosperous, and dignified civilized society (*masyarakat madani*). Some members of PPME Amsterdam were recruited as the organizer of the event, which took place at *al-Hikmah* Mosque. The members of PPME the Netherlands and its sympathizers, the activists of PIP PKS and their sympathizers, and members of other Indonesian Muslim communities in the Netherlands were invited except the members of Majlis Dzikir. Another example was the support of William S. de Weerd, chairman of PPME the Netherlands and sympathizer of PIP PKS, for training in Manajemen Sholat menuju Khusu' dan Nikmat (MSKN, Management for Earnest and Contented Prayer) organized by (156) PIP PKS. It was held on 30-31 August 2008, and took place at *al-Hikmah*. Seventy people attended. They came from PPME, PIP PKS itself, and Forum Komunikasi Alumni (FKA, Communication Forum of Alumni) of Emotional and Spiritual Quotient (ESQ, an Indonesian training centre for Character Building, founded on 6 May 2000 by Ary Ginanjar). This training of MSKN, which was part of the PIP PKS' activities, was led by Ansufri Idrus Sambo, the owner of Pesantren Ustadh (Islamic Teacher) and Imam Masjid (Prayer Leader of a Mosque) in Bogor, West Java (Sujadi 2017, 157).

As far as the cooperation was concerned, it is worth noticing the viewpoints of PIP PKS' people from PPME Amsterdam. According to Budi Santoso, "in fact, PIP PKS always searches for sympathizers, including from PPME. However, since the outset, our cooperation has been focused on *da'wa.* Therefore, this concern motivated us [PPME and PIP PKS] to communicate with each other." (Sujadi 2017, 157).

However, apart from the occasional contacts and reciprocal visits, such cooperation was not carried on in the following years. The reason was PPME's suspicion of the pragmatic approach of PIP PKS, i.e. an approach which focuses on gaining as many votes as possible for the PKS in the Indonesian general elections. Santoso, who used to be a sympathizer of the PIP PKS, insists: "In each activity, the centre displays the party's flags and uses political language – this will make participants who are not connected to the PKS feel less comfortable." Kurdi could not agree with activists of PIP PKS trying to influence PPME members during *da'wa* activities organized jontly with PPME. She also criticized the fact that PIP PKS was very selective in offering

its service. “The PIP PKS will only act as a centre of information and service when it is to the advantage of the party. The information and service will, actually, be provided to their own friends [cadres, members, and sympathizers].” Sulchan insists: “The PIP PKS has brought about the *afscheiding* (the separation) of PPME Amsterdam from PPME the Netherlands. It has influenced the leading figures of the PPME in Amsterdam to prohibit [performing *tahlilan*, *yasinan* and (158) *istigotsah*].” These are the suspicions of PPME, which tend to blame the PIP PKS (Sujadi 2017, 158-159).

IV. PCIM (2006): The Result of Reformists’ Support

From the outset, PPME has never been part of the organizational structure or under the coordination of reformist socio-religious organizations such as Muhammadiyah, Persis, and al-Irsyad, or of the traditionalist NU. Its neutrality means there are no barriers to Indonesian Muslims with a non-reformist or traditionalist religious orientation to become a member of the PPME. Its principles are simply based on Islam; thus, any Muslim can join its congregation. This cannot be separated from the task it had set itself from the start, i.e. to be a unifying Muslim organization for Indonesian Muslims living in the Netherlands and the rest of Europe. Thus, the rise of PCIM in the Netherlands, led by a former leader of the PPME at the end of 2006, raises a question. The following section will examine the connection between PPME and the PCIM (Sujadi 2017, 160).

Though a structural link is absent, reformist members of PPME have supported PCIM. The support came from PPME Amsterdam. This occurred since its traditionalist members had left in 2006. This PPME facilitated the official inauguration of the PCIM taking place in its mosque, now called *at-Taqwa*, on 8 December 2006. The event was attended by around one hundred people, including Din Syamsuddin, the chairman of the central board of Muhammadiyah, and its sympathizers living in the Netherlands. The links between PPME Amsterdam and PCIM also found their expression in an exchange of *ustādh*s. One of them was Agus Hasan Bashori al-Sanuwi, an Indonesian Salafi *ustādh* requested by both PPME Amsterdam and PCIM to deliver lectures on Islamic subjects to their congregations in February and early March 2008 (Sujadi 2017, 160).

The interactions between PPME and PCIM could take place as

a result of the relationships of leaders of both Muslim associations. Balbaid, a prominent member of PPME Amsterdam, became acquainted with the leader of PCIM, M. Surya Alinegara, who had a top position in PPME in the middle of the 1970s. This fact is confirmed by Yusuf Setiyono, the PCIM's treasurer. He asserts that good relationships between them fostered the abovementioned cooperation between PCIM and PPME Amsterdam. The importance of this personal relationship is revealed by the fact that cooperation between the two organizations waned following the stroke suffered by Alinegara in early 2008. In addition, Balbaid knows the main proponent behind establishing the PCIM, Jani Kurdi. She was a PPME activist in the 1990s (Sujadi 2017, 161).

Nonetheless, the link with PPME Amsterdam did not appear to be of value in terms of creating relations with other branches of PPME in the Netherlands. The reason is the fact that the traditionalist practices of reciting *tahlilan, yasinan,* and *istighotsah* performed in most PPME branches (other than PPME Amsterdam) were rejected by reformist-oriented members and sympathizers, thus, contributing to the rise of the new PCIM. They have criticized these practices (Sujadi 2017, 161).

These criticisms and objections came from the individuals who recently had stopped attending most of the activities held by the PPME, but have supported those organized by PPME Amsterdam. It is worth noting that the death of Moch. Chaeron, who was the only person who drafted PPME's statute, was a factor in PPME becoming a more traditionalist organization. He frequently organized its religious activities of not only *dhikr,* but also *fikr*. Chaeron, himself, was one of the reformist-oriented members and took great care to keep them, and traditionalist-oriented members, together. These criticisms are extremely pertinent to the PPME al-Ikhlash (Sincerity), Amsterdam, which has committed to maintaining the practices, particularly following its split from PPME Amsterdam at the end of 2005 (Sujadi 2017, 163).

PPME leaders, themselves, did not ignore the criticisms of the traditionalist practices. De Weerd, the chairman of PPME the Netherlands, asserts: "There is no coercion to attend the performing of *istighotsah* [frequently initiated with performing *yasinan* and *tahlilan*]. This is due to the diverse socio-religious backgrounds of the members,

and also because of ethnic and national diversity." Moreover, Hasyim, a sympathizer of PPME, clarifies that PPME The Hague performing (163) *istighotsah* [usually after performing *yasinan* and *tahlilan*] led by A. Naf'an Sulchan, was scheduled for the end of each month, whereas the third week of the month was allocated for a discussion programme led by Ashif Ishom (a reformist member) (Sujadi 2017, 163-164).

Parallel to the PPME The Hague, the PPME al-Ikhlash Amsterdam regularly performed the *istighotsah* [its formula is similar to that of PPME The Hague] in the first weekend of each month led by Mustofa Sulchan, a younger brother of A. Naf'an Sulchan. The remaining weekends of the month are allocated to learning other Islamic subjects [such as Quranic recitation and its interpretation, Islamic law, Islamic traditions, and Islamic ethics]. In other PPME branches, such as Rotterdam, Breda-Tilburg, and Heemskerk, the activity forms a part of their bi-weekly or monthly gatherings, in addition to discussions on Islamic subjects and understanding Quranic verses under the guidance of selected religious teachers (Sujadi 2017, 164).

In response to this dispute, both sides were strict when it concerned their own customs. On the traditionalist side, reciting the Sūra of Yāsin and performing *tahlilan* and *istighotsah,* as part of conducting Islamic observance, are always performed using *tawassul*, i.e. reciting the name of the Prophet Muhammad and the names of selected authoritative *ulama*s and reciting given *sholawat*s (intercessory prayers particularly aimed at the Prophet Muhammad) such as *munjiyat* and *nariyah*. In fact, these are considered as *shirk* (ascribing partners to God) by the Indonesian reformist Muslims. Therefore, the practices have induced discomfort among those reformist-oriented members (164) who have never performed them such as those affiliated to the PCIM. "…The Muhammadiyah does not practice the *yasinan,* reciting the Sūra of Yāsīn of the Quran for a certain occasion and for a certain purpose, does not practice *tahlilan* - recite selected *sūra*s of the Quran, *istighfār, shalāwat, tasbīḥ*, *taḥmīd* and *tahlīl* on a certain occasion and for a certain purpose, and refuse to implement the *tawassul* in prayer." On the reformist side, in dealing with the traditionalist activities there is no effort to apply the Muhammadiyah's *dakwah kultural* (cultural propagation), which can be exercised in domains in which cultural creation is permitted. The reformist members and sympathizers who objected to the practices

preferred splitting off from the PPME to modify the activities in such a way that was proper for them. Mulkhan, a Muhammadiyah intellectual, opines that "the *dakwah kultural* relies on an assumption that each human being and society has different experiences, and goes on to change in various ways." Therefore, the refusal of the reformist members to attend the activities of PPME and the break-up of PPME Amsterdam into two groups, PPME Amsterdam and PPME al-Ikhlash Amsterdam, are a consequence of this discomfort and disapproval of the practices among reformist-oriented members. Balbaid strongly rejected the traditionalist rituals in PPME Amsterdam (Sujadi 2017, 165).

PPME Amsterdam and PCIM shared a similar view on the traditionalist practices. As a consequence for the reformist members, the presence of PCIM seems to be a solution to their predicament. This solution corresponds with the interest of the central board of Muhammadiyah which wished to extend its branches overseas. However, it was opposed to the opinion of A. Naf'an Sulchan who rejected the founding of an Indonesian Muslim association based on a specific socio-religious background, such as the NU and Muhammadiyah because of the small number of Indonesian Muslims living in the Netherlands and the existence of PPME (Sujadi 2017, 166).

In response to the wish of Muhammadiyah, Siregar, a former member of the PPME in the 1980s and a preacher from Dār al- Iftā in Saudi Arabia, wanted to establish the PCIM soon. He led a gathering, aimed at deciding on the PCIM's structure, which was held on 25 November 2006 in Alinegara's house in The Hague and urged those who were present to elect Alinegara as the leader of PCIM. Siregar explains that he merely wanted the rapid establishment of this Muslim association so that its proponents could perform their socio-religious activities according to their own practices. Similarly, he hoped that other religious congregations would follow suit and found their own associations. His desire for the rapid establishment (166) was met with objections from Kurdi stating: "Why should the PCIM be formed in a rush? Why were there no preparatory actions taken, such as determining who should sit on its boards and run it? and on what fields should it focus." However, her reservations fell on deaf ears. The PCIM was founded in less than a month, on 8 December 2006 with Alinegara as its chairman. The fact is that Alinegara was an experienced leader; he, had studied at al-Azhar

university, was a former leader of PPME the Netherlands, and ICMI in the Netherland (Sujadi 2017, 166-167).

Leaving aside what both sides said, the composition of the PCIM board contradicted the effort to protect the boards of Muhammadiyah against interference by the PKS. The fact that a number of the PCIM's board members were party-affiliated must be seen as the fault (170) of the central board of the Muhammadiyah. Their carelessness in selecting board members was not in accord with the policy of the Muhammadiyah. In response to the PCIM's passivity with regard to the visit of the members of Muhammadiyah central board, Kurdi and the candidate secretary of PCIA in the Netherlands, Alia Baedhowi, were asked by the central board to become involved in the arrangements of welcoming the members of the Muhammadiyah central board. It is apparent that two different groups existed within the PCIM, i.e. party-affiliated and non-party-affiliated members. This led to disagreement and disunity in the organization. This fact was at odds with the ideals of its leader himself, Alinegara, who wanted to situate PCIM as a unifier, not only of Muhammadiyah's proponents and sympathizers, but also of all Indonesian [reformist] Muslims living in the Netherlands. According to him, "…a lot of Islamic organizations claim themselves as the best. This claim has caused them to move away from other congregations who adhere to differing Islamic organizations. If this feeling of the best or the truest is allowed to develop, it will threaten '*ukhuwwa* (brotherhood)… Such a condition opposes the vision-mission of Muslim associations that want to develop an *umma* [Indonesian Muslims]…." In short, the PCIM was unable to fulfill its role as a way out and a solution for disenchanted PPME reformist members (Sujadi 2017, 170-171).

Chapter 3
The Development of Islam and The Nahdlatul Ulama

Islam in the World

Contemporary Muslim politics is not monolithic; it is very diverse and evolving, although its dynamics vary in many countries. Religion is a determinant of political identity, a focus of loyalty, and a source of authority in the Muslim world (Vatikiotis, 1991, p. 36). One of the most continuously discussed aspects of Islam and politics in recent international debates has been Islam's compatibility with democracy. In fact, there has been an effort in many countries to give "Muslim politics a civic, pluralist, and even democratic face" (Hefner, 2005. p. 4). The notion has much arisen in the West in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent U.S. and its allies' 'War on Terror' (WoT) in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Syria, and other countries. Islam, as a religion, interacts with social, political, economic, and cultural determinants and is shaped by them. Hence, there does not exist a homogenous and unchanged Islam that overrides politics and society. If we take politics to be about relations of power, then we should be concerned with how Islamic discourses and traditions are mobilized in contestation activities and in power struggles, whether involving formal political institutions or wider societal forces and processes (Ismail, 2004, p. 163).

There were also earlier debates that generated less international attention yet no less intense that included the French government response to the headscarf dispute that questioned, among other things, whether Muslims could be fully integrated into the French society, while in Turkey, the U.K and Germany, authorities reacted very differently to the politically and religiously charged issue of wearing headscarves. In

all cases, Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori argue that "the headscarf issue exemplifies the struggle to control and interpret symbols integral to Muslim politics" (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996: 8-9).

Political Islam in the sense of radical Islamism was actually in a state of decline in the 1990s in the belief that it failed to offer a viable alternative for a system of govenment within the Muslim world and failed also to facilitate resolution of disputed issues. Just as moderate Islam was beginning to emerge at the centre state, September 11 and its aftermath was a shot in the arm for radical Islamism, and gave a new lease of life to Muslim extremism (Nathan and Kamali 2005: xiv-vx). The book is an attempt to give an account of Islam in Madura; local politics; socio-political actors participating in its local politics; and socio-political, socio-cultural, and socio-religious events during the periods under study.

A number of developments in Muslim-majority states since the Second World War demonstrate that all major political currents that include Islamism, authoritarianism, fascism, secularism, liberalism, populism, and many others exist, thrive, and form political environments. These environments are dominated by movements attempting to transform the state and question the legitimacy of existing governments, public participation, and access to governments. The first obvious example of state transformation was the 1978-1979 Iranian Revolution, when a Muslim cleric, Ayatollah Khomeini, rallied a mass movement and began a revolution to overthrow the Pahlavi dynasty under Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi who was supported by the United States and replaced it with an Islamic government. An example of questioning the legitimacy of existing governments was the assassination of Muslim state leaders, such as Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt, Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan, Ziaur Rahman in Bangladesh, Rashid Karami in Lebanon, and Mohammad Najibullah in Afghanistan following turbulent political disputes, confrontations, and upheavals. The last and the most recent example of state transformation was when Islamism really came to the fore when the Taliban, emerged in 1994 as a prominent faction in the Afghan Civil War, held power from 1996 to 2001 in Afghanistan and enforced a strict interpretation of *sharia* (Islamic laws); and the involvement of Al-Qaeda, a multi-national organization founded in 1988 by Osama bin Laden and other Arab

volunteers who fought against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s, in numerous attacks on civilian and military targets in various countries, including the September 11 attack in the United States and the 2002 Bali bombings in Indonesia.

The events have signified the entanglement of Muslim-majority states in dealing with the challenges of adapting politics and governance to the requirements of Islam. The existence of Islamic governments, radical Islamist political groups, and terrorist attacks is now irrecusable (Brown, 2000, p. 2). In all over the Muslim world, the advances of political Islam and the Islamists have been aided by the blunders of the secular modernizing post-colonial elites. The rise of Islamism was partly due to weak, corrupt, and essentially discredited elites who turned to Islam as a discourses of legitimation to perpetuate their own power and right to rule (Noor, 2004, pp. 750-751).

Islam continues to act as a key mobilizing ideology and social movement frame in Muslim-majority states. Islam, however, is not only a subject of political contention, but also its object (Bayat, 2010, p. 8). It is true that political trends in Muslim-majority states are often violent and contradictory, due in part to the authoritarian regimes. However, "public Islam"[1] for the most part works against violence. Armando Salvatore and Dale Eickelman suggest that advancing levels of education, greater ease of travel, and the rise of new communications media throughout the Muslim-majority states have contributed to the emergence of a public sphere in which large numbers of people want a say in political and religious issues. The result has been challenges to authoritarianism, the fragmentation of religious and political authority, and increasingly open discussions of issues related to the "common good" in Islam (Salvatore and Eickelman, 2004, xi). It is obvious, therefore, that Muslim politics comes in various backgrounds, purposes, forms, and sizes. Differences among Muslim politics can be noticeably perceived not only among regions or among countries but also within countries as well.

Southeast Asia has often been regarded as a region of 'peripheral' Islam compared to the 'centre' in the Middle East despite the fact that the region is home to Indonesia as the largest Muslim state in the world and the fact that it has had some of the more dynamics and also syncretic, mostly non-violent manifestations of Islamic social and

political life for centuries (Saravanamuttu, 2010, p. 3). In fact, the four biggest Muslim states in terms of population with over 100 million Muslims are all located outside the Middle East: Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India. Southeast Asia has more significant diversity in cultures, customs, and historical patterns that have traditionally militated against the emergence of a unified realm with Theravada Buddhism, Sunni Islam, Catholicism, animism, tribal religions, as well as Daoism, Mahayana Buddhism, Confucianism, Judaism, Hinduism, Christian denominations, and all forms of New Age religions flourishing as people's religions (Schottmann and Camilleri, 2013, p. 5).

Given the fact that the Southeast Asian nation of Indonesia is the largest Muslim-majority state in the world, and has Muslim populations of around 88 per cent or 202 million in 2011 (Pew Research Center, 2009, p. 5), it offers examples of a Muslim politics as plural and contested as its counterparts in recently-transforming Muslim-majority states, such as Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia, and Iran. Indonesia shows the articulation of Muslim politics within the context of the authoritarian (the New Order) and democratic (the post-New Order) politics in recent years despite being frequently overlooked in discussions of Muslim societies. The country, along with others in Southeast Asia, such as South Korea and the Philippines, has been a 'newcomer' in the 'Third Wave' of democratization. In the final years of the New Order administration under the Suharto presidency (1966-1998), a powerful movement for a democratic Muslim politics took shape. The movement succeeded in May 1998 in toppling the long-ruling and formerly unassailable Suharto, signifying the movement's alliance with secular Muslims and non-Muslims. Since the end of the long authoritarian regime, Indonesia has implemented a vast number of political reforms that one may arguably place it among healthy electoral democracies. What is also remarkable was Muslims' participation in the democracy campaign dedicated themselves to formulating religious arguments in support of pluralism, democracy, women's rights, and civil society (Hefner, 2005, p. 4; Bertrand, 2010, p. 45). Be that as it may, Indonesia has generally been on the periphery of discussions of comparative and international politics. More importantly, the interaction between Islam and politics in the country has received somewhat little attention by

experts focusing on state-society relations compared to countries in the Middle East.

In Indonesia, Muslim politics encourages people to involve in alliances and competitions over the interpretation of Islamic and cultural symbols, and of control of state and public institutions. The alliances and competitions with definite goals to ensure the upholding of Islam that have been constantly articulated, are common in Muslim-majority states, although they are varied in conceptions and forms. The relationships between Islam and politics have been highly intricate when they are transformed into public symbols, discourses, and practices. Groups of religious elites and individuals pose challenge to state authority in the quest for social order. The relationships between Islam and politics vary in each area and there are diverse traditions of the relationships between Islam and politics.

In view of these socio-political developments, there have been efforts by various Muslim organizations, such as the Indonesian chapter of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HTI) and Salafi-inspired groups, to idealize Muslim-majority states or Muslim-majority areas, including Indonesia, to as the myth of the Islamic state, religiously based, and defined and governed by God through political means. In post-New Order Indonesia, it is seen in an Islamization of politics expressed in, among other things, the adoption of local Islamic laws in the context of democratization; the rise of political Islam; and the growth of modern political Islamic fundamentalism that claims to (re)-create a true Islamic society. The processes that have been marked by continuous debates on secular conceptions of citizenship and that have been involved a dialectical relationship between the state and society, encourage the continuous production of Muslim politics and thus signify the importance of Muslims to use existing political system to reflect their political views. Elsewhere, the transformations of Muslim-majority states are not identical. As a result, there are secularly-administered states, such as Turkey, Senegal, and Azerbaijan; Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan that have incorporated Islamic law in part into their legal systems and are commonly recognized as Islamic states; and Somalia and Bangladesh that have declared Islam to be their state religion in their constitutions, but do not necessarily apply Islamic laws in their courts.

Moreover, a contemporary Indonesian experience with culture, religion, and politics may illuminate the future socio-political trajectories of Muslim-majority states currently undergoing similar democratic transitions—i.e. the engagement with democratic politics experience that appears to have presented an enigma. On the one hand, the overall electoral support for Islamic parties has been in steady decline since 1999 when the country became a democracy. On the other hand, there has been an Islamization of politics as expressed in hundreds of *sharia* laws that have been adopted across the country. Moreover, on the one hand, the developments of Islam in law and politics seem to indicate that Indonesian Islam has become more rigidly conservative or radical. On the other hand, the driving of rapid Islamic commodification and the growth of urban middle-class Muslims have shaped a more resilient religious culture and thinking. Elsewhere, in many Muslim-majority states, conflicts and accommodations between Islam, state, and society have frequently been shaped and characterized by Islamic religious movements who have created Islam as an intense ideological force which challenges territorial rule. Indonesia's more peaceful experience than that of the Middle Eastern countries in the aftermath of the Arab Spring in negotiating and re-arranging institutionalized patterns of political practices with populist movements claiming to represent an *ummah*/*umat* (religious Islamic community) can become a constructive indicator in possible future trajectories of Muslim politics.

We have to remember that the relationships between people's leaders and between them and the state in Muslim-majority-states, including Indonesia, have been more complex since the encounters with democracy. The struggle for influence within these elites is not only centred on opportunities for private material benefits, but also on political competition which is loosely organized, pragmatic, and often mutually beneficial in nature. Their continuous presence in the New Order and the post-New Order period reflects their constant influence over society. There are two rather different reasons for that. Firstly, it shows that they are highly capable of adjusting to the continuously changing political atmosphere of the Indonesian state. Secondly, they continue to be needed by society to safeguard and preserve its values and norms. The first reason indicates that the creation of a strong and autonomous civil society is still hampered by the presence of an

ineffective state system, while the second reason suggests that the religious and cultural values and norms of the Madurese are their last strongholds in coping with modernity.

Furthermore, the characters of traditional Islam in Indonesia remains the driving force that has preserved Islam in Indonesia—recently often articulated as Islam Nusantara—as a more peaceful religion unparalleled with its counterpart in many seethed Middle Eastern, African, and South Asian parts, and has contributed to the transformation of Indonesia's polities from centralized authoritarian control to the decentralized democracies that the *Reformasi* required. Despite its complex consequences, islamization and re-islamization in Muslim strongholds is not necessarily a setback. It appears to have been a long and on-going Islamization process for centuries, and it has actually gained public support due in part to the euphoria of democracy. Meanwhile, substantive challenges to the state authority under the banner of Islam have yet to be realized.

In sum, in comparison between the New Order and the post-New Order, Indonesia as a new democracy in Asia[2] has successfully intertwined decentralization process with the process of democratization, despite the abundance of strong evidence that decentralization is not synonymous with the process of democratization. It thus means that compared to the New Order, the Indonesian nation-state is arguably stronger now. Although the country is called into question in terms of the quality of democracy in aspects such as the lack of autonomous and strong civil society, the frequence of ethnic and religious violence, and the prevalence of populism, clientelism, and corruption, Indonesia has arguably been successful in creating good governance in the post-New Order; in realizing the mantra "bringing the government closer to the people"; in the sense of electoral politics and decentralization; in the reinforcement of local identities; and in the high numbers of local regulations that signify a core in decentralization.[3]

In increasingly democratised as well as Islamised Indonesia since the fall of the New Order administration in 1998, there has been a complex entanglement between communal piety, religious commodification, Islamic populism, and Islamism in many Islamic institutions. Shifting religious expressions conformed to transnational ideas of Islam and the penetrative forces of global market economy are

prevalent among urban middle-class Muslims. In the context of Islamic populism and Islamism, for instance, these groups appear to follow populist ideas in social issues such as, among other things, identifying and condemning collective enemies; these are often the non-Muslim rich who have foreign descent, mostly the Chinese, or Western powers who are always thought to have the intention to destroy Islam. Moreover, they also tend to follow populist ideas in social issues related to, for instance, socio-religious affairs and conflicts in other Muslim-majority countries, such as Palestine and Syria, and in local political issues related to, among other things, elections and political parties. In the context of communal piety and religious commodification, they seem to bluntly participate in religious observances and indulge in the spirits of consumption of (sacred) commodities and also religious journeys, such as the craze for religious attires and the increasingly popular *umrah* (a pilgrimage that can be undertaken at any time of the year).

The entanglement frequently involves the phenomena of contestation between supporters of variants of Indonesian Islam and the fragmentation of the *ummah*. These rapidly growing yet fluid groups have continuously attempted to pursue “true” Islamic identity and have claimed recognition of their identity as the most appropriate, promoting it to be the ideal socio-cultural identity for the whole nation. The

identity-claiming has been facilitated by the penetration of local and transnational ideas and practices of communal piety, religious commodification, Islamic populism, and Islamism.

These complex circumstances have been escalating since the fall of the Suharto administration when the country was characterised by great fluctuations in the socio-political spheres and the dominance of the neo-liberal economic paradigm (Lim 2009, p. 14). The political transformation has fueled Muslims' public expression of identities that include ethnic, religious, and social class, as indicated in rapid consumption and commodification in religious practices and observances as well as in the creation of religious identities, piety, Muslim pride, and brotherhood through the commerce of Western and local brands, that had previously been excluded during the New Order, but which were rapidly politicised in the newly democratising and decentralising regional political spheres (Millie *et. al.* 2014, p. 195; Fealy 2008, pp. 15-39; Lukens-Bull 2008, pp. 220-234).

While nowadays many religious activities are expressed and practised openly in public, including in state-owned mosques and television, and thus are prone to be inclusive (Millie *et. al.* 2014), and due to the desire of modern Muslims who find scripturalist Islam 'dry' (Howell 2010, p. 1042), a number of contemporary trending religious activities, such as urban *pengajian*, are frequently exclusive—attended by tens of participants, and mostly located in houses of the participants alternately—and appear to challenge the traditional and more moderate faces of Indonesian Islam. Despite its exclusive characters, the materials and issues discussed in such *pengajian* touch upon global and local religious affairs.

The reasons for attracting Muslims across the globe to worldwide religious issues are caused by the global Islamic revival in the last several decades that has fragmented traditional forms of religious authority, generated new figures of public piety, and created new publics through which Islamic teachings are constituted and contested (Hoesterey 2012, p. 38). Advancing levels of education and the rise of new communications media have also contributed to the emergence of a public sphere in which large numbers of people want a say in political and religious issues. The result has been challenges to authoritarianism, the fragmentation of religious and political authority,

and increasingly open discussions of issues related to the "common good" in Islam (Salvatore and Eickelman 2004, p. xi). In addition, we are also witnessing various forms of islamisation and re-islamisation in Muslim strongholds which are not necessarily a setback. In fact, they appear to have been a long and on-going Islamisation process for centuries, and they have actually gained public support due in part to the euphoria of democracy (Pribadi 2018, p. 9). In Indonesia, in tandem with the rising consciousness of Muslims to demonstrate their religious self in the public sphere, Islam has increasingly transformed into public attention and become part of political expressions, legal transactions, economic activities, and social and cultural practices (Hasan 2009, p. 230).

During the New Order, the political domination of the state over society extended enormously. The military-dominated Suharto regime and his supporters moved to limit political participation and to concentrate power, and generally remained vigilant against and attempted to neutralise Islamic forces (Macintyre 1991, pp. 2, 3; Hamayotsu 2002, p. 356). For the most part, the governments at all levels neglected Muslims' socio-political interests and attempted to apply the development policies in one, rigid way. Therefore, it seems obvious with the benefit of hindsight that all post-New Order democratic administrations would face challenges from newly-reborn generations of Muslims who were marginalised during the old administration. In responding to state power and policies, they tend to employ populist ideas in all aspects of life. In fact, there have been people wishing to take over the state as to impose *sharia* law, or to capture specific institutions as a means to impose their views on society and to suppress the contending views of other Muslims (Ricklefs 2013, p. 19).

It shows us that in contemporary Indonesia, the relationships between Islam and politics that involve, among other things, on-going processes of democratisation, identity politics, and the creation of civil society have been more complex than before. Indeed, Islam has penetrated the dominant nationalist and secular political parties. Almost all parties have accommodated religious aspirations and shied away from criticising controversial religious issues, the facts that show the strength of religious influence in Indonesian politics today (Tanuwidjaja 2010). As a result, Islamic parties are no longer the lone channel for

Islamic aspirations, and thus they seem to have failed to gain popular support or to capitalise these sentiments (Sakai and Fauzia 2014, p. 41; Hicks 2012, p. 40).

Islamism (or political Islam) in Indonesia has increased since the early years of the post-New Order. Sakai and Fauzia argue that the increase of Islamists in Indonesia is a result of ordinary Muslims turning to Islam as a reference to regulate their life (Sakai and Fauzia 2014, p. 43). In fact, while the Islamist movement in Indonesia has been influenced by transnational features, the success of the spread of the local-based movement is based on its effective use of local repertoires of reasoning (local history, *adat*, rituals and memory), rather than through scriptural arguments (Alimi 2014), as well as the rampant expansion of television and other media's preaching programmes and local *pengajian* that offer opportunities for Muslims to gain Islamic knowledge independently for ethical self-improvement (Sakai and Fauzia 2014, p. 43; Muzakki 2008; Howell 2008). Therefore, rather than directly involving themselves in political Islamic movements, many Muslims in Indonesia are seeking to implement an Islamic way of life in a challenging and secularising world (Sakai and Fauzia 2014, p. 43). This is especially true for urban middle-class Muslims.

As Noorhaidi Hasan has put it, the rising consciousness of urban middle-class Muslims to engage in debating and objectifying their religion entails the availability of religious spaces in big cities. In view of the growing demands for such spaces, elite housing complexes and shopping centres provide meeting places for listening to public lectures on Islam (*majelis taklim*). Luxury Islamic centres have been built in big cities, such as Jakarta, Surabaya, Bandung, Yogyakarta, and Makassar. In those sites urban middle-class Muslims participate in reciting Quran and the like, while discussing various aspects of Islam (Hasan 2009, p. 237).

Contemporary urban Muslims are in constant search of a world which is religiously defined, which provides moral order and spiritual sanctuary to human being. In Peter Berger's words, this kind of world is called 'the sacred canopy' (Berger 1967). To urban Muslims, Islam represents various sacred canopies that fertilise communal bonds and piety as well as impose morally sacred orders at the cosmological and everyday mundane activities. We have become accustomed to see how

religiously Muslim societies attempt to cope with an ever secularising world.

The world, with the exception of Western and Northern Europe, is "as furiously religious as ever" (Berger 1992, p. 32). This state of affairs runs against the assertion of secularisation theorists who predicted the significant decline of religion as an influential determinant of social action when people experience modernisation and rationalisation. In fact, modernisation has also triggered a myriad of countertrends as evidenced by the movements of religious revival worldwide (Kitiarsa 2008, p. 3; Pohl 2006, p. 393). However, religiosity is often built on discontent. Rapid social transformation marked by industrialisation, urbanisation, and modernisation can generate notions of uprootedness and disenchantment among certain segments of society, such as the youth, the *petite bourgeoisie*, and other members of the middle classes who experience frustration for social mobility and set to protest against the modern way of life (Ismail 2006, pp. 11-13). In terms of education, many young Islamic activists coming from newly urbanised middle-class families have not necessarily experienced formal religious training (Tan 2011). Instead, many have been educated in 'secular' institutions where command over knowledge and skill is revered as the key to meritocratic social advancement.

Islam has apparently become pop, chic, young, and cool among urban middle-class Muslims. In Indonesia, religiosity has since 1980s gradually become a significant factor in an overt political statement against the Suharto administration and as a pride symbol of religious identity politics after the demise of the authoritarian regime. As Hoesterey and Clark have put it, popular culture has become a significant arena in Indonesia through which Muslims constitute and contest ideas about Islam and piety (Hoesterey and Clark 2012, p. 207). Elsewhere, the rise of pop Islam has provided Muslims with an important platform for breaking with traditional gender roles, building social capital, and acquiring the participatory skills necessary to bring 'civil society' into their own communities (Mushaben 2008, p. 507).

Many female members of the *pengajian* groups are aspiring housewives who seek both worldly comforts and everlasting afterlife. Most of them believe that *pengajian* serve as media to bring them closer to God. Not all participants who come to these occasions can read Arabic

or understand the meaning of the verses in the Quran. Nevertheless, they are attracted by the tantalising *pahala* (religous reward/merit for moral conduct) they might obtain. Therefore, in addition to the regular *pengajian* in their neighbourhood, they also attend other *pengajian* occasionally held in other places, such as in neighbouring mosques or in events organised by local government offices and mass organisations. By attending many *pengajian*, these women also feel the need to look charming as it serves as a display of wealth, power, status, and social class. In this case, no wonder that Islamic brands and products of cosmetics, beauty care, and fashion have enjoyed the success of their sellings through a rampant and attractive marketing. Clearly, urban *pengajian* are a perfect display of communal piety and religious commodification.

As we have noticed, religiosity has been a significant issue among Muslim communities in the last several decades in Indonesia. Being a Muslim means that one not only has to perform religious duties and avoid immoral and misconduct activities, but also proudly and persistently to demonstrate his or her Islamic identity. In these *pengajian* groups, being religious can mean clearly showing their 'Islamic' appearance. For the women, distinctive religious garbs, such as expensive *hijab* and long and loose-fiiting *hijab* can be the principal symbols.[4] For the men, growing beards and wearing *celana cingkrang* (shorter trousers below the knee but above the ankle considered the most appropriate trousers for Muslim men) are the primary identities. They like to claim that wearing and showing Islamic clothings and appearance are the first steps to become "true" Muslims. They also prefer to talk—or actually to mention—in broken Arabic for certain terms, instead of using Indonesian terms. Moreover, consuming what are thought to be religious commodities is also very important for their religiosity. Examples of such things are dates fruits, *habbatus sauda* (black caraway/black cumin), and camel milk; all of which are non-native Indonesian commodities. For these people, these habits, along with the participation in religious activities, are now considered to be the most appropriate religious expressions of Islamic identity.

These conditions, however, are not exclusive to Indonesia. P.J. Vatikiotis argues that it is not striking that in the Muslim world, religion acts as a determinant of political identity, a focus of loyalty, and a source

of authority (Vatikiotis 1991, p. 36). Islam continues to act as a key mobilising ideology and social movement frame in Muslim-majority states. Islam, however, is not only a subject of political contention, but also its object (Bayat 2010, p. 8). In short, contemporary urban middle-class Muslims in Indonesia are more dynamic, prone to adopt transnational ideas of Islam, but at the same time are more exclusive and tend to oppose to more traditional expressions of local Islam.

In the country, Islam has become part of an extensive consumer culture and served as much an important identity marker as a sign of social status and political affiliation. Its strength lies in the fact that it has developed into some sort of network that enables numerous people from different social backgrounds to share and make contacts, both real and virtual. Through this network, the global Islamic revival messages have significantly amplified, influencing multiple socio-political fields and encouraging a collective "true Islam" identity. Wearing proper Islamic dress, watching Islamic television programmes, gathering in Muslim cafés and beauty salons, veiling, attending study circles with popular preachers, doing 'Islamic' sports, such as archery and horse riding, or making the pilgrimage to Mecca link an individual, indirectly perhaps, to a larger social group and *ummah* in a general sense. The network, in turn, provides credible paths for upward mobility and also a market for commercial products (Hasan 2009, p. 231). Pattana Kitiarsa indicates that commodification helps redefine religions as market commodities as well as exchange in the spiritual marketplace which is further expanded by the transnational connections of religious organisational and market networks (Kitiarsa 2008, pp. 6-7). The market for religious and spiritual renewal products is rather diverse. On the one hand, many Muslims avidly select brands and products symbolically linked to Islam in preference to non-religiously marked ones. On the other hand, some of the most successful commercially delivered piety promotion programmes combine religious teachings with elements of secular culture to enhance their appeal and demonstrate their relevance to modern life (Howell 2013, 402-403).

"True" Islam for some Muslims in Indonesia means 'return to Quran and *Sunnah*' (the practice of the Prophet, which is derived from the *hadith*); the practices of which in everyday affairs, in terms of Islamic populism and Islamism, are often highly political as we can see

in this section. According to Salwa Ismail, the term Islamism is used to encompass both Islamist politics as well as re-Islamisation, the process whereby various domains of social life are invested with signs and symbols associated with Islamic traditions. In short, Islamism is not just the expression of a political project; it also covers the invocation of frames with an Islamic referent in social and cultural spheres (Ismail 2006, p. 2). In Indonesia, it is particularly true.

Ernest Gellner proposes two models of Muslim societies: the High Islam of urban Muslims and the Low Islam of rural Muslims. The former is scripturalist and ascetic, suitable to the character of the city people, while the latter is ecstatic, meeting the needs of village dwellers. With greater urbanisation, Low Islam declines and High Islam becomes ascendant. This occurs because High Islam captures the urban strata's desire for learning and upward mobility. This desire is disturbed by the weakness of the state to modernise their country, and thus Islamism is viewed as an affirmation of the scriptural-based spirit expressing frustration with the blocked road to modernisation (Gellner 1981).

In the Indonesian context, much of the debate about the compability of Islam and modernity rejects the idea of the secular

modernist that to achieve modernity entails the privatisation of religion and the removal of religious discourse from the public sphere. In fact, according to Sulfikar Amir, there stands the Muslim modernists who call for the combination of *iptek* (*ilmu pengetahuan dan teknologi* – science and technology) and *imtaq* (*iman dan taqwa* – faith and devotion) to build an Indonesian nation underpinned by strong Islamic faith (Amir 2009). Furthermore, Daromir Rudnyckyj looks at how the rapid transformations after 1998 in the social and economic realms have provoked intense ethical reflections in Indonesian society. He shows that Islam spreads through means that reflect its compability with modernity (Rudnyckyj 2009). In a Muslim-dominant country such as Indonesia, Islam is an integral part of the founding ideologies, and ideological elements of Islam are drawn upon by both political parties and organisations in civil society (Yew-Foong 2013, p. 5).

The supporters of "true" Islam in Indonesia are generally peaceful, in the sense that they are not violently attempting to transform Indonesia into an open battle field of wars between Muslims and non-Muslims. Nevertheless, they frequently make use of intolerant ways in arguing, promoting, and disseminating their own expressions of Islam against certain groups, whether Muslims or non-Muslims, who are not in the same opinion on Islam. These intolerant acts often eventually cause religious strains. Therefore, besides showing a peaceful and moderate look, as Hadiz puts it, Indonesia can be used to easily exemplify the dangers of the rise of religious violence and intolerance within a democracy, especially due to the activities of vigilante groups that employ religion to justify their presence (Hadiz 2016, p. 14).

Islamic populism in Indonesia is an urban phenomenon. The rise of spirited urban middle-class Muslims in Indonesia cannot be detached from the marginalised position of Muslims in the country, and eventually, these groups help establish and sustain the emergence of new Islamic populism. Vedi Hadiz argues that the main project of the new Islamic populism is defined in terms of the favourable repositioning of the marginalised *ummah* within the confines of the nation state through possible strategies of contestation which do not necessarily involve the call to establish a *sharia*-based state (Hadiz 2016, p. 4).

Since the 2014 presidential elections, popular political polarisation in Indonesia that divides the citizens into secularist-

nationalist faction and Islamist-nationalist cohort has escalated and political tension has fluctuated, heating up every now and then, and cooling down again.[5] The level of tension is influenced by mixed political factors; and the situation in Jakarta is rapidly felt in the regions, including in Serang. Most members of the *pengajian* groups claim that they are not interested in politics, in the sense that they are not members of any political party. Neverheless, many, if not most, share the opinions about the requirement that head of state, regional heads, and leading public office must be Muslim; *sharia* must be implemented in daily life; the limitation of foreign influence; and the abolition of communism, liberalism, and religious pluralism. A recent study demonstrates that Islamist political attitudes have increased after a massive Islamist mobilisation in late 2016 and early 2017 (*Aksi Bela Islam* – Action for Defending Islam)—combining both street demonstrations and an electoral challenge—directed against the then incumbent Chinese-Christian governor of the Special Capital Region of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok). The authors argue that Muslim attitudes surrounding the main message of the mobilisation (that is, the exclusion of non-Muslims from political office, in this case Ahok) significantly intensified during and after the mobilisation. This suggests that many Muslims have absorbed the message propagated by the mobilisation leaders (Mietzner, Muhtadi, and Halida 2018: 161).

It is clear now that the spirits of "true" Islam are determinant factors that reinforce the rise of Islamic populism and Islamism in Indonesia. It is also a clear sign that Islamisation is still continuously taking place in the country. It has to be noted, however, that Islamisation does not necessarily denote the rise of Islamism. As Andreas Ufen has suggested, in many instances Islamisation in Southeast Asia signifies the strengthening of a conservative Islam, not of Islamists. Moreover, he argues that for decades, most Muslims in Indonesia have undergone an Islamisation which was radicalised in some areas after the fall of the New Order. This development has, since independence, been partially facilitated by the state and by political elites. The state certainly has circumscribed the activities of particular religious actors. Nevertheless, for the most part this process genuinely appears to be a result of civil society dynamics. Today in the country's party system, Islamisation of

politics is moderate, whereas society-wide there is a mushrooming of a mostly conservative Islam (Ufen 2009, p. 309).

Elsewhere I have argued that Muslim politics encourages people to involve in alliances and competitions over the interpretation of Islamic and cultural symbols, and of control of state and public institutions. The alliances and competitions with definite goals to ensure the upholding of Islam that have been constantly articulated, are common in Muslim-majority states, although they are varied in conceptions and forms. The relatioships between Islam and politics have been highly intricate when they are transformed into public symbols, discourses, and practices. Nevertheless, in Indonesia, substantive challenges to the state authority under the banner of Islam have yet to be realised (Pribadi 2018, p. 9, 11). The country, on the one hand, once in 1990s—and now reborn into other forms—was marked by the concern over the notion of *ghazwul fikri* (invasion of ideas) which became a passionate term to refer to various forms of Western cultural invasion, i.e. American movies, music, fashion, food, and most importantly certain styles of religious thought and attitude, such as secularism, liberalism, and religious pluralism. On the other hand, as a response, many were concerned at what they perceived as an effort to Arabise Indonesian Islam and eradicate local practices and liberal interpretations. Against this Arab-style political Islam, prominent intellectuals pleaded for what they called 'cultural Islam', the expression of Islamic values in Indonesian cultural forms. Both sides appeared to share the perception that Indonesian Islam was under threat of being subverted by foreign influences and the assumption that local cultures are largely passive recipients of global flows (Van Bruinessen 2015, pp. 61-62). Nowadays, it is exactly the proponents of Arabisation who are concerned and actively attempt to avert the notion of Islam Nusantara propagated by traditional factions of Indonesian Islam (mostly the Nahdlatul Ulama) and supported by wide segments of the population who oppose Arabisation, including leading intellectuals associated with secularism, liberalism, and religious pluralism, such as those gather at the Liberal Islamic Network (JIL).[6]

Today most Muslim societies are marked by deep disagreements over who is qualified to speak as a religious authority and over how seriously ordinary Muslims should take the pronouncements

of individual scholars (Hefner 2005, p. 6). In Indonesia, the image of Indonesian Islam remains a contested discourse. It certainly is not a product without foreign influences. As Martin van Bruinessen has put it, Indonesian Islam is not a product of relative isolation from foreign influences, but due to centuries of active interaction with highly diverse powerful cultural flows, including the Middle East and the West which have been the dominant and competing sources of the flow of ideas, with minor visible roles of China and South Asia (Van Bruinessen 2015, pp. 62-63). This is in line with Mark Woodward's notion that religion, culture, and nationality are as contested today as they were more than 70 years ago when Indonesia was founded (Woodward 2011, p. 270).

While there are Muslims who engage in violent acts to realise their goal of establishing an Islamic state and supporting Islamic populism and Islamism, there are others who share the same goal but prefer peaceful means such as education and political election (Tan 2011, p. 9). It seems that since 1998, there have been continuous efforts to idealise Muslim-majority states or Muslim-majority areas by various Muslim organisations and political parties, such as the Indonesian chapter of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HTI)[7] and the Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS) as well as other Salafi-inspired groups, including in Indonesia, to as the myth of the Islamic state, religiously based, and defined and governed by God through political means.[8] Meanwhile, there have also been moderation attempts by traditional Islamic groups and proponents of secularism, liberalism, and religious pluralism against this 'idealisation'. For example, the key champion of these groups, the fourth President of Indonesia, Abdurrahman Wahid (1940-2009) claimed that Indonesia should be an example of the compability of Islam and democracy by resisting both religious majoritarianism and anti-religious secularism (Seo 2012, p. 1047), even though it is not an easy task as the MUI issued a *fatwa* (non-binding religious opinion) No. 7 on Pluralism, Secularism, and Liberalism (2005) that rejects the three Western-origin thoughts (Nasir 2014). The making and contest for religious authority is clearly taking place, not only at central level, but also in regional public spheres

During the New Order, the political domination of the state over society expanded enormously (Macintyre, 1991, pp. 2-3). The administration attempted to consolidate its power through policies that

require the creation of socio-politically homogenous communities. Roberth Hefner suggests that Suharto's stance towards Islam was paradoxical. While endorsing religious activities that encouraged Muslim piety, the administration restrained political Islam (Hefner, 2000). In post New Order Indonesia, however, people are not passive recipients of state policies. With the benefit of hindsight, it seems obvious that after the New Order, more democratic administrations would be challenged by an urban-modernist camp of a newly-reborn generation of Muslims, influenced mostly by the nineteenth century Middle Eastern thoughts e.g. those of Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Ridha, who had been politically marginalised by the old administration. This is a generation which, in many aspects of life, and especially in response to state power and policies, tend to employ populist ideas, such as defending the interests and speaking in the name of the Muslim community.

Populism is an array of "political discourses and strategies that aim to rupture institutional systems by polarizing society into two antagonistic camps" (De la Torre, 2019, p. 8); in the context of Indonesian Islam, the camps are primarily divided into traditionalists and modernists. Populism refers to the population as a whole, and concomitantly to a section of the population, those considered to be excluded (De la Torre, 2019, p. 2). Some concepts of populism in the developing world focus on the exclusion of an identified enemy, anti-foreign rhetorics, and calling for the replacement of the existing polity (Mietzner, 2015, p. 3). Steven Levitsky and James Loxton develop three characteristics for populists: "First, populists mobilise mass support via anti-establishment appeals, positioning themselves in opposition to the entire elite. Second, populists are outsiders, or individuals who rise to political prominence outside the national party system. Third, populists establish a personalistic linkage to voters" (Levitsky and Loxton, 2013, p. 110). Like all variants of populism, Islamic populism involves the mobilisation and homogenisation of a range of disparate grievances of the 'masses' against identified 'elites'. A central conception of Islamic populism is that of the *ummah* as proxy for 'the people', i.e. the righteous masses, made up of internally diverse social interests, homogenized as pious members of the community who posses

righteousness through juxtaposition against un-Islamic elites and their foreign non-Islamic allies (Hadiz, 2016, pp. 3-4; Hadiz, 2018).

Supporters of populism in North America are often agrarian farmers and small to medium entrepreneurs (Hofstadter, 1969, quoted in Hadiz, 2016, p. 24); in Latin America there have been cases of old rural populism supported by the peasantry as well as by the urban population (Hennessy, 1969, quoted in Hadiz, 2016, p. 24), such as the case in Venezuela in which Hugo Chavez won power in 1998 with the support of rural poor and low-income workers (Hawkins, 2003); and in Thailand, populist leader Thaksin Shinawatra built his influence amongst low-income farmers in the north and northeast of the country against Bangkok-based elites (McCargo & Pathmanand, 2005). In general, populists have challenged the power of elites in almost everywhere. What may be new is that populists are now in power not only in fragile democracies in the global south, but also in the cradle of liberal democracy, the United States, in which Donald Trump won the recent election (De la Torre, 2019, p. 1).

However, in Indonesia, Islamic populism is an urban phenomenon. The rise of a vocal urban Muslim middle class in Indonesia cannot be detached from the formerly politically marginalised position of urban-modernist Muslims, which led these groups to establish and sustain the emergence of contemporary Islamic populism. Vedi Hadiz argues that the main project of Islamic populism is defined in terms of a favourable repositioning of the marginalised sections of Muslims within the confines of the nation state through strategies of contestation (Hadiz, 2016, p. 4), while Kenneth M. Roberts suggests that populist movements claim to offer more authentic forms of political representation for previously excluded constituencies (Roberts, 2019). Hadiz maintains that the vehicles of Islamic populism can include political parties, mass organisations, paramilitaries, and terrorist cells, those that are geared towards bypassing the mechanisms of representative democracy in favour of more direct forms of political partisipation (Hadiz, 2016, p. 27). This paper shows that Sekolah Islam is one important vehicle of contemporary Islamic populism and Islamism in Indonesia.

Contemporary urban Muslims are in constant search of a world which is religiously defined, and provides moral order and spiritual

sanctuary to human beings. In Peter Berger's words, religion or a religious worldview is a 'sacred canopy' (Berger, 1967). To urban Muslims, Islam represents various sacred canopies that fertilise communal bonds and piety as well as impose morally sacred orders on cosmological and everyday mundane activities. According to Hadiz, the urban Muslim middle class in Indonesia has responded positively to Islamic populism because it claims to be able to establish a society religiously resilient against the shallow materialist values and excessive indulgence in pleasure lifestyles associated with Western culture (Hadiz, 2016, p. 25).

Apart from Western and Northern Europe, the world is 'as furiously religious as ever' (Berger, 1992, p. 32). This is contrary to the ideas of secularisation theorists who predicted a significant decline of religion as an influential determinant of social action when populations experienced modernisation and rationalisation (Kitiarsa, 2008, p. 3). However, religiosity is often built on discontent. Rapid social transformation marked by industrialisation, urbanisation, and modernisation can generate dislocation and disenchantment among certain segments of society, such as youth, the petite bourgeoisie, and members of the middle classes who are frustrated by the lack of social mobility (Ismail, 2006, pp. 11-13). In New Order Indonesia, especially in 1980s, a new camp consisted of urban modernist Muslims working in academia, NGOs, and Muslim social organisations, appeared to advocate the cultural Islam movement (Amir, 2009, p. 79). Many of these young Indonesian Islamic activists come from newly urbanised middle-class families (Hasan, 2006, p. 219) in which many of them have not necessarily obtained formal religious training (Tan, 2011) but have instead been educated in 'secular' institutions.

"True" Islam for some Muslims means a 'return to the Quran and Hadith' (the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad recorded by his contemporaries), and also the Sunnah (the practices of the Prophet which are derived from the Hadith)'. Salwa Ismail suggests that the term Islamism is used to encompass both Islamist politics as well as re-Islamisation – the process whereby various domains of social life are invested with signs and symbols associated with Islamic traditions. Examples of this process in the Muslim world, including Indonesia, include wearing of the *hijab* (veil), conversations conducted in broken Arabic to signify the speakers are "true" Muslims, the consumption of religious commodities, holding exclusive religious gatherings, and displaying symbols of religious identity (Ismail, 2006, p. 2). As a result of Islamism and re-Islamisation, the existence of Islamic governments, radical Islamist political groups, and terrorist attacks is now irrecusable (Brown, 2000, p. 2). Across the Muslim world, the advances of political Islam and Islamists have been aided by the blunders of the secular modernising post-colonial elites (Noor, 2004, pp. 750-751).

In the Indonesian context, according to Sulfikar Amir, there are Muslim modernists who call for the combination of *iptek* (*ilmu pengetahuan dan teknologi* – science and technology) and *imtaq (iman*

dan taqwa – faith and devotion) to build an Indonesian nation underpinned by a strong Islamic faith (Amir, 2009). Bahtiar Effendy shows that the modernists are very active in advocating political rights of the Muslims and in supporting the agenda of political Islam (Effendy, 2003). Furthermore, Daromir Rudnyckyj looks at how the rapid transformations after 1998 in social and economic realms have provoked intense ethical reflections on Indonesian society (Rudnyckyj, 2009). In a Muslim-dominant country such as Indonesia, Islam is an integral part of the founding ideologies, and ideological elements of Islam are drawn upon by both political parties and organisations in civil society (Yew-Foong, 2013, p. 5).

Supporters of "true" Islam in Indonesia are generally peaceful, in the sense that they are not violently attempting to transform Indonesia into an open battle field of wars between Muslims and non-Muslims. Nevertheless, they frequently demonstrate their intolerance in how they argue for, promote, and disseminate their perspective on Islam and are highly critical of Muslims and non-Muslims who do not share their views. These intolerant acts often eventually cause socio-religious strains.

A corporatist framework of analysis provides us with an important starting point for understanding how Suharto's regime managed state-Islamic relations. However, such a framework does not explain an entire social-political reality. Deeper historical and socioeconomic factors are responsible for the development, strength and diversity of organisation in a given society. For Suharto, channelling interests into corporatist structures was a means of limiting (3) organised pluralism in society. The aim was to keep political participation and interest-demands low by channelling group interests into state-supervised structures and effectively locking them out of power sharing arrangements. During the 1970s and 1980s, the strategy of containing social-political organisation and suppressing opposition appeared to be largely successful. However, by the mid-to-late 1990s, corporatist forms of organisation were proving incapable of containing societal interest as increasing demands were being made for political participation and the right to organises independently of the state. During Habibie's administration, corporatist structures were largely dismantled or rendered irrelevant in an emerging multiparty system (Donald J. Porter,

Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia, 2002. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon: 3).

Thus, the book goes beyond a purely corporatist framework of analysis and addresses broader considerations concerning regime maintenance and survival, and regime decay, under authoritarian systems of rule. The argument is made that state management of Islamic political interest demonstrated a shift in the pattern of corporatism being applied from a strategy based on the restrictive exclusion of interests (1970s-1980s) to a more inclusionary one (1990s)—albeit with a key exclusionary mechanisms still in place. This partial shift in strategy refleced the need, as part of regime maintenance, to respond to the demands of an expanding pluralism of social-political organisation. However, the shift in strategy, which aimed to keep political interests within the corporatist net, ultimately was unable to contain the burst of organised activity (Donald J. Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia, 2002. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon: 4).

The Nahdlatul Ulama

The Background of the NU

The NU seems to have had a great impact in Madura. For instance, in the 1971 general elections (*pemilu*), of the total number of votes in all regencies in Madura, 817,561 went to the NU party and 300,399 to Golkar, while in the East Java province only 4,379,806 went to the NU and 6,837,384 to Golkar (Panitia Pemilihan Daerah Tingkat I Jawa Timur, 1971: 170-171). At a glance, these figures show us how central the association (and the political party in 1971) to the Madurese in general and to the Madurese *kiai* in particular, since the *kiai* were the most important factor behind the success of the association in persuading the people to vote for the NU.

The NU is by far the largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia, with approximately forty to fifty million followers who are heavily concentrated in the Central and East Java provinces (Nakamura, 1983; Feillard, 1995; Mujani & Liddle, 2004: 111). The organisation, which has had close connections with the countryside and the *pesantren*

established there, was founded on 31 January 1926 in Surabaya by a number of renowned *kiai*, most of whom owned Islamic boarding schools, including *Kiai* Hasyim Asy`ari of Jombang and *Kiai* Wahab Hasbullah of Surabaya. The NU can be considered the heir to Nahdlatul Wathan, founded in 1916 in Surabaya by Abdul Wahab and *Kiai* Mas Mansur (who later turned to the Muhammadiyah). This older organisation was aimed at defending the authority of the four *madhhab* (Islamic schools of law) against Ahmad Syurkati,[6] the ultimate religious authority of Al-Irsyad Al-Islamiyah or known as Al-Irsyad, an Arabic-influenced socio-religious organization. Like its predecessor, the NU also sees its function as being the guardian of sacred tradition by maintaining the four *madhhab* teachings, although it is the Shafi'i religious school that has been predominantly embraced by Indonesian Muslims (Boland, 1982: 11; Feillard, 1999: 13). This indicates the NU's acknowledgement of the great *ulama* of the four *madhhab* in interpreting the Quran and *hadith*.

The foundation of the NU was, on the one hand, a reaction against the growth of reformist groups. The Muhammadiyah and Sarekat Islam were seen as a threat to traditionalist religious beliefs of Islamic jurisprudence, which depended strongly on strict devotion (*taqlid*) to the *madhhab* rather than *ijtihad* (the making of a decision in Islamic law by personal effort as opposed to *taqlid*) of the Quran and *Sunnah* (the practice of the Prophet, it is often equated with the *hadith*). More importantly, however, it was founded in response to the changing global developments in the Islamic world in the 1920s: the eradication of the

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[6] Sheikh Ahmad Syurkati or Sheikh Ahmad Muhammad Surkati al-Ansari was born in Dongola, Sudan in 1875. He studied in the prestigious Islamic centres of Medina and Mecca in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He came to the Dutch Indies in 1911 following a request to participate in Jamiat Khair, an education institution whose board members consisted of people of Arabic descent who claimed to be descendants of the prophet. After spending some years at the institution, he resigned due to a disagreement with other board members over equal rights between the Alawi group, the descendants of the prophet, and non-Alawi Arabs. Leading members of the Jamiat had denounced his idea that Alawi Arabs in the Dutch Indies could marry anyone as long as the person was a Muslim and had a good attitude. Following this dispute, Syurkati, along with other non-Alawi Arabs founded Al-Irsyad in 1914. For an extensive account on Syurkati, see Affandi, 1999.

caliphate, the invasion of Wahhabi into Mecca and the search for a new Islamic internationalism (Van Bruinessen, 1994: 18, 28; Samson, 1978: 196-226).[7] From its inception, the NU's main base of support has been rural East Java, including Madura where traditional Javanese practices and ways of life absorbed elements of Islam. Rural *kiai* have authority especially where their influence is bolstered by a web of marital alliances between leading *kiai* families and a network of *kiai-santri* relationships throughout East Java. This social base of support for the NU has expanded over time, attracting some urban and more educated followers (Samson, 1978: 196-226).

After its establishment, the NU became concerned with social, educational and economic affairs, and did not simply deal with religious issues. Efforts were made to improve communication between the *ulama*, upgrade *madrasah* (Islamic schools), and establish a special body that was aimed at advancing the Muslim rural economy. The dispute between traditionalists and reformists throughout the second and the third decade of the twentieth century steadily narrowed, as points of religious difference came to be identified as dissimilarities of practice, rather than of principle. From its beginning until Dutch power came to an end, the NU worked to uphold its position as a religious association with a critical standpoint against the colonial administration (Samson, 1978: 196-226). However, in the 1930s NU leaders issued a *fatwa* accepting the Dutch colonial authority (Mujani & Liddle, 2004: 112).

The first statute of the NU was created in 1928. Its format did not contradict Dutch colonial law, which indicates an eagerness to be approved by the Dutch administration. As a result, the NU obtained legal status under Dutch authority (Van Bruinessen, 1994: 41-42). The statute, however, did not include the relationship with Hijaz, a region in the west of present-day Saudi Arabia, which had been the foundation for its establishment, yet it explicitly stated that the NU would expand Sunni

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[7] Wahhabism remained marginalised until the rise of 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud (d.1953) at the beginning of the twentieth century. He created a nation-state by relying on a combination of force and ideological mobilisation based on Wahhabism. 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud played an important role in initiating an effort to place Saudi Arabia at the centre of the Muslim world and preparing the ground for the sustainability of this position (Hasan, 2007: 86).

Islamic teachings and defend it from the deviation of the reformists and the modernists (Van Bruinessen, 1994: 43).

Under the auspices of notable *kiai* and their *pesantren* network, the NU spread its wings during the colonial era. By 1929, its branches in Central Java already outnumbered those in East Java and West Java, with 31 branches in Central Java, 21 in East Java and ten in West Java. It claimed to have 40,000 members in 1933 and 100,000 in 1938. In 1935, the NU had 68 branches with 67,000 followers. In 1938, with 99 branches, the NU expanded its influence to South Kalimantan, South Sulawesi and South Sumatera. In order to become a large-scale national association, the NU held conventions not only in East Java, but also in Bandung (1932) and Banjarmasin (1936) (Feillard, 1999: 18-19; Fealy & Barton, 1995: ixx-xxvi; Van Bruinessen, 1994: 48-49).

A definite enforced unity among the diverse Muslim groups was caused by the Japanese occupation during the Second World War. The Japanese attempted to politicise rural *ulama* by bringing them together in training courses and transforming them into Japanese propagandists. On 1 July 1943, the first training course (*latihan kiai*) was opened in Jakarta. It marked the beginning of the Japanese administration's Islamic grass-roots policy (Benda, 1958: 133-135). Moreover, the Japanese were assertive in confronting Muslim groups. In order to establish complete control over the Islamic movement, the Japanese banned Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII - formerly known as Sarekat Islam) and its offshoot, Partai Islam Indonesia; effected a complex network of control over the prominent *ulama* in the rural areas; and established a central body in a new Islamic association known as Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia) in November 1943. The creation of this organisation represented a victory for Japanese Islamic policy. The Japanese instigated a fundamental change to the traditional means of governing by the increase of power for Islam. The organisation had an impressive membership in the Indonesian archipelago and it constituted a working agreement between the NU and Muhammadiyah. Not surprisingly therefore, the Masyumi board consisted of members of the NU and Muhammadiyah. Hasyim Ashari became its president, with Wahid Hasyim and Mas Mansyur of Muhammadiyah acting as vice presidents who handled daily affairs in Jakarta. Ki Bagus Hadikusumo (Muhammadiyah) and Abdul Wahab (NU) were made special advisers

to the Masyumi executive. Wahab Chasbullah and Ki Bagus Hadikusumo of Muhammadiyah served as the organisation's advisors (Benda, 1958: 151-152, 262-263; Van der Kroef, 1958: 33-54; Van Bruinessen, 1994: 54-55).

The formation of Masyumi signalled a more tolerant policy towards Islam that was going to be of great importance for the future. The foundation of the Ministry of Religious Affairs started from this. During the Japanese occupation Islam was equipped as religious system so that afterwards it could be expanded to include a ministry with a network of regional offices all over the country. Masyumi was then a political power under the flag of Islam, and on 7 November 1945 it was reorganised into a political party with members from a number of Muslim associations, including PSII, Partai Islam Indonesia, Muhammadiyah, NU, Al-Irsyad (Boland, 1982: 12).

In general, the NU participated in the anti-colonial battles only after the Japanese occupation (Feillard, 1999: 19). Nevertheless, it became partly involved in the national struggle against Dutch power through its younger activists, such as Mahfudz Shiddiq and Wahid Hasyim, before the Japanese occupation (Anam, 1985: 91). On 21 and 22 October 1945, representatives of the NU from Java and Madura gathered in Surabaya and declared the struggle to gain independence as a holy war. This declaration was known as 'Resolusi Jihad'. This resolution urged the Indonesian government to declare a holy war (Van Bruinessen, 1994: 59-60).

After independence, a deviation of interests led to a split in Masyumi. At its National Congress in 1952, the leaders of the NU decided to break their political ties with Masyumi and go their own way by founding their own party named Partai Nahdlatul Ulama. The dissatisfaction that led to the differences between the NU and Masyumi covered a wide variety of problems, among them:

> [t]he dislike of conservative rural *ulama* and their business ancillaries for the socialistic and modernistic ideas of a younger, urban-centred group of Masyumi leaders for whom the future structure of the Indonesian economy was to be both collectivist and capitalist (Van der Kroef, 1958: 33-54).

In the decision-making process, senior leaders of the NU were downgraded within Masyumi. This was the result of the growing dominance of reformist leaders at the top levels.

During the Sukarno administration, the role of Muslim leaders in Indonesian politics, as shown by Islamic organisations, indicates a series of struggles in formulating the Islamic system of state. On the one hand, the NU managed to align itself with the deep-rooted traditions of the Indonesian people, especially in Java. Masyumi, on the other hand, blended its reform Islam with modernistic, more Western-oriented but also nationalistic and secular currents ideas. The development of several Islamic parties was the result of Muslim factions failing to realise the unitary political agreement of a single party.[8] The vast majority of NU followers perceived it primarily as a religious organisation, rather than as a political party. Their political support was channelled through the actions of the traditional Javanese and some Madurese *kiai*, whose support provided religious legitimacy to the NU. Although for many supporters the NU was a truly religious organisation, they also believed that it was a truly Islamic political party, with leaders who they could trust to preserve Islamic principles in the political spheres. The NU was also a typically government-minded party and because of its extreme willingness to cooperate with other parties it was often accused of being opportunist (Samson, 1978: 196-226; Boland, 1982: 50).

In the more recent period, it is not only influential leaders of the NU who have proudly acknowledged the eradication of communists, but also the government and the military forces have voiced similar feelings. For instance, in the 1996 Banser[9] grand rendezvous (*apel akbar*) in Kediri, Pangdam (Commander of Military Region) V Brawijaya, Major General Imam Utomo praised Banser for destroying the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Meanwhile, Kiai Ma'shum Jauhari (Gus

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[8] In those days, during the Sukarno administration, the religious nature of the NU and Masyumi was also apparent in their organisational structure. In religious organisations, such a function devolves on a special board. A Majlis Syuriah, or Majlis Syura, Religious Advisory Board, safeguards the integrity of the party or organisation, supervising its actions to ensure that its religious doctrine is honoured (Van Dijk, 2009: 54).

[9] Banser or Barisan Ansor Serbaguna is NU's paramilitary unit that consists mostly of young *nahdliyin*.

Maksum), a *kiai* of Pesantren Lirboyo, Kediri, who acted as commander of Banser Kediri[10] in 1965, proudly stated: "Kalau sekarang ada organisasi [lain] yang mengklaim dirinya sebagai penumpas PKI, itu hanya isapan jempol dan ambisi yang tidak mendasar" (If now there are [other] organizations that claim themselves to be PKI exterminators, it is only myth and groundless ambition) (*Surya*, 1 September 1996).

Istighosah (communal prayer) is one of the most attended events organized by the NU, along with *muktamar*. Although other Muslim organizations also regularly hold the event, the NU usually attracts larger numbers. During the ethnic conflicts in Kalimantan, NU Madura frequently hosted *istighosah* to pray for the safety of people who were severely affected, especially the Madurese. One of the largest prayer meetings was held on 8 March 1997, when fifteen East Javanese *kiai* led around 50,000 *nahdliyin* in prayer at the *alun-alun* (square) of Bangkalan (*Jawa Pos*, 9 March 1997). Most *nahdliyin* were attracted by the presence of prominent *kiai*, such as *Kiai* Idris Marzuki of Lirboyo, *Kiai* Hasyim Muzadi, the head of the NU of East Java, and *Kiai* Abdullah Schal of *Pesantren* Demangan.

[10] In Kediri, the mass killings were directed as a response towards '*aksi sepihak*' (unilateral action) that was executed towards landowner *kiai*, such as Kiai Machrus Ali of Lirboyo (Van Bruinessen 1994: 85).

The modernists viewed the Quran and *hadith* not only as sources for religious ideas and practices, but also for social and political ideas. This certainty of the unity of religion and politics in Islam was reflected in the activities of the Muslim political associations (Noer 1973: 307-308).

Over the centuries, religious leaders developed their own methods of disseminating conceptions of Islam in Nusantara. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, *haji* played a pivotal role in the spread of Islamic thought in the Netherlands Indies. In that period, larger numbers of returning pilgrims increased the number of religious leaders in the Indonesian archipelago (Kartodirdjo 1966: 155). *Haji* were inclined to reject indigenous forms of Islam in the Archipelago and were supportive of 'true' Islam as it was practiced in the Arabian Peninsula (Van Bruinessen 1999: 163).

Before he studied in Mecca in the 1860s, he had studied Islamic knowledge in various *pesantren* in Bangkalan and Java. Among the boarding schools he attended were *Pesantren* Langitan in Tuban, *Pesantren* Cangaan, *Pesantren* Darussalam and *Pesantren* Sidogiri in Pasuruan, and *Pesantren* Syafi'iyah in Banyuwangi.

In the following chapters, *kiai pesantren* will be the main subject and form the heart of the discussion, whilst *kiai tarekat* will complement the former. Since the discussion of *kiai tarekat* in this study will only appear occasionally, it is essential to briefly portray *kiai tarekat* here. Madura in the nineteenth century, mostly through the *pesantren* of *Kiai* Kholil and others, became a profoundly Islamised area. The *pesantren* with leading *kiai* figures were engaged in the formation of *santri* communities. Meanwhile, *kiai tarekat* with their *pesantren*, which were chiefly located in isolated regions, came to represent ideological distance from political power (Van Bruinessen 1995: 172-173). Although *Kiai* Kholil was not associated with any *tarekat* order, he was recognised as a renowned Sufi *ulama* (Zulkifli 2002: 26), a condition that also holds true for almost all eminent *kiai pesantren* in Java who have been recognised as *wali* by their followers (Dhofier 1980: 53). One other example is the founder of the NU, *Kiai* Hasyim Ashari, who is said to have performed Sufi ritual practices (Dhofier 1999: 285).

After the East Indies were placed under the authority of Governor-General Herman Willem Daendels in 1808, he reorganized the administration on the orders of King Louis Napoleon, the ruler of the newly established Kingdom of Holland (Atsushi 2006: 143). The Dutch, who served as Governors-General of the Netherlands East Indies, showed little inclination to promote Islam. In fact, the advance of Dutch power threatened a potential separation of religious and political, sacred and secular authority (Moertono 1981). Furthermore, Daendels created a centralist government. All government affairs were arranged from Batavia. Daendels's aim was to run the government under direct rule, so that he could rule the people without the local leaders as intermediaries (Kartodirdjo 1966: 52).

Besides its 'patriotic' history in the colonial era, the NU has a dark side. The organisation has been deeply associated, along with the military, with the 1965-1966 massacres of communists. Fealy and McGregor categorise factions within the NU towards the stance on the mass killings. Most influential groups within the NU acknowledge its role in the mass killings. This acknowledgement is even frequently voiced with pompous tones to show their pride in eradicating communists. There are also other factions that tend to downplay the

NU's involvement by accusing the military of being to blame. Both sections repeatedly emphasise that during the turmoil it was a matter of 'kill or be killed', and both employ religious justifications to argue that the actions were aimed at guarding the nation and defending Muslim religious leaders.[11] There is also a small and unpopular group within the NU that recognises the extremely inappropriate attitude of the NU in the mass killings. This faction encourages *nahdliyin* (NU followers) to confess their mistakes and apologise for the mass slaughter of communists (Fealy & McGregor, 2010: 37-60). Although not specifically confirmed, statements of several *kiai* urging young *nahdliyin* to 'smash the communists' (*mengganyang komunis*) were understood as an invitation to eliminate the communists. Moreover, *Duta Masyarakat*, NU's daily newspaper, explicitly declared that communists must be wiped out and that it was seen as the most appropriate and best decision (Feillard, 1999: 72). In the more recent period, it is not only influential leaders of the NU who have proudly acknowledged the eradication of communists, but also the government and the military forces have voiced similar feelings. For instance, in the 1996 Banser[12] grand rendezvous (*apel akbar*) in Kediri, Pangdam (Commander of Military Region) V Brawijaya, Major General Imam Utomo praised Banser for destroying the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Meanwhile, Kiai Ma`shum Jauhari (Gus Maksum), a *kiai* of Pesantren Lirboyo, Kediri, who acted as commander of Banser Kediri[13] in 1965, proudly stated:

> Kalau sekarang ada organisasi [lain] yang mengklaim dirinya sebagai penumpas PKI, itu hanya isapan jempol dan ambisi yang tidak mendasar (If now there are [other] organisations that

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[11] As a result, not only hundreds of thousands died, but also survivors of the violence converted to Christianity, Hinduism and in larger numbers to Islam (Fealy & McGregor, 2010: 50; Van Bruinessen, 1999: 168).

[12] Banser or Barisan Ansor Serbaguna is NU's paramilitary unit that consists mostly of young *nahdliyin*.

[13] In Kediri, the mass killings were directed as a response towards '*aksi sepihak*' (unilateral action) that was executed towards landowner *kiai*, such as Kiai Machrus Ali of Lirboyo (Van Bruinessen, 1994: 85).

claim themselves to be PKI exterminators, it is only myth and groundless ambition) (*Surya*, 1 September 1996).

Fealy and McGregor conclude that the NU was an active participant in the massacre. Furthermore, they believe that it was the NU elites who generated the anti-PKI campaign among NU followers. The use of religious elements by the elites was actually directed at protecting their privileged economic and political capital (Fealy & McGregor, 2010: 59-60). In Surabaya, the military exploited Ansor, a youth wing organisation of the NU, and Banser forces from Madura to carry out the eradication (Van Bruinessen, 1994: 85-86).[14] Ansor from East Java also took part in the killings in Bali (Eklöf, 2002: 124-125).

Pesantren as the NU's Main Base

In the history of Islam in Indonesia, *pesantren* are generally regarded as traditional Islamic educational institutions. *Pesantren* have generally sought forms of accommodation with the government in power while maintaining a certain distance from it. *Pesantren* are traditional in terms of the content of education, which is primarily religious; in terms of teaching and learning processes; and of management, which is mainly in the hands of traditional *ulama*. There are at least three important roles of *pesantren* within the Muslim community: first, as a centre of transmission of religious knowledge; second, as a guardian of Islamic tradition; and third, as a centre of *ulama* reproduction. *Pesantren* and similar institutions in other parts of Southeast Asia, such as *surau,* are the centres of rural religious life and they tend to be tradition-oriented and socially conservative (Noor, Sikand, and Van Bruinessen, 2008, p. 26; Azra and Afrianty, 2005, p. 1; Van Bruinessen, 2008, p. 218). *Pesantren* have been a crucial force in the *santri* culture since the nineteenth century Dutch East Indies. Despite their traditional characteristics, *pesantren* as the centre of education developed into a central component of modernization.[9]

[14] According to Cribb, the massacre of 1965-1966 was justified by the idea of vigilantism (Cribb, 2005: 57).

In the contemporary period in Indonesia, there are around 50,000 Islamic schools. Of the total number, 16,015 of them are *pesantren*, 37,000 of them are *madrasah* (Islamic day schools) and a small minority are Sekolah Islam (reputed as elite Islamic schools, mostly urban-based, and offer a high academic standard in general subjects within an Islamic environment). Islamic schools in Indonesia can be divided into three main types: *pesantren*, *madrasah*, and Sekolah Islam (Tan, 2011, p. 92). The Ministry of Religious Affairs has reported that in the whole country there were 4,195 *pesantren* with around 677,384 *santri* (the pupils) in 1977, while in 1981 the numbers grew to 5,661 and 938,397, respectively. The number increased again in 1985, when the total number of *pesantren* and *santri* were 6,239 and 1,084,801. This increasing trend was also evident in 1997, when the number reached 9,338 for *pesantren* and 1,770,768 for *santri* and by 2003-2004 the ministry noted that there were 14,647 *pesantren* (Departemen Agama RI, 1997; 2004, cited in Burhanudin, 2007, p. 2).

As we can see, despite the introduction of secular public and private schools in villages in Indonesia in recent years, the number of *pesantren* has grown, rather than shows signs of decline. One of the most important factors in the survival of *pesantren* in the history of Islam in Indonesia is their ability to accommodate the rapidly changing situation without losing some of their fundamental distinctions (Azra and Afrianty, 2005, p. 2). This is to some extent unsurprising, given the historical fact that religious education has played a significant role in the history of education in Indonesia. For example, *pesantren* were the only form of education in Java prior to the twentieth century (Abdullah, 1986, p. 100).

After Suharto came to power, most *pesantren* leaders have developed a more dynamic mindset in response to the challenges posed by the New Order administration to fulfil the rising demands of employment in the business and government sectors following the development plans established by the new administration. *Pesantren* have been modernized, including in terms of their education system; for example, by setting aside seventy per cent of the curriculum for secular subjects. As a result, many *pesantren* graduates have been involved in various sectors and governmental services, as well as modern business

structures (Hasan, 2009, p. 5). The modernization process has also been evident in the participation of some *pesantren* people in politics.

The involvement of *kiai pesantren* (*kiai* who lead *pesantren*) in politics during the New Order, however, does not indicate a change in stance among traditionally conservative *kiai* into reformed and progressive ones. Although there is a tendency for *kiai* to give their political support to Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP – the United Development Party), most Madurese *kiai* kept their distance from political parties during the New Order. Only a certain number of *kiai* openly participated in politics. The new patterns of *kiai* in politics, such as guiding older *santri* to opt for a certain political party, were only evident in *pesantren* where these elements were highly appreciated by the *santri*. Stephen Lyon provides us with a good comparison in a Pakistani case. There, the *ulama* stand in a unique position to attempt to challenge the relationship between the state and them for various reasons. They are not able to stand completely outside the state, so they cannot achieve the kind of independence which might allow them to truly establish a kind of rational-legal authority in which their office holds the power rather than themselves (Lyon 2004: 222). In the Indonesian case, R. William Liddle reminded us about popular participation when the country had recently began to cement its 'new order' policies. He argued that in the developmental formula preferred by the New Order government, the dimension of popular participation—in my case, the participation of *pesantren* people in politics—was conspicuous by its apparent absence. The formal model did not encompass the whole of social reality as perceived by the governing elite, who were well aware that their situation differed from that of their colonial predecessors in, among other things, the clientele that had to be taken into account in the decision-making process (Liddle, 1973, p. 288).

The Ulama as the NU's Main Man of Religion

A strict distinction between the term *ulama* and *kiai* does not appear in this book. According to Deliar Noer, the term *kiai* might indicate two kinds of people. The first comprises those whose knowledge of Islam surpasses that of the ordinary man, and who

typically devote themselves to teaching. The second type is more closely related to a *dukun* (healer) who teaches mystical and secret doctrines and practices all kinds of medicine (Noer, 1973, p. 8). Hiroko Horikoshi distinguishes between the terms *kiai* and *ulama*. For Horikoshi, the difference lies primarily in the more extensive charisma that a *kiai* possess. The *ulama* play more roles in the social system and the social structure of villages and their ultimate status is legitimized by hereditary factors. Among the people, the *kiai* are higher than the village *ulama* and their presence is regarded as a unifying symbol in society, since their moral and spiritual leadership is not tied to the normative structure of a village (Horikoshi, 1987, pp. 211-212). A number of authors associate *kiai* with traditionalists, incompatible with neo-modernist ideas and puritanist conceptions of Islam. For instance, Clifford Geertz underestimated *kiai*, and downplayed their roles, especially in brokering local cultures and modernity (1960: 249).

Haji constituted the reformist movement that first took root at the turn of the twentieth century. According to Noer, the reformist ideas in general can be divided into two large divisions: the educational and social movement; and the political movement. The reformists were concerned with the nature of Islam in general. They only recognized the Quran and *hadith* as the basic source of their ideas and thought. Furthermore, they sustained the idea of *ijtihad* and rejected the idea of *taqlid*. They also acknowledged the benefits of a scientific Dutch education. The modernist supporters also adopted organisational and educational methods and ideas from the West, including those of Christian missionaries, as long as these were not in violation of the principles of Islam. Moreover, Noer and Van der Kroef reveal that their ideas stressed a return to the Quran as the main source of Islamic belief, contesting folk Islam and traditional eclecticism, and aiming to bring Islam in line with modern scientific advances and empiricism. These ideas showed a willingness to examine the great social, political and economic upheavals of the modern world in light of Islamic ‘truth’, and above all urged a dynamic application of individual energy in the furtherance of one’s social and economic status in life (Noer, 1973: 30, 296-308; Van der Kroef, 1958: 33-54). The modernists viewed the Quran and *hadith* not only as sources for religious ideas and practices, but also for social and political ideas. This certainty of the unity of

religion and politics in Islam was reflected in the activities of the Muslim political associations (Noer, 1973: 307-308).

It is also in Java that many leading *kiai* have family ties with other *kiai*. The ties are made possible due to, among other things, the tradition of intermarriage among *kiai* families. A *kiai*'s son, for instance, is usually sent to a *pesantren* whose owner (almost certainly also a *kiai*) is familiar with the *kiai*. After finishing his religious education, the *kiai*'s son will be trained by his last mentor to build his own *pesantren*. The *kiai*'s interventions are evident when it comes to matters of marriage and a *santri*'s leadership. For instance, *Kiai* Hasyim Asy`ari's interferences can be witnessed when *Kiai* Manaf Abdulkarim, the founder of *Pesantren* Lirboyo in Kediri, *Kiai* Jazuli, the founder of *Pesantren* Ploso in Kediri, and *Kiai* Zuber, the founder of *Pesantren* Reksosari in Salatiga were finishing their studies in *Pesantren* Tebuireng in Jombang, under the guidance of *Kiai* Hasyim. During their last stint in the *pesantren*, the three *santri* (who later on became *kiai*) were appointed senior teachers. They were entrusted with religious and non-religious issues such as tutoring younger *santri*, placing new *santri* and even receiving *santri*'s parents who visited their children. When *Kiai* Hasyim was ensured that the capacity of the three *santri* had developed the capacities to lead their own *pesantren*, he arranged marriages for them. In the early period during their leadership in their newly built *pesantren*, they were also provided with a number of *santri* from Tebuireng. These *santri* were initial assets for the young *kiai* in terms of expanding their own *pesantren* (Dhofier, 1982: 59).

Kiai are seen as people who have extensive knowledge of Islam, and whose capability in the religious realm goes beyond that of the commoners. They are respected as the most authoritative source within the Islamic dominion. The high esteem in which the public holds *kiai* places them as commanding figures and the people's leaders, a position which has been largely achieved since at least the early nineteenth century when the local aristocracies gradually lost their influence. It is mostly in villages and sub-districts that the great power of *kiai* has been noticed, not only by villagers but also by village officials. Village authorities have, on the one hand, been contested by *kiai*, and on the other hand, they have also enjoyed the benefit of *kiai* leadership among the people. Without the support of the *kiai*, it would have been less

possible to involve the villagers in the implementation of development programmes during the New Order era. Both village authorities and the *kiai* are certainly aware of this situation.

The high status of the *kiai* is also enjoyed by their families. People's regard for *kiai* families is central to the *kiai* and his families' success in winning sympathy. Their institutions and personalities have also played significant roles in successfully gaining followers. Although exceptions occur, the position of *kiai* in Madura is an ascribed status, in which the children of *kiai* (especially, but not exclusively, the sons) also enjoy the high status bestowed upon their father—a position that they will assume, voluntarily or otherwise, later in life.

Moreover, the prestige of a *kiai* is garnered from the gathering of visitors. Top *kiai* are aware that they can get a more accurate image of society by meeting people not only from their own region, but also from other areas. During the New Order era, when only a minority of educated people in the villages had access to radio, television, newspapers and magazines, *kiai* were able to disseminate up-to-date issues to their visitors. Armed with the latest information, they could create more concern among their visitors about the socio-political world outside their place of origin. However, they were also aware that by presenting their independence, *kiai* could prove that they were responsible only to God. By distancing themselves from the irreligious realm, *kiai* gained the trust of their followers. As long as a *kiai* was independent, he would enjoy leadership among his followers.

When beneficial opportunities knock, *kiai* do not waste them, although they do risk their respected position in society. The *kiai*'s pragmatism also shows the ability of religious leaders as individuals who are capable of placing themselves in the public eye. They tend to seek secure places within communities in order not to become trapped in the wrong political choice, so that when there is a political change (as was the case after the Suharto administration collapsed), they know how to voice their political aspirations or they know how the people will voice theirs. The use of religious elements by religious elites is in fact directed at protecting their privileged economic and political capitals.

The process of gaining legitimacy from abroad was crucial since many NU followers demanded guidance from their *kiai*. As one author notes, Islamic political leaders are supposed to act legitimately in their

use of power and act for God. Such a leader is able to act in a pragmatic manner, including seeking relations with secular factions if this is believed to advantage the groups he stands for (Samson, 1978: 196-226).

Religious leaders in Indonesia respond in various ways to ideological and political developments, in part because in each area they relate to localised political situations. In present day Indonesia, religious life has not been integrated into the political state and although a number of religious leaders occupy bureaucratic positions, most religious elites in Indonesia are not affiliated with bureaucracy. However, they continue to play important roles in Indonesia.

Chapter 4
PCI NU

Introduction

As Indonesia's largest Islamic organization, the NU has expanded their scope and networks by establishing its special branches (Pengurus Cabang Istimewa NU – PCI NU) across the globe. In Germany, the special branch was established in 2011, while in the Netherlands it was established in 2013. Both special branches have been founded, organized, managed, led, and dominated by Indonesian students pursuing their M.A. and Ph.D. degrees, although recently many Indonesian migrants who have long resided in both countries also joined and influenced the organization. Meanwhile, the Indonesian Islamist associations, such as the PKS, the DDII, and the HTI also spread their influence in Europe through, mostly, students pursuing post-graduate degrees as well as other diaspora. Although in Europe they are less organized than the NU, through committed individuals, their activities and influence have continuously challenged the NU in terms of religious and political ideologies, Islamic observances, and other socio-political facets similar to the situation in the home country. Therefore, it is argued here that the NU through its special branches and the Islamist associations through individuals, officially or non-officially represent the PKS, the HTI, the DDII, and other Islamist groups, have expanded their rivalries, tensions, as well as compromises overseas.

It is the objective of this research project that seeks to investigate how Indonesian religious communities in Europe, particularly in Germany and the Netherlands, are extending their

networks and seeking influence and at the same time competing and also compromising with each other.

The rising of movement emphasizing Christian identiy as an opposition to the perceived rise of Islam, raise an ontology is Europe still thinking of itself as Christian identity, albeit there has been a gradual movement towards secularization and dechristianization. Since 1968, Europe has been going through major anthropological shifts that have fundamentally separated society's values from Christian values. Making Islam as the central issue, to solidifiy their stand on Christianity is a bogus one. The (86) legality of same sex marriage, practice of LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexsual and transgender), abortion lawful and increasingly demanding of human rights enforcement are all coming from inside Europe itself, voted by people and ratified by their law (Muhammad Aiman Awaluddin and Anisa Safiah Maznorbalia. 2019. "A Suggestion that Europe Also a Muslim: A Study from Historical and Contemporary Perspectives". *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 9 (1): 83-110, pp. 86-87).

The polemic on the identity of Europe as a christian club still exists until now, although after the reduction of power in term of roles and political power by church and raising of Muslims in Europe. The rising of secularism or paganism among Europeans, separation of religion from individual life does not disappeared the "feeling of Christianity", albeit they do not practice Christian nor believe in God.[7] The issue can be seen on the reluctant of some European Union countries on the application of Turkey. Some of the them raise an issue if a Muslim country can be considered as part of Europe.[8] The reluctant approach by some EU countries has triggered a research question, is Europe exclusively only for Christian or Judeo-Christian? Is Europe identity solely belongs to those two semantic religions. How about Islam and its position in Europe? This paper is going to investigate suggestion on the basis that Europe also has roots of Muslim, despite dominant influence of Christianity in historical perspective and contemporary view (Awaluddin and Maznorbalia 2019, 87).

After 200 years on the completion of Christinization in Roman Empire, Islam came to Europe through several occasion by Arab during

Umar and Umayyad period. In 652 AD, after established first navy, Arab launched a small invasion against Byzantine Siciliy but not succeed until full conquest began on 827-902.20 Islam gained first stronghold through Umayyad conquest on Hispania (Spain and Portugal), renamed as Al-Andalus in 711. As opposed the Christinization process within Roman Empire, the (90) conquest of Muslim is welcomed by Spanish Jewish Community as liberator from the oppression of the Catholics. In stark contrast, Islam presence within Europe always seen as a threat to the the existence of Christianism and saw as militarily seized territory from native Iberian Christian, which in latter years Christian's kingdoms called for reconquista againts Muslim's presence. The Islamic civilization in Spain encompasses many field that left a profound imprint in the Iberian Peninsula and Europe. During that period literature and art were flourished, many buildings were constructed based on Islamic arts. At the same time, Cordoba became the civilization capital for both Spain and west in general. As capital of civilization, Cordoba was known as for its scientific advance, which played vital role in the revolution of science. This was not limited to Cordoba alone, but was spreaded to other cities under Islamic rule, for instance Granada, Toledo and etc. According to historical sources, Pope Sylvester II (other name Gerbert) hase been enrolled at some universities in Andalusia and introduce science of mathematics and Arabic numerals in Italy (Awaluddin and Maznorbalia 2019, 90-91).

The event of Catholic' declination of power saw the separation of state and individual life from religious control. There are several occasions that lead to such declination event such as power struggle between Pope Gregory VI and Henry IV and age of Renaissance which accelerated the process, when people start to think out of the box in seeking for truth. In the 16th century, Martin Luther who became fed up with the church practise of selling indulgences and he began the Protestan Reformation which divide Europe geographically between Protestan North and Catholic south.36 The advancement of scientific revolution such as emergent of philosophy by Aristotle, Galileo Galilei's theory of solar system and Copernican's theory of the universe has shaken the foundation of beliefs that has been preached by the church.37 Through of these occasional events, the unity of the European continent in terms of religion had been broken. The introduction of secularism and national identity are getting the way in shaping identity of Europe. Since

the signing of the Treaty of Rome 1957 that established the European Economic Community (EEC) and initated the ongoing process of European Integration, western European societies have undergone a rapid, drastic and seemingly irreversible process of secularization. The limitation power of religious bodies, some countries constitution invoke Christianity, religious diverse society and raising numbers of self-declared atheism and agnostics have diminished shared identity of Christianity (Awaluddin and Maznorbalia 2019, 97).

The contemporary identification of Europe undeniably an interested topic for discussed. The declination of Pope's power, emergence of secularism and nationalism, and also the raising of Islam shaping the latest identification of Europe. Presently, Islam is the fastest growing religion in the sacred land of Christendom due to large migration of Muslims, with solid statistic evidence that it might be triple by 2050 (Awaluddin and Maznorbalia 2019, 98).

The rising of Muslim in Europe has made Islam as the second largest religion after Christianity. The term of "Muslim Europe" no longer can be erased nor modified as its covered Muslim presence in European countries, largely in Balkan area. Although, some countries fear on the rising of Muslim, they have integrated into European society in the last decades, contributed to its economy, its culture, and have developed a peaceful-attitude of Islam that enables them to integrate into Western culture. Furthemore, the reluctant of some European (98) countries to recognize history truth on the 'Christian roots of Europe" in its new constitution sparked the dubious identification. This is because mentioning Christianity and God was considered too controversial and will spark furious opposition from secularism and Protestan countries, and also considered wrong to exclude Muslims and Jews regarding on the religious reference (Awaluddin and Maznorbalia 2019, 98-99).

The increasing of Muslims presence in European countries making the continent hardly longer to be recognized as a single identity based on the Christianity. As wroted by famously Anglo-French writer and historian, Hillaire Beloc, "Europe will return to the Faith, or she will perished. The Faith is Europe, and the Europe is the Faith".43 The quote strongly signify the unbroken relationship between Christianity and Europe. However, the current situation shows otherwise where the Christianity is losing grips on the modern society of European. The issue

of gay marriages, raising of atheism, abortion and separation of Protestan and Catholician make it harder to solidify the position of Christianity within the society. Moreover, the sharply increasing secularism make Christianity as default is gone and showing majority of young people becoming non-Christian. For instances 70% of young people in United Kingdom identify with no religion, with largest recorded in Czech Republic 91% and average score around 50% in other Europe countries (Awaluddin and Maznorbalia 2019, 100).

Presently, to suggest European continent as Christendom is contestable due to diversity of religions, gradual movement towards secularization and dechristianization. Albeit, majority of Europe identify themselves as Christian, many of them living their lives without adhering to Christian values, which accelerating the process of dechristianization. In fact, by claiming European as Christian identity after the fall of Byzantine Empire is questionable unless specifically focus on Western part only. This is because after the fall of Byzantine Empire, and its territories being conquered by Ottomans saw that area under Islamic rules. The Ottomans has brought along them the new administrative order, primarily based on Islamic Sharia law. The implementation of Sharia law in Balkan area and the presence of Muslim rules diminished the sphere of Christendom in South Eastern Europe. Therefore, calling Europe (Eastern and Western) as Christendom is contentious (Awaluddin and Maznorbalia 2019, 102).

It is undebatable that Europe is rooted from Christianity, but saying Islam ingrained in European should also not being indisputable. The history of Europe is complex, but based on chronology early Europe is Paganism, Judeo-Christian, Christianity and Islam, accordingly. Henceforth, denying the term of Muslim Europe is totally disagreeable. The debate of European lossing identity in fearing of Islam is considered wildly unreasonable, because Islam already there since an establishment of Andalus and existence of Muslims in Sicily. Whether by conquest or not, it is should not be a matter of today, as many continents and several countries unwillingly accepted they have been colonized and converted during colonialism period without denying the truth about it. It is like (Awaluddin and Maznorbalia 2019, 102).

Besides, referring to the contemporary situation in Europe, it is no longer should be identified with Christianity or “Christian club” term.

The rising of secularism, atheism and hedonism have lessening the spirit of Christianity and its value within individual, altogether the society. It is a matter of time whether people ready to accept the current reality or to stay in blindfoldedly. According to the think tank organization Pew Research Center, Christianity has shifted from Europe to Africa.51 With that, it is believed that Europe is no longer center gravity for Christianity. The rising of Muslims which already integrated culturally and socially should also not been undermined as they are already been part of European community (Awaluddin and Maznorbalia 2019, 103).

The Netherlands

With the end of empire in parts of Asia after World War II, the fate of groups that traced their origins to colonial encounters seemed uncertain. As visible reminders in postcolonial nations of their colonial history, many members of these communities experienced first-hand the upheavals of decolonisation in the often chaotic transition from colony to independent nation. Successive waves of immigrants left for former metropoles to carve out new identities for themselves in nations that were often anxious to forget their colonial past. The demands of decolonisation required these groups to re-think the ways in which they articulated their identities. Scholarly work discussing those who left their homelands tends to frame them as remnants of colonialism, out of place in nations eager to emphasise mono-cultural national identities that did not include the populations of far-flung colonies (Rosalind Hewett. 2015. "Children of Decolonisation". Indonesia and the Malay World, 43:126, 191-206, p. 192).

As outlined by Jean Gelman Taylor (2009), a significant number of the Netherlands Indies elite prior to the 20th century were Eurasian. By the 20th century, the Netherlands Indies government had moved from dividing the population of the colony into categories based on religion to loosely racial categories, consisting of 'Europeans', 'foreign Orientals' and 'natives' (Fasseur 1994). Each of these categories could include people of mixed descent. An individual's legal status was determined by his or her father's status. If a European father did not acknowledge illegitimate children, legally they were usually classed as

native. Within the European component of society, Indo-Europeans formed a distinct community marked by language, cultural practices and physical appearance. Some classified as European denied their indigenous roots, partly to avoid certain racially based stereotypes originating in the 19th century and perhaps even earlier, (192) such as that Indos were indolent, morally loose and unable to speak proper Dutch (Houben 2009: 71–2; Stoler 1992). An unknown, much larger number of people legally classed as native had European ancestry, but whether this group of people was also termed 'Indo' in the Netherlands Indies or not is unclear. A few non-European groups took on European names and adapted certain customs that they traced to their European history, such as the Belanda Depok of Depok, the Mardijkers of Tugu and the orang Borgo of the Minahasa region. However, the former consisted of freed slaves with Dutch surnames, and the latter two traced their ideological, if not ancestral, origins to Portuguese and/or Spanish traders who visited the Indonesian archipelago long before the establishment of a Dutch colony (Cedercreutz 2003: 175) (Hewett 2015, 192-193).

Indo-Europeans, thanks to their knowledge of Dutch, occupied the lower and middle ranks of the colonial civil service and the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger, KNIL). A small number were involved in travelling Malay language theatre, the Komedie Stamboel (Cohen 2014), and also, at least at the beginning of the 20th century, were prolific editors of the Malay language press (Suryadinata 1971: 9). Wider fears among the European community that children of European descent were at risk of 'disappearing into the kampung', or assimilating into the indigenous, poorer areas of colonial cities if they were not sufficiently exposed to 'European' ways of behaving and thinking, led to public concern about the living conditions of this group (Bosma and Raben 2008: 220–3). This concern was one motivation behind the efforts of the Indo Europeesch Verbond, the more mainstream successor to Ernest Douwes Dekker's short-lived nationalist Indische Partij (Indies Party), to raise the living standards of Indos, who increasingly became displaced by educated 'natives', 'foreign Orientals' and an influx of temporary Dutch migrants in their traditional sources of employment, like the civil service, as the century wore on (Hewett 2015, 193).

All remaining Indos of Dutch citizenship were forced to leave after the Sukarno government expelled Dutch citizens in 1957 over the Dutch New Guinea issue. In 1958 the Indonesian government nationalised foreign companies, which had been an important source of employment for many Dutch-educated Indos. By 1960 it had also prohibited teaching in languages other than Indonesian to Indonesian citizens. About 25,000 of those Indos who had opted to take Indonesian citizenship changed their minds on account of these laws, the increased cost of living as the Indonesian economy struggled through the 1950s, and the political volatility of the Sukarno government's later years. Many who left also cited a Dutch education for their children as one reason for changing their minds, which had assured them a good standard of living in colonial Indonesia. These Indos who changed their minds, termed spijtoptanten in Dutch, were granted loans from the Dutch government to repatriate, with the last fewarriving in 1967. The small number of Indos in Indonesia who had formerly held European status disappeared from formal records, along with many others whowere legally classified as 'native' in the Netherlands Indies, but today also identify as Indo in postcolonial Indonesia (Hewett 2018, 194).

In the Netherlands, Indos, where they are also known as the Indisch Dutch, comprised a visible group that was often represented in public discourse as an example of a 'successful' minority in comparison to later groups of migrants.1 After World War II increasing waves of Indos chose to leave Indonesia for the Netherlands. However, it was not until 1957, with the expulsion of Dutch citizens from Indonesia, that they began to attract attention in the media, which depicted them 'as the innocent victims of the difficult process of decolonisation in Indonesia' (Goss 2000: 19). Many were placed in pensions (boarding-houses) with other Indo families, and forced to adapt to a country that most had never set foot in before. A number had to accept lower positions than those they had filled in the Netherlands Indies, and adjust to life without Indonesian servants. Stories prevailed of wider Dutch ignorance about Indos, who often were termed Indonesiers (Indonesians) in the years following decolonisation (Hewett 2015, 194).

A small number of these 'repatriates', as they were termed in official Dutch government discourse, later moved to third countries such as the United States. These transnational communities maintained

contact with each other through magazines such as Tong Tong (later Moesson) and De Indo, thanks to the efforts of activists like Tjalie Robinson. Today, the members of this generation and their descendants continue to use magazines and online forums to remember the ‘good old days’ of the Netherlands Indies, the trauma of the Japanese Occupation and the events that followed in (194) independent Indonesia. Broadly, these Indo communities, connected through kumpulan (social gatherings), events such as the annual Tong Tong Fair, the internet and magazines, identify as Dutch-speaking, Indies-born (or descended from Indies-born) people of European and Indonesian descent. Many are active in campaigning for the unpaid back-pay of civil servants from the Japanese Occupation, and war reparations for Dutch citizens living in the Indies during the same period (Hewett 2015, 194-195).

A number of Dutch Indos are involved in contributing to what they see as a forgotten piece of Dutch history overseas. The written and online histories produced by this group tend to focus on Tempo Doeloe (‘the good old days’) of the Netherlands Indies (Indie¨), but also emphasise the events of the Bersiap period and the difficulties that many remember from postcolonial Indonesia, such as discrimination and unemployment, with Indie¨ and Indonesia often represented in a kind of dichotomy. Common terms present in these popular histories and in interviews with members of this generation include Tempo Doeloe, ‘trauma’ and discriminatie (discrimination). A number of academic works also chronicle the history of Dutch Indos (Bosma and Raben 2003; Bosma et al. 2006; Meijer 2004;Willems 2001). These books were government funded, part of an official response on the part of the Dutch government to atone for its silence on the role of Dutch Indos in the Netherlands’ colonial history, but also to provide a ‘gesture’, though not necessarily compensation, in recognition of their experiences during the war years (Oostindie 2010: 26; Steijlen 2009) (Hewett 2015, 195).

In the Netherlands, Dutch Indos became involved in grassroots activism, campaigning over issues such as war reparations and wider recognition of the role of Indos in Dutch colonial history. They tended to frame their life histories as an important and forgotten piece of Dutch colonial history, one which included first-hand experiences of decolonisation as they struggled to adapt to changed postcolonial circumstances in both Indonesia and the Netherlands, and convince the

Dutch government and society that they were equal Dutch citizens. They expressed their identities in contrast to an imagined Dutch identity, drawing on an ‘Asian’ heritage to do so. Boundaries about who could be Indo were firmly drawn, with members of this group either born in Indie¨ or descended from someone born there. This Indie¨ was remembered nostalgically as a kind of paradise, almost bittersweet after its postcolonial loss, in contrast to independent Indonesia, which many remembered for its discriminatory policies, anti-Dutch rhetoric and poverty (Hewett 2015, 203).

These are the strategies that the PCI NU in the Netherlands have attempted to formulate in 2016:

Pengantar Rapat Kerja
PCINU BELANDA 2017-2019

Nijmegen, 16 April 2016

DUA POLA “DIALOG GANDA”: ISLAM, NUSANTARA, EROPA

STRATEGI “TRIBAKTI” PCINU BELANDA

MATRIKS PROGRAM-PROGRAM PENAJAMAN STRATEGI "TRIBAKTI"

	Missi Dakwah Islam Aswaja	Keterlibatan Intelektual	Keterlibatan Sosial-Politik
Isu-isu Utama	?	?	?
Mitra Utama di Belanda	?	?	?
Mitra Utama di Tanah Air	?	?	?
Program Unggulan di Belanda	?	?	?
Program Unggulan di Tanah Air	?	?	?
Potensi Dukungan Pendanaan di Belanda	?	?	?
Potensi Dukungan Pendanaan di Tanah Air	?	?	?

Terima Kasih

Germany

Islam in Germany has long historical trajectories. A massive Muslim population is not a current phenomenon, but it cannot be separated with the history at which Germany conducted formal a guest worker agreement program with foreign countries to build country after World War II, including Italy, Spain, Greece, and Muslim countries especially Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia. On the top of that, it can be seen that Turkish Muslim is the majority among Muslim populations in Germany (50,6%) (Rangga Eka Saputra. 2018. “Life of Muslims in Germany, and Its Contextualisation to Indonesian Islam”. Studia Islamika 25 (3): 651-660, p. 652).

Demographically, debating on Islam can be associated with the population of Christian confession which have also been declined. In (652) 1950, they had reached out 90% of total population, and slumped down to 58% in 2016. It can be understood because of rapid secularisation in Western civilisation. Currently one third of German population has not religious affiliation. Therefore, it also contributes for the German to give more attention for growing Muslim population. However, efforts for Muslim integration German society have been still running performed by Muslim themselves, German civil societies, and state indeed (Saputra 2018, 652-653).

Recently, Germany has amiable policies with regard to immigrants or refugees. In 2015, Germany welcomed more than a million of immigrants coming from conflict countries, especially from Syria. Besides the humanitarian reasons, the demographic factor is one of pivotal reasons to figure out this Germany refugees policy. Nowadays, they have been lacked productive workforces, or their elderly citizen are bigger in the societies. They need immigrants who are working to build the state especially through taxes (Saputra 2018, 653).

Moreover, embarrassing Muslim communities are crucial in order to prevent radicalism and terrorism which have become a global problem. Dr. Carola Roloff, a visiting professor for Buddhism in Academy of World Religions of the University of Hamburg, said that German’ government considers that mosques and Muslim

communities are assessed as representation of moderate Islam. Muslim who involve in terrorist or radical groups actually have problems with the Muslim communities or mosques. Hence, by experiencing in Germany, terrorist and radical group are not affiliated with mosques (Saputra 2018, 653).

In Germany, Muslim integration processes also are actually not only conducted by the state, but also organized by grassroots organisations. For this case, participants were given an opportunity to discuss Germany' policies related to Muslim integration with the state official in Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building, and Community. In 2006, the Ministry initiated to establish German Islam Conference (DIK, *Deutsche Islam Konferenz*), an organisation which has goals to enhance integration of Islam under German law governing religious communities and to foster social participation of Muslims (Saputra 2018, 653).

DIK is actually German's national platform for dialogue between government and Muslim communities to solve everyday life of (653) Muslim. It is established to look solutions for Muslims in view of the traditionally close relationship between government and churches, as well as to foster social cohesion and prevent social polarisation and radicalisation. DIK has brought some topics of legislative term such as social welfare provided for Muslims, Islamic chaplaincy in public institutions, and efforts by Islamic institutions to help and integrate refugees. A Ministry's representative explained that there were topics and results of previous legislative terms (Saputra 2018, 654):

1. Religious interaction in Islam: recommendations of the Conference played a major role in introducing instruction in Islam in North Rhine-Westphalia, Hesse and Lower Saxony.
2. Establishing centre for Islamic theology at five German universities: recommendation of the Conference.
3. Training of Imam: development and publication of guideline serving as a basis for Imam training throughout Germany.
4. Guidelines for practical school-related issues (e.g. swimming lessons, headscarf).
5. Recommendation on building and operating mosques and on Islamic burial.

The integration efforts are also perpetrated by Muslim communities itself. In Sehitlik Turkish mosque in Berlin, they have programs to integrate Muslim refugees in German societies. They tried to recover refugees from traumatic conflicts. The objective of the program is to prevent refugees to conduct extremism or violent acts after experiencing in war. Moreover, in Neukollin District in Gottingen, Darussalam Mosque has also progressive integration programs for immigrants. They have a collaborative program on interfaith dialogue. The program does not only involve with other religions, but it also entangles with other sects in Islam such as Ahmadiyya, Alevi, and Shia. Through education, they also serve a German class for refugees, it is because language is appraised as one of the most barriers in integration processes. Furthermore, they also teach immigrants' children regarding German cultures (Saputra 2018, 654).

Meanwhile the efforts of integration are carried out in top and bottom levels, it also faces several challenges particularly coming from anti-immigrant campaign and cultural barriers in Muslim communities themselves. Firstly, the obstacles of integration processes are emerged from rising anti-Muslim racism led by right-wing movements. They (654) have currently attracted public attentions in campaigning anti-refugees. They bring populism issues. They are eagerly denoted that Muslim will lead culture of violence such as terrorism and radicalism in Germany (Saputra 2018, 655).

Actually, the right-wing is not a new movement in Germany, but they are newly organised especially after coinciding between massive refugees in Europe and the rise of political populism deployed over the Western countries. In Germany, anti-refugee is also led by National Democratic Party (NPD), which is closed with the far right-wing and ultranationalist organisation. They also reject ideas of freedom of expression and human right. They finance a newspaper, "Young Newspaper", to propagate their ideas and influence public emotion particularly against Muslim immigrants (Saputra 2018, 655).

Secondly, a crucial problem in integration processes is related to language and qualification of Muslim immigrants. Many immigrants are unqualifed in German or English language. Their level of education also tends to be low educated, so it is difficult to set them in certain workplaces. Not only related to work affairs, but a lack of language

profciency also becomes cultural barrier in integration processes among Muslim immigrants and German societies. Even though many Islamic organisations such as Sehitlik and Darussalam mosque have organised integration programs especially teaching German language for refugees, but this problem are still considered as a main problem (Saputra 2018, 655).

Another issue related to integration processes is that there is no an authority representing Muslim communities. In some cases, it also contributes to become a barrier particularly for state to make policy for Muslim's affairs. A state's official in the Parliament of ASEAN of Germany said that state actually want to allow that Islamic education is taught in schools. However, it is difficult because there are some technical problems such as are there teachers in Islamic education? who are represented of Islam? Are materials of Islamic education compatible with human right values, for instance, and German constitution? Until now, this problem still becomes an issue for state in approaching Muslim life in Germany (Saputra 2018, 655).

That there is no single authority representing all Muslim communities can be understood because Muslim in Germany is diverse

based on sects and nationalities; it is two main social cleavages. It can be seen from their denominations: Sunnis (74%), Alevi (13%), Shiite (7%), Ahmadis (2%), and others (4%). Meanwhile, according to based (655) nationalities background Muslim in Germany mainly come from Turkey (50,6%), Middle East (17,1%), Southeast Europe (11,5%), Southeast Asia (8,2%), North Africa (5,8%), Southern Africa (2,5%), Central Asia (2,4%), and Iran (1,9%) (Saputra 2018, 655-656).

Their religious activities are unfortunately embedded with their nationalities. Consequently, it leads spit nationalities between their well-born nationalities and German. It can be noticed from many mosques established in Germany which tend to base on their originated nationalities. For example, Islamische Kulturzentrum Al Taqwa e.V (Islamic Cultural Centre) in Gottingen mainly supported by Egyptian, Turkish Sehitlik Mosque, and Indonesian Al-Falah mosques in Berlin. Hence, their identity will be strengthened according to their own national identities instead of German. In addition, their religiosity is also encapsulated based on their religious denominations or sects; in this context, fanaticism of their denomination will also be thickened (Saputra 2018, 656).

On the other hand, these religious polarisations and no Muslim single authority are examined beneficial for the Muslim minority. According to Malina Noor, an Executive Officer of Ibn Rushd-Goethe mosque, by liberating all Muslim communities without a single authority which represents them, it will hinder potential discriminations for minority denominations. This condition will also ensure religious harmony among Muslim communities because they have sovereignty to regulate their own denominations without interfered by others. This insight is led by the fact that historical and theological tensions among Islamic denominations are still occurring in Muslim world (Saputra 2018, 656).

Making religious harmony among religions is possible for Germany's government because they have a secularisation model called "positive neutrality". It means that meanwhile the relationship between state and religion is separated institutionally, state still considers religions as a pivotal part in developing social services and welfare. It is different from other secularisation models implemented in European countries, especially in France which use strict secularism; state totally

is separated and does not tolerate religions in public affairs (Saputra 2018, 656).

In other word, the German's secularisation model respects for religions, but it still does not affiliate with certain neither a religion nor religious denomination. It also seems that state does not be allowed (656) to discriminate person or communities based on belief or religious affiliation. The German constitution guarantees religious freedom for all citizen; every person has a right to believe in religion and to practice their religious belief. Therefore, the state must be neutral for all religions and non-religious affiliations in public affairs (Saputra 2018, 656-657).

One of the main issues in terms of religious harmony is that there has been a tendency that Muslim is perceived in the lens of security. The cases of terrorism and wars in the Middle East have contributed in shaping German's perception on Islam. Islam is only associated with violent culture, anti-gender equality and human right, and incompatible with democracy. Islam is also simply connected with Middle East. This view is a consequence of news reports which do not provide the factual reality of Islam. The diversity of Islam based on regions and cultures instead of Middle East does not serve as an objective news reports. In discussion session, Sussane Keiser added that "news reports regarding Middle East conflict have sometime exaggerated, and it shaped perception of German society toward Muslim" (Saputra 2018, 657).

Factually, biased news reports on Islam are not supported by the fact that there are Muslim sects living in Germany; and they have different religious practices and cultures. Sunni and Hanafi law school is a majority among Muslim communities, followed by Alevis, Shiite, Ahmadis, and others respectively. Indeed, in Germany, Ahmadiyya is one of established organisations, and they have been legalised. Accordingly, the biased news reports which generalise Islam as a monolithic culture associated with Middle East contradict with the factual reality of the diversity of Islam in Germany (Saputra 2018, 657).

Thereto, pluralism not only becomes a states' concern, but it also becomes crucial issues in an academic sector. In Centre for the Study of World Religion, Hamburg University, they have a program namely *Religion and Dialogue in Modern Societies* (ReDI). The objectives of the programs are to identify the potentials and limits of

dialogue orientation in different theological traditions, and to develop a dialogue-oriented approach. This is an optional program for students in Hamburg University. In addition, Junge Islam Konferenz (JIK), an organisation associated with Humboldt University, has conducted a program for youth in order to strengthen multiculturalism in German societies. JIK becomes a dialog platform for young people with and without Muslim background, and it also reflect-analyse image and perception regarding Islam as indicator for acceptance of diversity and inclusion (Saputra 2018, 657).

Interfaith programs are also created by religious communities in grassroots levels together. In Berlin, three different religious communities are planning to build house of worship, called 'House of One', which can be used for Christian's church, Moslem's mosque, and Jews' synagogue. It is very progressive program conducted by religious communities, and it actually contributes to strengthen religious harmony in the society (658).

Finally, making religious harmony in Germany is not only held by the state, but also in academic sectors and religious communities in grassroots. From these cases, the important thing is that the state ensures religious freedom for all religious believers or non-believers. For instance, in case of a liberal Ibn Rushd-Goethe Mosque, the state safeguards their religious activities. According to Malina Noor, an Executive Officer, because of their progressive views, their founder, Seyran Ates, is often threated by certain other Muslims; so that the state has to secure her with dispatching polices. This mosque accommodates LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) as members of the mosque. They also allow for woman to become praying imam (Saputra 2018, 658).

How can the Germany's experiences in making religious harmony implement in Indonesia? It is an intricate question, but the spirit of making religious harmony coming from top-down and bottom-up should be lesson learnt for Indonesia. The state must rethink their policies in order to treat all religions or religious communities equally, without giving a special supremacy or favouritism for one or few religions (Saputra 2018, 658).

Even though Indonesia has different history, culture, and socialpolitical structure with Germany, some values and ways on

regulating religious harmony in Germany can be valuable learning in approaching social-religious problems happened in Indonesia. Different from German secular state and societies, in Indonesia religion becomes part of public affairs. The minorities issues are one of detrimental consequences from the strengthening of religion in public spheres (Saputra 2018, 659).

German secularisation model called "positive neutrality" contributes to make social harmony and to mitigate tensions among either religions or religious denominations. The State treats all citizen equally without giving special supremacy for a certain religion. For example, German Islam Conference (DIK) is being a cannel where Muslim can dialogue with the state in terms of their everyday life problems. Its accommodation is also crucial to build mutual trust between state and religious communities. Their generosity in facilitating integration process has encouraged religious believers to be moderate (Saputra 2018, 659).

Then, the interfaith programs which directly entangles religious communities instead of only facilitated by state are a pivotal case in making genuine social harmony in grass-root levels. It can be seen in project's House of One at which three religious communities initiate to build one house of worship to three religions –Christian, Muslim, Jews. The project is crucial to reduce religious fanaticism incriminated these religions due to conflicts entangled them in some regions in the world (Saputra 2018, 659)

To sum up German's experiences are arduous to be implemented in Indonesia because Indonesia can be appraised as a religious society. German secularisation model of "positive neutrality" is not feasible implemented in Indonesia. However, Indonesian' state should ensure that policies created for public are equal for all citizen. State also ensures equal rights and opportunities for all religious communities to express their belief. By establishing a forum to dialogue their everyday life among religious communities instead of only discussion interfaith or theological topics, it can make religious communities to be moderate because an equal accommodation for all religions and efforts for making solution together might create mutual trust and understanding among them (Saputra 2018, 659).

This is the organizational structure of the PCI NU in Germany:

This is the profile of the PCI NU in Germany:

Introduction

There are various ways of defining citizenship and, as we have witnessed in the interdisciplinary field of citizenship studies, each falls short of a satisfactory clarity or comprehensiveness. Whether citizenship is defined as membership, status, practice, or even performance, it carries an already assumed conception of politics, culture, spatiality, temporality, and sociality. To say, for example, that 'citizenship is membership of the nation-state' assumes so much and leaves so much out that it becomes an analytically pointless statement. Ironically, it is also the most common definition offered today. Similarly, to say that 'citizenship is performance' leaves as much unsaid as said about the way in which it comes into being and functions (Engin F. Isin and Peter Nyers. 2014. "Introduction: Globalizing Citizenship Studies". In *Routledge Handbook of Global Citizenship Studies*, edited by Engin F. Isin and Peter Nyers. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 1-11).

Our best offer is to define citizenship as an 'institution' mediating rights between the subjects of politics and the polity to which these subjects belong . There are several things of note in this minimalist yet broad-ranging definition. First, 'institution' here should obviously not imply a narrow conception of organization. It implies a broader conception of processes through which something is enacted, created, and rendered relatively durable and stable but still contestable, surprising, and inventive. Second, we use the term 'polity' to move away from the idea that the state is the sole source of authority for recognizing and legislating rights. There are international polities such as the European Union or the United Nations as well as many other covenants, agreements and charters that constitute polities other than the state. Third, note that we suggest using 'political subjects' rather than 'citizens' as the agents of the mediation in hand. This is because not all political subjects will have the designation of citizens. This also clarifies our use of 'belongs', which we take to include official and non-official forms, legal and extra-legal belongings. Note also that we use 'subjects'

in the plural because citizenship involves collective mediations and not just the relationship individuals have with their polity. Either way, whether certain political subjects can make claims to being, or constitute themselves as, citizens is an important aspect of the politics of citizenship or politics *for* citizenship. Finally, note the double meaning of 'political subjects'. Just now we used it to signify those people who have constituted themselves as subjects of politics in the sense that they (1) act as political subjects. But 'political subjects' can also mean those issues that are the topic of discussion under the designation 'political'. In other words, the topics that come under discussion during the mediation of rights between political subjects and polities are themselves a political subject. So when we say 'mediation between the subjects of politics and the polity to which they belong', we mean that politics *for* citizenship involves both where and how this mediation occurs, who becomes implicated in these rights, and what rights are the focus of mediation (Isin and Nyers 2014, 1-2).

The combination of rights and duties is always an outcome of social struggles that finds expression in political and legal institutions. Traditionally, in modern state societies, three types of rights (civil, political, and social) and three types of duties (conscription, taxation, and participation) defined the relationship between the citizen and the state. Civil rights include the right to free speech, to conscience, and to dignity; political rights include franchise and standing for office; and, social rights include unemployment insurance, universal health care, and welfare. Although conscription is rapidly disappearing as a citizenship duty, taxation is as strong as ever and jury duty, even as it is increasingly challenged under certain circumstances, still serves a fundamental role. Moreover, new rights have appeared such as sexual, cultural, and environmental rights with varying degrees of success of institutionalization (e.g. witness the struggles over same-sex marriage in the United States and Europe). Again, as we have mentioned, whether (2) classical (civil, political, social) or expanded (sexual, environmental, cultural), these rights and duties are mediated through other polities that influence the actual combination that obtains in a given polity at a given time (Isin and Nyers 2014, 2-3).

The older and more theoretical classifications of ideas of citizenship (such as liberalism, republicanism, and communitarianism)

make much less sense now given the contemporary complications just mentioned. Since the combination of rights and duties and their performance vary greatly across polities, it is probably more accurate to speak about various citizenship regimes that characterize a similar, if not co-dependent, development of certain combinations. We can, for example, talk about an Anglo-American regime (e.g. Britain, the US), a North European regime (e.g. Denmark, Norway), a continental regime (e.g. France, Germany), a South American regime (e.g. Brazil, Chile), a South Asian regime (e.g. India, Pakistan), and so forth. We can also talk about postcolonial citizenship regimes (e.g. India, Brazil, Ghana), post-communist citizenship regimes (e.g. Poland, Hungary, even China), neoliberal citizenship regimes (e.g. Britain, the US), post-settler citizenship regimes (e.g. Canada, Australia), or settler regimes (e.g. Israel). Arguably, each of these regimes has a different combination of rights and duties of citizenship but each displays a recognizable culture of rights and duties. The proliferation of these overlapping regimes, moreover, speaks to the need for scholarship on citizenship to appreciate the multiple ways in which citizenship has itself been globalized. The field of citizenship studies is globalizing because people around the world are articulating their struggles through citizenship (Isin and Nyers 2014, 3).

The performance dimension of citizenship highlights two issues. First, rights and duties that are not performed remain as inert or passive rights and duties. These rights and duties are brought into being only when performed by citizens. Consider, for example, conscription as a duty. As we have mentioned, although declining, if it exists on paper, states may occasionally invoke this in times of conflict or war. Secondly, since citizenship is brought into being by being performed, non-citizens can also perform citizenship. In fact, those who do not have the status of citizenship but obtain it by making claims to it often negotiate many rights and duties. This performative aspect of citizenship has been expressed in various ways, most notably in the language of active versus passive citizenship (isin and Nyers 2014, 3).

These two dimensions of citizenship permeate social and political life to a greater degree than meets the eye. It is citizenship studies scholarship that brings them into light in analytical terms. When people mobilize for legalizing same-sex marriage, rally for social

housing, protest against welfare cuts, debate employment insurance, advocate the decriminalization of marijuana, wear attire such as turbans or headscarves in public spaces, leak information about the surveillance activities of their own governments, seek affirmative action programmes, or demand better health-care access and services, they tend not to imagine themselves as struggling for the maintenance or expansion of social, cultural, or sexual citizenship rights. Nor do governments recognize them as such. Instead, people invest in whatever issues seem most related and closest to their social lives, and dedicate their time and energy accordingly, and governments respond or fail to respond to these demands. There are two points to make about such struggles. First, they are irreducibly social struggles that arise from social existence. To classify such struggles either as redistribution (economism) or recognition (culturalism) misses their complexity and the political stakes involved. Secondly, while they may not clearly articulate it, it is important to acknowledge that when people engage with such issues, whatever differences may separate them in values, principles, and priorities, they are performing citizenship, even those who are not passport-carrying members of the state (non-citizens). But by so doing they shape both subjects of politics and political subjects. Thus, citizenship is certainly much more than legal status, although formal legal citizenship remains important for accessing citizenship rights. Although (3) it mediates between citizens and polities, citizenship does not always take the form of demands on government (Isin and Nyers 2014, 3-4).

We can conclude that if citizenship mediates rights between political subjects and the polity to which they belong, it also involves the art of being with others, negotiating different situations and identities, and articulating ourselves as distinct from, yet similar to, others in our everyday lives. Through these social struggles, citizens develop a sense of their rights as others' obligations and others' rights as their obligations. This is especially true for democratic citizenship, as it is the only form of citizenship that approaches the combination of rights and duties as a dynamic (and thus contested but changing and flexible) outcome and its creative performance as a fundamental aspect of a democratic polity. Citizenship, especially democratic citizenship, depends on the creative and autonomous capacities of political subjects

whose performance of citizenship is not only the driving force for change but also the guarantee of the vitality and endurance of the polity. Governments may see domains of citizen engagement as separate from each other in the everyday governing of the polity and in the social lives of their citizens, but occasionally an event reminds everyone that citizens are indeed participating in the performance and enactment of citizenship. It is in this deep and broader sense that citizenship is social and polities (or, rather, authorities responsible for governing them) neglect this often with perilous consequences. This is where the responsibilities of citizenship studies scholarship may assume a significant public and political role (Isin and Nyers 2014, 4).

The use of rights and citizenship has exploded with groups of many different types demanding and in some cases obtaining new rights. Many complain of a cacophony of rights claims and the comparative silence on obligations and duties to fulfill those rights. At the same time, immigrants in many countries clamor at the gates of industrialized nations with claims for a new citizenship that will socially and politically integrate them into a society with opportunities to live and prosper. Rights and duties are trumpeted and denounced with great emotion, diverse definitions, shallow usage, and uncertain relationships between concepts. What can citizens, politicians, and social scientists make of these claims for inclusion, obligation, and rights of citizenship? (Thomas Janoski. 1998. *Citizenship and Civil Society: A Framework of Rights and Obligations in Liberal, Traditional, and Social Democratic Regimes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 1)

Although most advanced industrialized countries cover nearly all of their inhabitants with at least some legal, political, and social rights, citizenship rights clearly remain contentious. Citizens and subjects demand rights, but their success depends on the ebb and flow of the power of contending political parties, interest groups, and social movements. Many libertarian conservatives and radicals see citizenship obligations as overly enforced, but communitarians and neo-conservatives see obligations as being in steep decline. On the one hand, Freeden sees rights as being overwhelmingly accepted: "The concept of rights has become (1) one of the most reputable and positively connoted in political theory. The desirability of promoting in principle the ideas represented by the concept is far less controversial than, for example,

the promotion of equality, democracy or even liberty" (1991, p. 1). On the other hand, Etzioni asks for an emphasis on obligations: "We should, for a transition period of, say, the next decade, put a tight lid on the manufacturing of new rights. The incessant issuance of new rights, like the wholesale printing of currency, causes a massive inflation of rights that devalues their moral claims" (1993, p. 5). Clearly, positions differ widely on the status of rights and obligations, which is one of a number of reasons why understanding the rights terrain is so difficult (Janoski 1998, 1-2).

The claiming of rights involves many questions that would seem to be hard to deny. In terms of legal rights, one may ask today whether ethnic minorities and immigrants have freedom from attack and harassment from majorities; whether citizens can defend themselves against robbery and attack on the streets and in their own homes; whether women have the right to walk outdoors at night or to control their own bodies in clinics and hospitals; and whether developmentally delayed persons have rights to attend regular schools, to work for pay, and even to procreate. Concerning political rights, one may ask when only half the eligible citizens vote in America, are their rights really operative? When the third generation of guestworkers in Germany are denied the right to vote, how can such exclusive principles of citizenship be justified? Questions about social rights focus on whether poor or middle-income persons have rights to health care, and whether children with AIDS may attend school. We may ask whether government bureaucracies serve or simply ignore clients, and whether government workers have adequate representation on their jobs. We may ask what rights workers at private corporations have to job security, safe working conditions, and abilities to set the terms of work, rest, and production. In sum, what status do rights have in post-industrial societies, and how can they be measured and explained? (Janoski 1998, 2).

Citizenship rights were not always widespread, and at earlier points in history, citizenship rights applied to less than a tenth of the population in many nations. Rights developed through nation-building with barons gaining access to legal rights (e.g., the Magna Carta in Britain). They developed further with the bourgeoisie obtaining legal and political rights in various legal codes and constitutions during the Industrial Revolution. Many see the unique Western Enlightenment as

the ideational motor of citizenship because of the rise of rational individualism, but others see it as a specific system of rights based on individualism that does not apply to other cultures (Bridges 1994, p. 6). Yet citizenship rights have widely diffused to many intellectuals and educated workers in non-Western cultures. With the world wars of the twentieth century, rights advanced for the working classes, especially after they served in the military. And rights continue to grow for gender, racial, ethnic, and ability groups. None of these processes were particularly smooth, and most were surrounded with considerable conflict, but from the twelfth to the twentieth centuries, citizenship rights have advanced in most industrialized countries. Nonetheless, the explanations for this advance are in critical need of development (Janoski 1998, 3).

What is citizenship? Although it is the lingua franca of socialization in civics classes, as well as the cornerstone of many social movements seeking basic rights, and a key phrase in speeches by politicians on ceremonial occasions, oddly enough, citizenship has not been a central idea in the social sciences. Six major social science surveys or dictionaries show no listing for "citizenship" or "citizen."Other sources reveal definitions that reflect legal, normative, and social scientific perspectives. The social scientific definition provides the more useful conception of citizenship for my purposes of reconstructing citizenship theory. Citizenship is passive and active membership of individuals in a nation- state with certain universalistic rights and obligations at a specified level of equality. Each aspect of this definition requires discussion, especially since it can be applied at both the national and individual level. (Janoski 1998, 8).

First, citizenship begins with determining *membership* in a nationstate. Internally, this means establishing "personhood" within a defined geographical territory. Out of the totality of denizens, natives, and subjects of a territory, "the citizen" is given specific rights. Personhood usually begins with a restricted group of elite citizens (e.g., the wealthy citizens of Athens, or the barons of thirteenth-century England) and then may develop to encompass a larger portion of nation-state residents (e.g., the 80 to 90 percent of residents in advanced industrialized countries). There are two perspectives on studying membership. The *internal approach* examines how non-citizens within

a nation-state achieve membership, that is, how non-citizens - stigmatized ethnic, racial, gender, class, or disabled groups - gain rights and recognition as citizens. The *external approach* analyzes how aliens from outside the nation-state obtain entree and then become naturalized as citizens with attendant rights and obligations. Bottomore differentiates between internal and external citizenship by calling membership "substantive citizenship" and possessing rights "formal citizenship" (Janoski 1998, 9).

Second, citizenship involves *active* and *passive* rights and obligations. Dennis Thompson (1970) sees citizenship as passive rights of existence and active rights that include present and future capacities to influence politics. Passive and active rights are very different in their theoretical implications. With passive rights alone, a beneficent dictator could rule with limited legal rights and extensive social rights in a redistributive system of income payments. Active rights bring citizens in a democracy to the foreground in politics and even economics. When citizens become directly active in citizenship rights, social scientists will be concerned with measuring the levels, causes, and consequences of participation. A good empirical example is Almond and Verba's (1965) comparative work on the various roles that citizens play one at a time or even simultaneously: the parochial or self-interested family person, the subject of the state, and the active citizen participating in the community. Thus, a stress on an active conception of citizenship may be normative, but also social scientific in that it helps construct a more complex theory of citizenship involving political and economic democracy, sometimes opposing the state (Nagel 1987, pp. 145-80). The next chapter will emphasize this distinction between active and passive rights (Janoski 1998, 9).

Third, citizenship rights are *universalistic rights enacted into law and implemented for all citizens,* and not informal, unenacted, or particularistic. Groups can advance unenacted rights as claims or proposals for (9) citizenship rights, but since these rights often derive from norms within subcultures and are enforced by social pressures or group rules, they often conflict with norms in other subcultures. The process of enacting citizenship rights is an attempt to iron out these conflicts through universalistic rights. Further, many claims may be labeled as rights that could never be universal citizenship rights. As

Giddens states, persons may have their own or group "moral imperatives" or more simply "customs" that lack universal application or state legitimation (1987, p. 320). For instance, employees working for IBM or kings of the Gypsies may enjoy specific group rights, but these rights are not citizenship rights unless they are universally applied within the country and backed by the state (Janoski 1998, 9-10).

Fourth, citizenship is a statement of *equality*, with rights and obligations being balanced within certain limits. The equality is not complete, but it most often entails an increase in subordinate rights vis-a-vis social elites. This equality is mainly procedural - the ability to enter the public forums of courts, legislatures, public bureaucracies, and private councils - but it may also include payments and services that have a direct impact upon substantive equality. The extent of rights actually used by citizens may also vary considerably with class and status group power (Somers 1993, pp. 602-6). (Janoski 1998, 10).

This definition differs from other conceptions of citizenship in four major respects. Legal definitions of citizenship focus on simple membership which often turns on naturalization processes (Brubaker 1992; Hollifield 1992). These definitions based on the acceptance of immigrants are too narrow and will be countered by a conceptualization of internal and external membership (see Marshall 1964, p. 92; Svarlien 1964; Piano 1979). A number of other definitions focus on "being a good citizen," which consists of knowing citizenship rights but also tending to volunteer for activities (Roelofs 1957). They tend to be valueladen and are most often applied to students and newly arrived immigrants. The definition used here precludes this conception of citizenship but uses it as the separate idea of "civic virtue" in civil society (Janoski 1998, 10).

Citizenship for Post-Colonial People

The modern conception of citizenship as merely a status held under the authority of a state has been contested and broadened to include various political and social struggles of recognition and redistribution as instances of claim-making, and hence, by extension, of citizenship. As a result, various struggles based upon identity and difference (whether sexual, ‘racial’, ‘ethnic’, diasporic, ecological,

technological, or cosmopolitan) have found new ways of articulating their claims as claims to citizenship understood not simply as a legal status but as political and social recognition and economic redistribution. Hence the increase in the number of scholars who work in feminist studies, queer studies, Aboriginal studies, African studies, diaspora studies, postcolonial studies, race and ethnic studies, urban studies, immigration studies, and environmental studies, who are exploring and addressing concepts of sexual citizenship, ecological citizenship, diasporic citizenship, differentiated citizenship, multicultural citizenship, cosmopolitan citizenship and Aboriginal citizenship. These studies, taken together, have already made an impact on social and political thought and practice in constitutional as well as governmental policies. Indeed, there has been a spectacular growth of the field of citizenship studies, evidenced in numerous books, articles, and theses dedicated to it (Engin F. Isin and Bryan S. Turner. 2002. “Citizenship Studies: An Introduction”. In *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*, edited by Engin F. Isin and Bryan S. Turner. London: Sage, 1-10, p. 2).

Emerging from these studies and trends is a new conception of citizenship that challenges its modern variant. Modern citizenship itself was born of the nation-state in which certain rights and obligations were allocated to individuals under its authority. Modern citizenship rights that draw from the nation-state typically include civil (free speech and movement, the rule of law), political (voting, seeking electoral office) and social (welfare, unemployment insurance and health care) rights. The precise combination and depth of such rights vary from one state to another but a modern democratic state is expected to uphold a combination of citizenship rights and obligations. That said, however, three points must be borne in mind to avoid assuming citizenship rights and obligations as ‘universal’. First, while within some states civil rights such as bodily control rights (medical and sexual control over the body) are guaranteed, some states deny even basic civil rights to its citizens, such as rights of access to courts and counsel. Similarly, while some states guarantee political rights and go so far as to franchise prisoners, others deny even such basic rights as refugee or naturalization rights. Citizenship obligations vary too, ranging from states where military service is required to those states where jury duty and taxes are the only

responsibilities. Second, while many nation-states have elaborate rules and criteria for 'naturalization', the granting of citizenship to those not born in its territory, such rules and criteria are often contested and debated and vary widely. Third, even some basic citizenship rights are remarkably recent. We should remember that the property qualifications for citizenship were abolished as recently as, for example, 1901 in Australia, 1918 in Britain and 1920 in Canada. Even this should be interpreted cautiously as citizenship did not include Aboriginals in settler societies. Similarly, the franchise was extended to women as recently as 1902 in Australia, 1918 in Canada, and 1920 in the United States, while British women over the age of 21 have been able to vote only since 1928 and French women since 1944 (Isin and Turner 2002, 3).

There is no doubt that citizenship has also emerged as a major theme connecting policy domains that range from welfare, education, and labor markets to international relations and migration. Citizenship connects these because it brings within its orbit three fundamental issues: how the boundaries of membership within a polity and between polities should be defined (*extent*); how the benefits and burdens of membership should be allocated (*content*); and how the 'thickness' of identities of members should be comprehended and accommodated (*depth*). As a simple matter of law, nationality is the primary axis by which peoples are classified and distributed in polities across the globe. However, the continuing rise of new forms of cultural politics has challenged modern understandings of belonging and has contributed to rethinking the meaning of citizenship. The reality of immigration and emigration, the formation of such supranational and transnational bodies as the European Union (EU), the formation of new successor states, the movement of refugee populations, and the codification of international human rights norms has prompted increasing recognition of citizenship as a transnational matter. The growing incidence of plural nationality exemplifies the transnational dimension of (4) citizenship not only as an object of policy but also increasingly as a source and marker of social identity. The difficulty in this growing recognition is that it has arisen through the interaction of citizenship rules that states, acting as sovereign agents, have adopted, but whose effects reach into the domestic jurisdictions of other states and invest individuals with binding

affiliations to two or more states. This difficulty is compounded for nations that have seen themselves as ethnically or racially homogenous. Moreover, the increasing importance of cities in organizing and shaping cultural, social, symbolics, and economic flows has also prompted a recognition of their role in fostering citizenship. Thus, the sovereign state is no longer the only locus of citizenship. Yet very few citizenship laws are enacted either above or below national levels (e.g. EU). So while negotiations for citizenship take place above and below the state, laws are still enacted at national levels. Hence national trajectories and practices still constitute important issues in citizenship studies despite the fact that citizenship is now negotiated at a variety of levels and sites (Isin and Turner 2002, 4-5).

Classical political philosophy and political economy also recognized the connections between citizenship and civil society. Hegel, while employing 'citizen' to mean a member of the state, recognized the associations between citizenship and civil society. In twelfth-century Europe, a burgher was a town-dweller, and in France *bourgeois* came to designate a stratum that was separate from the clergy and the nobility, but was also connected with 'market town'. Thus with the development of 'civil society' (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*), there was an intimate set of interconnections between the bourgeoisie as a class, the creation of an autonomous civil society and citizenship. These cultural and social connections with urban middle class life were the origin of Marx's criticisms of citizenship. Using the emancipation of the Jews as an example, Marx argued that bourgeois citizenship made an artificial separation between politics and society, condemned the continuity of class inequality in liberal capitalism, and claimed that citizenship was a smoke screen that masked economic exploitation. Radical thinkers have often remained suspicious about the democratic thrust of citizenship rights and argued theoretically that the task of democratic politics was to restore the vitality of civil society (Isin and Turner 2002, 6).

While there is much substance to this claim, it is partial. The liberal theory of citizenship that emphasizes individual rights is only one version of citizenship theory. Historically the working class has often mobilized behind the discourse of citizenship to claim collective social rights, and citizenship as a set of institutions does not necessarily separate social and economic rights. On the contrary, the thrust behind

modern citizenship has been to create a welfare state to achieve equality between citizens. Thus, the task of rebuilding civil society (or a public sphere) cannot be achieved without dynamic forms of citizenship (Isin and Turner 2002, 6).

Nevertheless, there has been a strong connection between citizenship and nationstate formation, as sociologists such as Reinhard Bendix (1964) recognized. In the nineteenth century Citizenship became a platform for racial exclusion and a foundation for 'national manhood'. In the twentieth century, it has often been intimately connected with the construction and maintenance of a global labour market of 'guests and aliens' as Saskia Sassen has demonstrated. If Marx was concerned about the tensions between political and social rights, we should be exercised by the problem of citizen and human rights Isin and Turner 2002, 6).

Precisely because citizenship rights have been historically tied to the nation-state, it is often thought that the rights of aboriginal and native groups, stateless people, refugees and children may be better served by human than by social (citizenship) rights. Aboriginal rights against postcolonial states are the typical example. In Australia, the doctrine of *terra nullius* meant that after 1788 the Aborigines became invisible and were treated as *de facto* migrants who could only claim rights as aliens. In the twentieth century, international legal institutions were often pitted against the state under the banner of human rights legislation to protect the rights of people who were not covered by a state. Similarly, people who were in conflict with a nation-state which they did not recognize as having legal jurisdiction would often appeal to human rights as a form of protection. For example, the British government has been frequently embarrassed by human rights criticism of its actions in Northern Ireland against the IRA and other nationalist Groups (Isin and Turner 2002, 6).

Although human rights and social rights often appear to be in conflict from a legal standpoint, in practice people typically claim human rights from the basis of a pre-existing or articulable citizenship right. Northern Irish oppositional groups who question the legality of the actions of the British state in Northern Ireland are already citizens. The problem with human rights has been historically that they cannot be (easily) (6) enforced, because there is no political community to which they can refer or which they can mobilize. In the absence of a global

state with legitimate juridical powers around the world that can override state legislation, it is difficult to see how human rights legislation can have authority over the legal rights of citizens of legitimate states. The problem is in short that human rights are often not enforceable or in more technical terminology are not 'justiciable'. In more specific terms still, while some jurists would accept the notion that political rights could be enforced, the whole arena of the social and cultural rights of the UN charters is not justiciable. So human rights are rarely conceptualized in terms of a set of corresponding obligations, and therefore there is some doubt about whether human rights are rights at all, as Giorgio Agamben (1998, 1999) suggested. Critics might conclude that citizenship rights are distinct and justiciable, but human rights are vague, unenforceable, quasi-rights. We do not accept this bleak conclusion and would argue that, for the foreseeable future, human and social rights are more likely to be compatible than mutually exclusive. Where citizenship rights fail to provide protection of individuals from the state, the individuals will appeal to international courts for protection of human rights. While we anticipate that the enforceable domain of human rights will increase with globalization, there are clearly tensions between national and international courts, and between citizenship and human rights (Isin and Turner 2002, 6-7).

We would argue that the neo-liberal view of citizenship is in crisis. Participation in the market is obviously important and the idea of the worker-citizen has been a foundational aspect of modern society. However, there are clearly problems with this foundation, especially where there is profound casualization of labor, under-employment, early retirement and flexible hours of work. As Richard Sennett (1998) has argued, the modern market creates casualized employment that leads to a 'corrosion' of character. There has also been a widespread devaluation of education and the university system by neo-liberal governments that have reduced funding and attempted to destroy the autonomy of universities in providing an education that is not merely training for a job. The marginalization of the worker and the degradation of education has resulted in an erosion of citizenship that we can see manifested in low participation rates in elections, distrust of politicians, lack of social capital investment in society, the decline of the public sphere, and the decline of the universities (Isin and Turner 2002, 8).

The revival of cosmopolitan idealism is in fact closely connected with the classical idea of virtue. There is a republican tradition that had its origins in the Stoical tradition of Rome that promoted the idea of cosmopolitan virtue. This tradition in the modern

period has attempted to distinguish between love of country (patriotism) and respect for the state (nationalism). We have lost this tradition, failing typically to recognize any distinction between patriotic and nationalist commitments. Writers such as Giuseppe Mazzini (1906) argued that love of one's own country was perfectly compatible with commitment to a commonwealth that embraced a love of humanity. Indeed an education in the love of *patria* moved inevitably towards a commitment to the *republica*. This language of virtue and the commonwealth has been lost to us in a world that has become dominated by calculating rationalism and the neo-liberal faith that our private vices (greed) are public virtues (wealth) (Isin and Turner 2002, 8).

Statecraft today is concerned with wealth creation not value creation, but the language of *patria* and *pietas* need not be archaic. Indeed, if we are to have global rights and cosmopolitan citizenship, we need to evolve a language of obligation and virtue. What commitments might a cosmopolitan citizen have? We suggest that one answer would be respect for other cultures and that this commitment to protect the cultural multiplicity of the global commonwealth would constitute a cosmopolitan virtue. We detect elements of this development in the theory of cosmopolitan democracy that has been promoted by writers such as David Held (1995) (Isin and Turner 2002, 8).

Various trends and dimensions of the current debate point in the direction of cosmopolitan or global citizenship. One such example might be Aihwa Ong's idea (1999) of flexible citizenship which she has developed in her work on the Chinese diasporic élite, but this perspective could in principle apply to all diasporas. As the globalization process produces multiple diasporas, we can expect very complex relationships between homeland and host societies that will make the traditional idea of national citizenship increasingly problematic. The increasing rates of labour migration and the growth of dual citizenship arrangements indicate that citizenship itself will become differentiated to accommodate these new status positions and identities. These labor and other migratory movements will produce a variety of interconnected social changes that are associated with multiculturalism in terms of marriage, family structures, pluralism, and multiplicity. The politics of difference and identity attempts to address these cultural transformations, and this transformation of societies places new

demands on traditional or national patterns of citizenship. The European Union has been attempting to address these questions through changes to citizenship status that as a minimum give some recognition to resident workers, for example Turks in Germany, who do not have full citizenship membership but nevertheless have rights by virtue of their presence as social groups (Isin and Turner 2002, 9).

In short, as societies are forced to manage cultural difference and associated tensions and conflict, there will be necessarily significant changes in the processes by which states allocate citizenship and a differentiation of the category of citizen. At a deeper level, these patterns of cultural multiplicity and identity raise questions about the porosity of political boundaries and cultural borders. Does a modern democracy require a strong sense of territorial integrity or can democracies evolve with very open and porous boundaries? There are many different answers to this question, but in terms of the republican legacy of patriotism, love of country prepares the way to respect for strangers and outsiders. Cosmopolitan openness might be compatible with a strong sense of place and tradition, provided there is a recognition of difference and otherness. This vision may appear utopian, but it is an important normative position from which to challenge the negative and closed features of nationalism, racism and fundamentalism. Citizenship must be a central component to whatever answers and policies emerge towards global governance (Isin and Turner 2002, 9).

In 1999 Indonesia became an electoral democracy. Despite this remarkable transformation, there are serious problems on the country's political life at the local level. One of the most significant aspects of the problems is the persistence of undemocratic practices in local politics. It happens not only in terms of regional development dynamics (Aspinall and Fealy 2003; Hill 2014), in the parliamentary or party politics (Choi 2004; Pratikno 2009; Choi 2009), or local politicians' attitude (Buehler 2007; Choi 2007), but also at the village level (Kammen 2003; Ito 2011; Ito 2016).

Much attention, in analyzing the character of Indonesia's democratization process, however, has gone to describing the behaviour of national's political elites and their 'predatory' behaviour (Robison and Hadiz 2004; Hadiz 2010; Winters 2011), the character of elections and political parties (King 2003; Mietzner 2006; Mietzner 2010;

Mietzner and Aspinall 2010; Aspinall and Fealy 2010), and the new boundaries characterizing governance (Schulte Nordholt and Van Klinken 2007; Van Klinken and Barker 2009; Aspinall and Van Klinken 2011). Consequently, much less attention has been paid to how Indonesia's democratization process has affected the political behaviour of ordinary Indonesians (e.g. Erb, Sulistiyanto, and Faucher 2005; Ito 2006; Sakai, Banks, and Walker 2009; Haug, Rössler, and Grumblies 2017).

A special issue of *Citizenship Studies* on informality and citizenship (2018) is very important in describing informal features of state-citizen interaction. While most studies on citizenship focus on the formal citizen rights and autonomous and individualistic citizens, the articles in the special issue pay much attention to the important but rather neglected personal and informal relations and pressures that are actually necessary for realizing formal citizens' rights. The issues in the articles revolve around, among other things, struggles to address human rights violations, realization of land rights and access healthcare, and the peculiarities of state-led volunteerism (e.g. Berenschot and Van Klinken 2018; Hearman 2018; Van der Muur 2018; Berenschot, Hanani, and Sambodho 2018; Jakimow 2018).

Western scholarship on citizenship relies much on T.H. Marshall's influential work *Citizenship and Social Class* (1950), based mostly on Western experiences of state formation, democratization, and formal state-citizen interaction. One proponent of Marshall's thoughts, Reinhard Bendix (1964), discussed the transformation of formal citizenship rights in the face of class inequalities caused by industrialization in Germany and United Kingdom. Bryan Turner (1986) built the developmental theory of citizenship towards conflict theory with a focus on social movements as the vibrant force pushing the development of citizenship rights. Twelve years later, Thomas Janoski (1998) advanced a theory of citizenship. He argued that the problems of citizenship concerned rights and obligations that were not adequately grounded, the balancing of rights and obligations that was totally ignored, and the development of citizenship rights and obligations that needed to be formulated at both the macro and micro levels.

These classical, Western-oriented theories of citizenship for the most part focus on the formal rights and duties citizens enjoy *vis-à-vis*

the state, and largely neglect informal dimensions of state-citizen interaction, even though they are actually necessary for realizing formal citizen rights, especially in non-Western countries. Such a view of citizenship that is mostly explored in the context of high-capacity and liberal welfare states without adequate attention to the more weakly institutionalized states and predominantly clintelistic political systems is closely being questioned. An increasing collection of literature is bringing to light the significance of (1) informal relations in state-citizen interaction; (2) the mediated character of citizenship; (3) the ways citizenship is understood and practiced by ordinary people; and (4) how citizenship in postcolonial states and non-Western countries is being redefined.

Consequently, more fluid and dynamic conceptions of citizenship in order to relate them to semi-bounded political communities are particularly needed (Shachar, Bauböck, Bloemraad, and Vink 2017); this is especially true when discussing present-day characters of citizenship in postcolonial states, or more broadly, non-Western world. *First*, in the context of the importance of informal relations in state-citizen interaction, a number of authors have proposed critical argumentations. Michelle Miller (2011) demonstrates that in many Asian countries, the boundaries between formal and informal rights are frequently blurred, or at least lack the legal certainty that is typically associated with formal notions of citizenship in the West. Akhil Gupta reveals that the relations between a regime and its subjects are complex. His seminal article on the nature of the state emphasizes the informal interface between the state and the citizens (Gupta 2006). Indeed, relationships of accountability in service delivery for poor citizens are often embedded in unofficial, informal, and personalized social relations and political pressures. When accountability systems do not work, they actually attempt to claim their entitlements in which informal pressures are in fact operating (Hossain 2010, 924). A recent article, drawing upon cases from a Taiwanese eco-village, denotes that there are ‘emerging political collectivities in community as a new basis of citizenship rather than formal membership within a deliberative democracy in the public sphere’ (Jung 2016, 512).

Informal relations often operate in informal institutions that include personal networks, clientelism, corruption, and a variety of

legislative, judicial, and bureaucratic norms (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 727). In practice, many forms of everyday state-citizen interactions are shaped by personal relations and norms of reciprocity that provide similar reaasurances that state agents will award certain claims (Berenschot, Schulte Nordholt, and Bakker 2016, 9). In the context of Indonesia, the notion of informality in everyday state-citizen interactions is an integral, constitutive dimension of citizenship that shapes the capacity of citizens to realize their rights. The fostering of personal connections characterizes an important element of political agency as it enables citizens to deal with undemocratic state institutions (Berenschot and Van Klinken 2018).

Second, 'mediated citizenship' in this article refers to the highly involvement of mediators or third-party actors in brokering citizens to deal with state institutions, leading to legal and socio-political participation and political agency. Elsewhere, it is referred to as 'twilight institutions', those who 'operate in the twilight between state and society, public and private' (Lund 2006, 686) or 'fixers', those who solve people's problems, often by improper or unlawful means in the relations between citizens and security forces (Pribadi 2018). Despite its diverse harmful effects, the presence of mediators somewhat serve to sharpen citizenship. For instance, the transformation of traditional brokerage-based clientelism into the bureaucratic clientelism of political parties improves the institutions and practice of rural citizenship. Zografia Bika demonstrates that this kind of clientelism has standardized the state's local presence so that the citizens are able to find rooms to manoeuvre (Bika 2011, 366).

In democratizing Indonesia, political competition often generates violent and communal conflicts (Colombijn and Lindblad 2002; Bertrand 2004; Sidel 2007). One significant feature in these communal, political conflicts is the flexible and socially appropriate processes of mediation between the state and citizens which facilitate the resolution of the socio-political disturbances (Kingsley 2012). Furthermore, institutional fragmentation in Indonesia has allowed for the emergence and reinforcement of non-state security groups. These groups often form unstable and loose alliances and networks of patronage with state apparatus or political elites in order for them to secure their own interests or to claim to represent the people (Hadiz

2010; Wilson 2010; Wilson 2012). In addition to mediating the citizens, these groups frequently exercise a form of vigilante citizenship by articulating claims based on populist, communal, and religious identities (Telle 2013).

Third, the ways citizenship is understood and practiced by ordinary people in developing countries are contingent on people's conception of citizenship rights that does not so much draw on liberal-universalist notions of citizenship that provide them with formal and fixed rights and obligations as on context-dependent entitlements (Jung 2016, 513). Indeed, formal citizenship rights in postcolonial states, such as Indonesia, depend on uneasy relationships between electoral democracy and particular socio-cultural factors, such as ethnic and religious sentiments, that tend to pay more attention to exclusive group interests while excluding a shared sense of citizenship (Schulte Nordholt 2008).

It is striking that in postcolonial Indonesia, the term '*rakyat*' (the people) has been considered inferior, and portrayed as belonging to the village and as objects of manipulation by the elite (Herriman 2010). Therefore, it is not surprising that the ways citizens understand and practice citizenship in everyday life have not been as advanced as their counterparts in Western countries. It is partly because Indonesia's intelegentsia is intimately tied by class origin, education, generation, and life experience, rather than by equally democratic principles (Anderson 1988, 197).

Fourth, a number of authors increasingly acknowledge that citizenship studies in postcolonial states or more broadly, non-Western contexts are inadequately investigated. They propose that a postcolonial and non-Western lens offers an understanding of citizenship from the standpoint of the marginalized, notably when discussing citizenship as not only a formal set of individual's status, rights, and privileges granted by the state, as constantly defined in Western contexts, but also a multilayered, constantly changing, and local process that is contingent on infomal institutions and everyday practices that serves as a wider tool and control mechanism to influence political membership in a state (Sadiq 2017; Chung 2017).

By investigating citizenship in non-Western world, we can we explore performative acts of making rights claims in traditions as well

as understand how these traditions have been transformed by the right to claim rights. In this sense, new sociologies of citizenship beyond the Western contexts that incorporate struggles for recognition, recognize group-differentiated identities, and develop new sensibilities toward otherness are complementary political and cultural developments (Isin and Turner 2002; Isin and Nyers 2014; Isin 2015; Isin 2017) .

With regards to the aforementioned literature, we can agree at one point that forms of citizenship are different from one place to another. What determines the composition of citizens, strangers, and outsiders and their respective rights and obligations in a given nation-state depends on its historical trajectory. Such developments have led to a sociologically informed definition of citizenship in which the emphasis is less on legal rules and more on norms, practices, meanings, and identities (Isin and Turner 2002, 3-4).

Consequently, citizenship in Indonesia should not be merely studied by comparing it to that of Western conceptions, instead, an understanding of the character of citizenship in the country should also depart from focusing on everyday state-citizen interactions and by studying how citizenship is understood and practiced, due to the nature of Indonesia as a more weakly institutionalized state and a predominantly clientelistic political system (Berenschot, Schulte Nordholt, and Bakker 2016). The similar state of affairs is also found in Latin America, postcommunist Eurasia, Africa, and other Asian countries in which many 'rules of the game' that structure political life are informal (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). The following section highlights the study of village in Indonesia and briefly sketches the setting.

Religious Agency

The major Islamic organizations in Indonesia such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, and the Islamic Unity (Persis), and also Islamic political parties, such as the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) have branches (special) abroad. In addition, there are also administrators, cadres, and sympathizers of Islamic organizations and other Islamic political parties who voice their affiliated ideologies and religious practices without officially representing them, but rather on their own behalf. Viewed from one side, this indicates that the world (Islam) is increasingly globalized, and Indonesians (Muslims) are participating in

it. From another perspective, we should make an important question: what are the motivations or goals of these groups?

Of course the answers can vary greatly, ranging from the factor of religiosity that may be the most important, to the political aspects which may also be very important, but are often covered for normative reasons. In this concise article, I will try to review it from the perspective of political sociology, namely by describing the possibility that one of the motivations or objectives for the establishment of such groups abroad is due to efforts to establish religious agencies for their interests.

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There are various definitions of the concept of agency, be it in sociology, philosophy, or psychology. From the standpoint of sociology, in general an agency is the ability of individuals/groups to act independently in a particular environment. The agency implies the capacity to understand and influence their environment, both actively and passively. In its scope, agencies are limited by structure, which are factors that influence and often determine or even limit the ability of

individuals/groups to act independently. Dominant structures often determine individual/group capabilities that include status, social class, ethnicity, religion, gender, citizenship and others.

According to Laura M. Leming (2007), religious agencies are sociological concepts that provide a lens to sharpen understanding of the ways in which individuals/groups claim and establish meaningful religious identities. Leming shows us how religious agencies are created in emotional, intellectual and behavioral strategies in which they are finally able to move individuals/groups to negotiate with other overlapping identities.

Jörg Rüpke (2015) explains that religion is understood as a strategy to connect agencies with agents (individuals/groups) that do not seem to make sense. There are three major parts of religious agencies, namely: (1) acting religiously with links to the past, present and future; (2) collective religious identity; and (3) religious communication. Against this condition, religion is explained as an unstable cultural resource that is articulated through individual agencies and allows changes in the attribution of individual agencies.

Meanwhile, Allen D. Hertzke (2017) does not distinguish between religious agencies and religious freedom. According to him, religious agency is the right to practice, interpret, criticize, or change one's beliefs. In general, religious agencies represent an active dimension of religious freedom enshrined in international law. Religious agencies demonstrate the capacity of individuals/groups to practice religious thoughts. This capacity helps explain the extraordinary impact of religious freedom on human resource development, governance, and inclusion.

For Indonesian diaspora groups abroad, the homeland basically shaped post-migration life significantly, and as such it remained a special reference point for their lives. In this era of increasingly sophisticated communication technology and transportation modes, many Indonesians abroad choose to maintain their relationships with people and institutions in the country for more regular real-time contact (Trupp and Dolezal 2013).

Indonesians who live abroad can choose from all information about the homeland available to them and selectively decide what is important and interesting to consume and what to ignore. They can

easily choose to recall past memories (or even trauma) by considering developments and changes and thus produce views produce views about distorted homeland (Missbach, 2011). Depending on whether the departure from the homeland is voluntary or not and whether living abroad is intended to be short-term, medium-term, long-term, or even permanent, people tend to make and re-create relationships with the homeland collectively and individually over time time in various ways, for example, through overseas workers' associations, student organizations, religious affiliation groups, or cultural societies (Missbach and Myrttinen 2014, 142).

Even though living abroad, Indonesians tend to dig up memories of their past, or may even dream of their return and a brighter future, where the latter is often not apparent among Chinese and Indian immigrants in the foreign countries they occupy. For Indonesians living abroad who project themselves into their homeland, they turn out to be a powerful vehicle for their long-distance political agenda, transnational solidarity/activism, fundraising, and even to shape Indonesia's reputation in their current country occupy. The image of the motherland is not at all homogeneous or static; instead they develop over time and in fact more often turn out to be somewhat fragmented, ambivalent, or even unrealistic when they see the Indonesian homeland differently (Missbach and Myrttinen 2014, 142).

In my opinion - before carrying out more in-depth research - the previous studies above about the Indonesian diaspora abroad showed that there was a strong tendency among Indonesians when establishing socio-cultural-economic-political associations that orientated interests towards the homeland appears stronger than the motivation to become an integral part of the new country they occupy. In the context of religious agencies to act independently in their new environment (both permanently and temporarily), Indonesian Islamic organizations abroad tend to project themselves more into the interests of their groups in the country. In other words, their capacity has not been optimally utilized to affect their new environment in a foreign country. The causes of these conditions vary. If we associate it with socio-political structures, especially with conditions in Europe, the United States, or other Western countries, and also with countries in the Middle East, we can see that social class, ethnicity, and citizenship play an important role in limiting

the ability of Indonesian Islamic organizations to direct socio-religious ideology, policies and practices, and to play their other roles in these foreign countries.

If we associate it with the conceptions formulated by Leming above, the religious agencies of Indonesian Islamic organizations abroad tend to be still weak in claiming and establishing meaningful religious identities there. The strategies created seem less able to move them to negotiate with other overlapping identities. This is in sharp contrast to, for example, Pakistani Muslims in Britain or Turkish Muslims in Germany who will firmly claim and establish their dual identities (as Muslims and as Pakistani/Turkish) to be actively involved in influencing religious life in countries new that they occupy and to be able to act independently in the foreign environment.

In relation to the propositions outlined by Rüpke above, the religious projections of Indonesian Islamic organizations abroad tend to be trapped in the first dimension of the religious agency described by them, namely that they carry out religious activities with links to the past, present , and a future for the motherland, which ultimately shows that their religious life in a foreign country is part of an unstable cultural resource that is articulated through weak individual/group agencies.

Hopes arise when major Indonesian Islamic organizations, such as the NU and Muhammadiyah, begin to actively engage in wider public religious life in the West and also other countries. Through, especially, students studying there who are cadres and sympathizers of the two organizations, both are able to provide important articulations not only for the orientation of their religious life in the country, but also provide a glimmer of hope in colouring religious life in the country they now occupy.

Muhammadiyah, for example, has established an Early Childhood Education (PAUD) program in Egypt, and plans to build the first Muhammadiyah schools abroad, namely in Melbourne, Australia, and universities in Malaysia and Thailand. They are also consultative members of ECOSOC, the UN socio-economic institution and are actively involved in the International Contact Group (ICG) for the peace process in the southern Philippines.

Meanwhile, since the last few years NU has been actively involved in promoting the conception and practice of Nusantara Islam

as a characteristic of moderate Indonesian Islam. Some of the things that were done to support the promotion were carried out by NU's Special Branch Management (PCI) in the Netherlands by, for example, holding a biennial academic conference on Islamic Nusantara values, the first in 2017 in Amsterdam and the second in 2019 in Nijmegen. In addition, its influence in Afghanistan was even stronger where there was a branch of NU standing with its administrators as local residents.

Indonesia has been a democratic latecomer. The global trend towards democracy that has been termed 'the third wave of democratization' (Huntington, 1991) has reched Indonesia relatively late, at the end of 1990s. this striking tide of political change began in Southern Europe in 1974, spread to the military regimes of South America in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and culminated in the democratizations in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. the third wave of democratization reached the shores of East and Southeast Asia by the mid to late 1980s. here, authoritarian regimes were replaced with democracies in the Philippines in 1986, in South Korea in 1987 and in Thailand in 1992. Indonesia, however, in the mid-1990s still seemed to be a safe place of authoritarian rule. Anders Uhlin in 1997 contended that 'the third wave has obviously failed to have any profound impact on Indonesia's democratic development' (Uhlin, 1997: 2). At that time the country has been in a 'pre-transition phase' (ibid.: ch. 7); that this was literally true became clear shortly afterwards when the Suharto regime suddenly began to crumble in the wake of the 1997 Asian crisi and gave way to a far more liberal political regime under Suharto's successor, B.J. Habibie. Only one and a half year after the collapse of the authoritarian regime, Indonesia had become an 'electoral democracy'. Yet, as Michael Malley has observed, democratization did not end at this point but was replaced by a 'protracted transition' in which authoritarian enclaves remained in place and competing elites struggled over the main state institutions and the direction of reform (Malley, 2000). Further initiatives have suffered serious setbacks because politicians could not agree on the course of reforms and extra-parliamentary opposition forces remained weak. It was not until 2002 that Indonesia witnessed a new round of political reforms providing for (3) the direct election of the president. All in all, progress in Indonesia's democratization has been somewhat slow and results have often been

ambiguous. On the one hand, the transition opened up unprecedented freedoms, giving the Indonesian population the opportunity to elect their own leaders and the liberty to organize themselves freely. The free and fair parliamentary elections in 1999 and 2004, the first direct election of the Indonesian president in 2004 and the direct elections of regional heads since 2005 are encouraging signs of this new openness. On the other hand, the spread of democracy has by no means eradicated all forms of political repression as the military still exercises a huge influence, the political elite often uses power for their own ends and, above all, corruption is endemic and often leads to frustration within the Indonesian populace (3-4) (Marco Bünte and Andreas Ufen, "The New Order and Its Legacy: Reflection on Democratization in Indonesia". 2009. In *Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia*, edited by Marco Bünte and Andreas Ufen. London and New York: Routledge: 3-29).

Chapter 6
Conclusion

We can see that the Nahdlatul Ulama (the NU) is a traditionalist Sunni Islam organization in Indonesia. It is by far the largest Islamic organization in the country, with approximately forty to fifty million followers (Nakamura 1983; Feillard 1999; Mujani and Liddle 2004, p. 111). It is in fact often said that the NU is probably the world's largest Islamic organization (Feillard 2013, p. 558; Van Bruinessen 2013, p. 21). The NU sees its function as being the guardian of sacred tradition by maintaining the four *madhhab* (schools of Islamic law) teachings, although it is the Shafi'i that has been predominantly embraced by Indonesian Muslims (Boland 1982, p. 11; Feillard 1999, p. 13).

Between 1950s and 1970s, the NU faced fierce religious-ideological competitions with the reformist/modernist Muhammadiyah. In post-New Order, the organization has competed with Islamist and other Middle Eastern-influenced Muslim associations, such as the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the Indonesian chapter of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HTI), the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), the Indonesian Council of Jihad Warriors (MMI), and the Indonesian Council of Islamic Propagation (DDII) in terms of Islamic movement, ideologies, *dakwah* (religious dissemination) activities, and other socio-political facets. The NU commonly represents the traditionalist cohort, while the other groups are associated with trans-national networks of Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi movement. The latter has made significant manoeuvres to broaden their scope and spread their influence among the constituency of the NU and other organizations, such as Muhammadiyah, and has challenged these larger organizations over their control of mosques, schools, and other institutions. While in post-authoritarian Indonesia the NU has openly expressed their support for

the unity of the Indonesian state, the HTI and the Salafi movement have rejected the very idea of the nation as a legitimate entity or have attempted to transform Indonesia to an Islamic state.

Meanwhile, Islam in the West, particularly in Europe, has been seen as a spectre haunting the continent. With rapid widespread and invigorating fear, suspicion, and hostility toward Islam, it is not surprising that these feelings have been turned upon Muslim populations across Europe (Goody 2004, pp. 1-2; Vertovec and Peach 1997, p. 4).

Today, one of the most widespread issues that has given rise to a heated debate in Europe relates to the continent's complex relationship with its large Muslim minorities largely comprising migrants from North Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Turkey and beyond (Sofos and Tsagarousianou 2013, p. 2). Now Islam poses the challenge of how to manage the European public sphere and life at the local, national, and regional levels while accommodating the political, social, cultural, and economic needs of all Europeans (Aykaç 2012, p. 2). Islam in Europe is in a state of flux, but so is religion in general in Europe, and it is useful to recognize how these two dimensions affect one another: understanding, in other words, how European policies impact upon Muslim communities, but also how activities and thoughts of Muslim individuals and groups influence changing conceptions and policy considerations on the place of religion in the European public sphere (Fokas 2007, p. 3).

Germany and the Netherlands are among the countries in Europe which have been facing complex encounters with Islam. In Germany, it was mainly Muslim immigrants who arrived during the 1960s under the so-called "guest worker" agreements who founded Islamic associations and practiced their religion in public. Their focus of activities ranges from the religious to the political sphere (Rosenow-Williams 2012, p. 1). In the Netherlands, the process of institutionalization of Islam reached a bold stage when mosques were established in about hundreds of Dutch towns in 1980s. On the national level, there were two processes progressing simultaneously: the concerted efforts to create a common platform for all Muslim organizations, and the establishment of rival federations of mosques and organizations, based on discrete ethnic communities (Landman 1997, p. 226).

Despite their negative labelling, these substantial minorities have important social and political implications for the respective societies, particularly as the communities are made up of recent immigrants who differ not only in their religion but in other cultural aspects (Goody 2004, p. 11). However, various forms of socio-economic, political, and physical exclusion and failure also abound. Such forms of exclusion have largely been responsible for producing conditions of serious expropriation rampant throughout the Muslim populations across Europe (Vertovec and Peach 1997, p. 5).

As many Muslim groups have increasingly organized themselves effectively to engage with local administrations, local populations, and other areas of the public domain, they have voiced their concerns by broadening their agendas to address an ever wider set of socio-political spheres. These include the freedom to exercise religious observances, the establishment of various Islamic organizations, and the gaining of political representation. These spheres are themselves conditioned by evolving contextual considerations including national political discourses (for instance 'pillarization' in the Netherlands and federalism in Germany) (Vertovec and Peach 1997, pp. 22-23).

Indonesian Muslims in Europe have also experienced such circumstances. As Indonesia's largest Islamic organization, the NU has expanded their scope and networks by establishing its special branches (Pengurus Cabang Istimewa NU – PCI NU) across the globe. In Germany, the special branch was established in 2011, while in the Netherlands it was established in 2013. Both special branches have been founded, organized, managed, led, and dominated by Indonesian students pursuing their M.A. and Ph.D. degrees, although recently many Indonesian migrants who have long resided in both countries also joined and influenced the organization. Meanwhile, the Indonesian Islamist associations, such as the PKS, the DDII, and the HTI also spread their influence in Europe through, mostly, students pursuing post-graduate degrees as well as other diaspora. Although in Europe they are less organized than the NU, through committed individuals, their activities and influence have continuously challenged the NU in terms of religious and political ideologies, Islamic observances, and other socio-political facets similar to the situation in the home country. Therefore, it is argued here that the NU through its special branches and the Islamist

associations through individuals, officially or non-officially represent the PKS, the HTI, the DDII, and other Islamist groups, have expanded their rivalries, tensions, as well as compromises overseas. It is the objective of this research project that seeks to investigate how Indonesian religious communities in Europe, particularly in Germany and the Netherlands, are extending their networks and seeking influence and at the same time competing and also compromising with each other.

Meanwhile in Indonesia, the majority of urban middle class Muslims who are suspected of being one of the strongest supporters of the spread of hoaxes in the 2019 Presidential Election, appear to be economically well-established. However, they actually have a problem in terms of identity. There is a feeling of insecurity because their lives are increasingly individualistic. In short, their socio-economic status has improved but there are parts of their lives that are also threatened.

These newly born Muslims are made religion the bond of living together. For them, religion offers a sense of security, not only in the world, but also in the hereafter. Religion can be a place to bind oneself in the community. Because what is needed is a common bond, religion is often interpreted as identity. Communal religious activities that offer themes of piety are seen as perfect refuge because they offer what was lost in their childhood: the true Islamic mission to become a "real" Muslim.

We see that the efforts of urban middle class Muslims in Indonesia to continue to build and also at the same time maintain their Islamic identity have produced conditions where Islam is now deeply embedded in the cultural, social, political and economic fields of their lives. This is in line with Azyumardi Azra's opinion in a broader context, "religion and beliefs are an important part of national culture and daily life in Indonesia" (Azra 2005, 1). At present, their socio-religious identity has been accumulated in the forces that present socio-political-cultural challenges for the state in managing national and local politics, including in the 2019 Presidential Election.

The efforts of the Indonesian state to consolidate the power of the state into all strata of society are generally based on the idea that communality in a larger community requires the creation of citizens who are socially politically homogeneous. However, in Indonesia after the New Order, the community did not only become passive recipients of

state policy. The process of creating such citizens simultaneously produces a special struggle for society in identity politics. In and through religious activities, these Muslim groups have played an important role in strengthening the politics of Muslim identity in Indonesia. In general, in Indonesia, Islam has played a major role in shaping the foundation in the relationship between religion and politics; between the state and society; and between conflict and accommodation (Pribadi, 2018).

Differences in Islamic expression in Indonesia today are unavoidable. However, these differences do not have to be interpreted as separators. Therefore, it is very natural that we must jointly carry out our duties as citizens to continue to manage diverse differences - not to unite them - religious views and believe that differences are our common strength.

In a broader context, we must manage these differences to produce productive products of democratization and decentralization, which are not only in the form of rowdy electoral political ripples. These products include the emergence of citizenship rights (citizenship), balanced representation in representation in the public sphere, and positive public participation in coloring the democratic process at the local and national level.

As Indonesia's largest Muslim organization, the roles of the NU in promoting moderate Islam in Europe is very significant, not only for the Indonesian people in Indonesia, but also for those living in Europe and for the local people. The NU can become a significant factor that contributes to the spread of Islam as a tolerant, peaceful, and multicultural religion.

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[1] "Public Islam", according to Salvatore and Eickelman, refers to "the highly diverse invocations of Islam as ideas and practices that religious scholars, self-ascribed religious authorities, secular intellectuals, students, workers, and many others make to civic debate and public life" (Salvatore and Eickelman, 2004, xii).

[2] In 1999 Indonesia became an electoral democracy—in the simple sense that people could participate in free and fair elections—and implemented decentralization. According to Dwight Y. King, electoral democracy is a minimalist definition that descends from Joseph Schumpeter, who defined democracy as a system "for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (King, 2003, p. 6 and 10). Indonesian democracy is progressing, but not nearly as well as the comparative data sometimes suggest. If democracy is really to become 'the only game in town', it must continue to become better—a more accountable, transparent, lawful, inclusive, fair, and responsive—democracy for ordinary Indonesians (Diamond, 2010, p. 47 and 49).

[3] According to the 2006 Freedom House report, for the first time since 1998, Indonesia's political rights rating improved from 3 to 2, its civil liberties rating from 4 to 3, and its status from Partly Free to Free, due to peaceful and mostly free elections for newly empowered regional leaders, an orderly transition to a newly elected president that further consolidated the democratic political process, and the emergence of a peace settlement between the government and the Free Aceh movement (https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2006/indonesia, accessed on 2 January 2017). However, in 2014, for the first time after 2006, its status declined from Free to Partly Free due to the adoption of a law that restricts the activities of non-governmental organizations, increases bureaucratic oversight of such groups, and requires them to support

the national ideology of Pancasila (https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/indonesia, accessed on 2 January 2017). The 'Partly Free' status has remained since. In terms of corruption, Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index classified Indonesia in 1995 as the most corrupt country (41 out of 41 countries surveyed) (http://www.transparency.org/files/content/tool/1995_CPI_EN.pdf). When decentralization came into effect in 2001, the country was still very close to the bottom (88 out of 91 countries surveyed) (http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2001/0/). Indonesia has, however, since recorded significant improvements (143 out of 179 countries surveyed in 2007 and 88 out of 167 countries surveyed in 2015) (http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2007/0/ and http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015).

[4] Rachel Rinaldo finds that PKS women's pious practices are part of the creation of a particular kind of middle class subjectivity. Based on an examination of two constitutive elements of this habitus, clothing and marriage, she reveals how these pious Islamic practices enact class and gender difference, and simultaneously produce "modern" selves. See Rachel Rinaldo, "Muslim Women, Middle Class Habitus, and Modernity in Indonesia", *Contemporary Islam* 2 (2008): 23-39.

[5] See for instance http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/06/21/why-avoid-political-polarization.html; http://time.com/2964702/indonesia-election-2014-joko-widodo-jokowi-prabowo-subianto/; and https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/17/the-key-to-understanding-indonesias-upcoming-elections-the-jokowi-effect/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.18c2697df044, accessed on 6 August 2018.

[6] For an account on the JIL, see Ahmad Ali Nurdin, "Islam and State: a Study of the Liberal Islamic Network in Indonesia, 1999-2004", *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies* 7, no. 2 (2005): 20-39.

[7] However, Ken Ward argues that although HTI retains some elements of the clandestine life it led when it was first set up, it has provoked surprisingly little hostility from the Indonesian political mainstream or security authorities. See Ken Ward, "Non-violent Extremists? Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia", *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 63, no. 2 (2009), pp. 149-164.

[8] Woodward *et. al.* and Hwang, however, both demonstrate that the PKS appears to have, in pursuit of electoral purposes, moderated its hardline positions in their strategy and ideology on the acceptability of local culture. The moderation process is complicated by divisions in the party between pragmatists who would target non-devout voters and purists who prioritise ideological authenticity. See Mark Woodward, "Getting Culture: a New Path for Indonesia's Islamist Justice and Prosperity Party, *Contemporary Islam* 7 (2013): 173-189 and Julie Chernov Hwang, "When Parties Swing: Islamist Parties and Institutional Moderation in Malaysia and Indonesia", *South East Asia Research* 18, Issue 4 (2010): 635-674.

[9] Along with *pesantren*, the Sarekat Islam (the SI) in the early twentieth century introduced Madurese to the modern world. The SI provided Madurese with a

new alternative in vertical relations between villagers and those who resided in town areas. A new alliance between urban intellectuals and rural religious leaders marked a new phase in the history of Indonesian politics (Kuntowijoyo, 1988, p. 109).

Between 1950s and 1970s, the NU faced fierce religious-ideological competitions with the reformist/modernist Muhammadiyah. In post-New Order, the organization has competed with Islamist and other Middle Eastern-influenced Muslim associations, such as the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the Indonesian chapter of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HTI), the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), the Indonesian Council of Jihad Warriors (MMI), and the Indonesian Council of Islamic Propagation (DDII) in terms of Islamic movement, ideologies, dakwah (religious dissemination) activities, and other socio-political facets. The NU commonly represents the traditionalist cohort, while the other groups are associated with trans-national networks of Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi movement. The latter has made significant manoeuvres to broaden their scope and spread their influence among the constituency of the NU and other organizations, such as Muhammadiyah, and has challenged these larger organizations over their control of mosques, schools, and other institutions. While in post-authoritarian Indonesia the NU has openly expressed their support for the unity of the Indonesian state, the HTI and the Salafi movement have rejected the very idea of the nation as a legitimate entity or have attempted to transform Indonesia to an Islamic state.

Meanwhile, Islam in the West, particularly in Europe, has been seen as a spectre haunting the continent. With rapid widespread and invigorating fear, suspicion, and hostility toward Islam, it is not surprising that these feelings have been turned upon Muslim populations across Europe.

Today, one of the most widespread issues that has given rise to a heated debate in Europe relates to the continent's complex relationship with its large Muslim minorities largely comprising migrants from North Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Turkey and beyond. Now Islam poses the challenge of how to manage the European public sphere and life at the local, national, and regional levels while accommodating the political, social, cultural, and economic needs of all Europeans. Islam in Europe is in a state of flux, but so is religion in general in Europe, and it is useful to recognize how these two dimensions affect one another: understanding, in other words, how European policies impact upon Muslim communities, but also how activities and thoughts of Muslim individuals and groups influence changing conceptions and policy considerations on the place of religion in the European public sphere.

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